This is the map of how countries voted in the UN to condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine. @aallermann spells out the coding: blue voting in favor, red voting against, not voting or abstaining (in other words, not to actively condemn Russia). A geopolitical lesson. Another 🧵1/
https://twitter.com/aallermann/status/1499079760902766603
In 2019, I penned a paper for @IERES_GWU discussing Russian grand strategy in the Middle East. A concept I've been trying to flesh out is how one part of Russia's approach is keep other major powers "invested in the maintenance of Russia as a great power capable of exercising 2/
influence and projecting power." In other words, channeling Bill Gates, we have to find a way to make them need us. 3/ centralasiaprogram.org/wp-content/upl…
You need Russia as a balancer, an alternative, a hedge, to exercise predominance over a particular patch of ground or maritime zone ...but no matter what, somehow your security or interests are negatively affected if Russia disappears as a major power. 4/
For Ukraine, increasingly all of Europe, the United States--Russia is a problem. If Russia were to be knocked out of the ranks of the great powers, this wouldn't pose a problem (or increasingly would be welcomed). As we can see, this view not universally shared. 5/
This vote cannot be explained, as with the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states, as the result of a few states that are dependent on Russia (e.g. Venezuela). We have some important players here, great powers in their own right. 6/
China would be happy with a diminished Russia, but not a defeated one. A Russia that is more dependent on China, more prepared to act as a junior partner than co-equal, but China needs Russia. It needs a Russia that can protect its supply lines for energy/raw materials from 7/
U.S. interdiction efforts, and it needs a Russia still strong enough to prevent the U.S. from fully focusing on the Indo-Pacific. It also doesn't believe that a deal with the West to have spheres of influence in a weakened Russia would work. 8/
India relies on Russia as a partner and supplier. Russia still willing to license key technologies that the U.S. wants to keep in American hands. New Delhi still not convinced the U.S. isn't a fairweather friend, given past U.S. tilts towards Pakistan and possible willingness 9/
to cut a deal with China. Other Eurasian powers don't want China to end up the last person standing in the region, and a situation where China and Russia must negotiate over the status of the region gives powers from Pakistan to Iran to ability to have more influence in 10/
setting the agenda. Also, let's face it, for some of the red states on that map, having Russia take the lead in being more confrontational with the West is in their interests. 11/
Saudi Arabia and Israel both voted in favor (blue), but Saudi Arabia is not going to break the OPEC Plus partnership with Russia, and as of writing today Israel not joining in some of the sanctions on Russia. 12/
Significant portions of northern and sub-Saharan Africa not yet willing to foreclose their relationships and partnerships with Russia. Again, hedging on what they see as inconsistent attention from the U.S., lack of trust in Europe, but also unease if China is the only game 13/
in town. Finally, calling attention to 2 "red" states: Azerbaijan and Algeria. Replacing Russian gas to Europe rests on these two states, but they also have partnerships with Russia. Suggests both will find ways to try and balance. END
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