Since @RadioFreeTom tagged me in a post on Cold War history, and he has been having spirited debates on his feed about managing escalatory risks with Russia over Ukraine (the no-fly-zone won't lead to nuclear escalation argument), I thought I'd develop a🧵on Cold War rules. 1/
And @RadioFreeTom, @20committee, @MinerPhD, @andrewfacini and others, feel free to jump on in. Starting premise: as restated by many senior U.S. officials, U.S.-Soviet confrontations could never rise to the level of open combat between U.S. and Soviet units. 2/
That, of course, did not mean "do nothing." The U.S. and Soviets would engage in proxy conflicts all over the world during the Cold War. But what happens if one side was directly engaged in hostilities? What were the "rules"? 3/
First step was covert provision of weapons. In the Afghan operation, step 1 was to find replacement weapons for the Afghans from their existing supplies, which meant WWI British Enfields, among others. We graduated to going to China, Yugoslavia, Egypt and Israel to either get 4/
existing stockpiles of Soviet weaponry or to buy weapons manufactured under Soviet license. This was to maintain the plausible fiction that the Afghans were taking weapons captured from the Soviets. In Latin America, Soviet-sponsored guerilla movements fighting against 5/
U.S. backed governments with American military advisors would receive shipments of U.S. equipment that had been captured in Vietnam. The next step was to escalate to provision of weapons that clearly could not be disguised as to their origins (e.g. Stingers to the mujihadeen).6/
But here too there were unwritten rules. The Soviets could not threaten escalation against the U.S. for Afghan weapons, but the U.S. could not threaten counter-escalation against Soviet efforts to sabotage the pipeline in Pakistan or to attack weapons shipments once they 7/
crossed into Afghanistan. The next step after that would be to embed advisors or support personnel. Covertly--as in pretending to be locals (feasible in some cases, harder in others). Or to try and carefully stress their non-combatant role. But this raised risks on both sides. 8/
When the U.S. directed air and naval gunfire into Lebanon in 1983, an ever-present concern would be if fire hit Syrian units that had embedded Soviet advisors--and what the Soviet reaction might be. 9/
The Korean war represented some of the most ambitious efforts to test the line of what might draw reactions. Decision of the Chinese to intervene (but with consequences falling on China, not the USSR, if that went wrong), use of KMT forces from Taiwan, undeclared and disguised10/
Soviet pilots flying North Korean aircraft. But that represented the outer limits of the rules set. It also imposed a set of what some commanders felt were artificialities. Why was Vladivostok (for the Soviets) or Japan (for the Americans) off limits to attack? Self-imposed 11/
limits. Tested in Vietnam and Nicaragua with the mining of harbors where Soviet ships could have been damaged, but otherwise these limits held. 12/
And, of course, the Cold War was fought in a pre-internet, pre-digital age, so managing the plausible deniability was a little easier. END
And to add @ColdWarTA to this as well.
Following up: this, via @SlawomirDebski ... intelligence sharing with Ukraine. Kremlin isn't going to like but this doesn't cross the Cold War "rules" ... 1a/
Also, per our NFZ discussion yesterday, NATO aircraft patrolling right at the borders. Also not grounds for any counter-escalation. 2a/
UPDATE: And now we have U.S.-NATO - Russia deconfliction line being set up.
3/4 UPDATE 1: NATO rules out NFZ over Ukraine--but will contain conflict from spreading to NATO states, per @jensstoltenberg ... and U.S. is limiting intelligence to Ukraine to avoid actual battlefield targeting (cont.)
Brief by Biden admin. to Congress shared sentiment that “It’s one thing to give somebody a rifle, and it’s another to tell him where to shoot it" & they are concerned about crossing a line that could give Russia a pretext to retaliate against the U.S. Per @KenDilanianNBC @NBCNews

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More from @FPRI_Orbis

Mar 4
Really appreciate the interactions today a @FletcherRussia / @FletcherSchool today! Some things to think about. 1/
Impact of long term depopulation of Ukraine and whether Ukrainian refugees provide European parties with acceptable solutions to labor shortages. 2/
Do sanctions on Russia prove no country is too big for Iran style sanctions, but also is China using this to learn and prepare? 3/
Read 4 tweets
Mar 3
As we watch internal developments in Russia and see pressure from sanctions growing, I’ve been getting questions as to whether we will see a change of leadership in Russia. A short thread drawing in lessons from Venezuela & Iraq. 1/
We often conflate personnel change with regime change and even state change, but these are three different things and depending on what our preferred outcome is elites and power brokers react quite differently. 2/
In the West, we experience personnel change all the time, but the regime—the rules, institutions, pathways into the elite, the parameters of winning and losing—remain constant and predictable. The mantra in politics or business is win some, lose some, but the stakes are not 3/
Read 22 tweets
Mar 3
Does China have a clear economic incentive to get the Russians out of Ukraine and get some sort of settlement? Building on this earlier thread and then examining a must-read @ForeignPolicy piece on the #geoeconomic dynamic. 1/
China's land transport corridor across Eurasia is imperiled, both by the war and by sanctions. @Andreebrin of the @RISAPOfficial notes, "Poland is home to train routes connecting China to Europe along the New Eurasian Land Bridge. 2/
This railway corridor that crosses all of Eurasia—running through Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus—has become an important branch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), dubbed the iron silk road." 3/ foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/01/bel…
Read 7 tweets
Mar 2
Briefly, also seeing a good deal of confusion. A No Fly Zone is a declared region and airspace over which specified types of aircraft cannot enter. But people are saying that a NFZ would allow strikes on Russian convoys. That means enforcing a No Drive Zone or No Movement area.
Longer points, now that I've finished teaching Cold War ... our modern discussion about NFZs begins in aftermath of 1991 Gulf War. Fear about Saddam Hussein's use of air power to crush Kurdish and Shi'a rebellions leading to massive refugee flows gives UN basis to generate 1/
resolution that Hussein's use of air power presents threat to peace and security of the region. In south, Hussein regains control with land power. In north, where Kurdish peshmerga fighters can hold some territory, NFZ allows for de facto autonomous area--although NFZ cannot 2/
Read 15 tweets
Mar 2
Reporting that the Biden administration is preparing measures that would stop the import of Russian oil to the United States is a stunning turn around. Only a few short months ago, the Biden administration was pleading with Russia, Saudi Arabia, and others to increase production.
The political team around the president was insisting that high prices at the gas pump was political toxin. Russia last year surged to become the second source of imported oil for the United States.
Either the president believes that the American people are prepared to pay a higher price in order to punish Russia for its invasion of Ukraine, or he is prepared to pay the domestic political consequences.
Read 4 tweets
Mar 2
This is the map of how countries voted in the UN to condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine. @aallermann spells out the coding: blue voting in favor, red voting against, not voting or abstaining (in other words, not to actively condemn Russia). A geopolitical lesson. Another 🧵1/
In 2019, I penned a paper for @IERES_GWU discussing Russian grand strategy in the Middle East. A concept I've been trying to flesh out is how one part of Russia's approach is keep other major powers "invested in the maintenance of Russia as a great power capable of exercising 2/
influence and projecting power." In other words, channeling Bill Gates, we have to find a way to make them need us. 3/ centralasiaprogram.org/wp-content/upl…
Read 14 tweets

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