Briefly, also seeing a good deal of confusion. A No Fly Zone is a declared region and airspace over which specified types of aircraft cannot enter. But people are saying that a NFZ would allow strikes on Russian convoys. That means enforcing a No Drive Zone or No Movement area.
Longer points, now that I've finished teaching Cold War ... our modern discussion about NFZs begins in aftermath of 1991 Gulf War. Fear about Saddam Hussein's use of air power to crush Kurdish and Shi'a rebellions leading to massive refugee flows gives UN basis to generate 1/
resolution that Hussein's use of air power presents threat to peace and security of the region. In south, Hussein regains control with land power. In north, where Kurdish peshmerga fighters can hold some territory, NFZ allows for de facto autonomous area--although NFZ cannot 2/
prevent subversion of some of the Kurdish politicians and partial return of Iraqi forces. Iraqi NFZs prevent Iraqi military aircraft from operating in the two zones, and for U.S./allied aircraft to deliver proportional responses to any attacks (e.g. if an Iraqi AA site fires, 3/
fire can be returned to that exact site. (Operation Desert Fox in 1998 was a separate set of military attacks, for reported violations of the cease-fire agreement having to do with weapons inspections, and was not part of the NFZ arrangement.) 4/
NFZs in Iraq did not prevent or preclude Iraq from deploying land forces in the south or north, and did nothing to support any efforts to remove Hussein. And SecGen Ghali later said the resolution on which they were based, 688, which authorized necessary means for delivery of 5/
of aid and an end to repressive measures, did not allow for perpetual patrolling of the skies. NFZs were developed as a tool to enforce 688. 6/
Some of the confusion about what NFZs are comes from the expansion of the Libya mission in 2011. UNSC 1973 envisioned a NFZ as a way to protect civilian enclaves and to permit attacks to protect civilians. Very well aware, as with the whole contested debate over what was 7/
promised regarding NATO enlargement after unification of Germany, that people remember what they want to remember, but Indians and Russians (both countries abstained) thought they were voting for NFZs as understood in 1991--protecting enclaves. Libya NFZ become basis for more 8/
direct action against Gadhafi government. This is why some see NFZ in Ukraine as then equaling attacks on Russian forces in Ukraine. Also, the way Libya went changed Russian perspective of NFZ. This also has implications for things like humanitarian flights. Kremlin will see 9/
this as disguised way to intervene. Could NATO use similar language as in UNSC 688 or on basis of Article 4 to set up a deconfliction zone on Ukraine's western borders, where, to prevent incidents, all outside aircraft would be banned? Possibly, and that might create 10/
de facto safe havens. Russians might be open to it to avoid a repeat of 2015 incident when jet crossed into Turkish airspace for a few seconds from Syria and was shot down. But any major action to close Ukrainian airspace to Russian forces, or to use airpower to strike 11/
Russian forces on the ground, runs the risk of escalation. Essentially, a country would have to accept becoming a co-belligerent with Ukraine. President Duda of Poland summed up where we are: “We are not sending any jets to Ukraine because that would open military inference 12/
in the Ukrainian conflict. We are not joining that conflict. NATO is not party to that conflict. ... We are supporting Ukrainians with humanitarian aid. However, we are not going to send any jets to Ukrainian airspace." @AndrzejDuda can't be accused of ignoring Ukraine or 13/
UPDATE: it's official: NATO SecGen @jensstoltenberg on no NFZ for Ukraine: "We are not part of this conflict, and we have a responsibility to ensure it does not escalate and spread beyond Ukraine."
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As we watch internal developments in Russia and see pressure from sanctions growing, I’ve been getting questions as to whether we will see a change of leadership in Russia. A short thread drawing in lessons from Venezuela & Iraq. 1/
We often conflate personnel change with regime change and even state change, but these are three different things and depending on what our preferred outcome is elites and power brokers react quite differently. 2/
In the West, we experience personnel change all the time, but the regime—the rules, institutions, pathways into the elite, the parameters of winning and losing—remain constant and predictable. The mantra in politics or business is win some, lose some, but the stakes are not 3/
Does China have a clear economic incentive to get the Russians out of Ukraine and get some sort of settlement? Building on this earlier thread and then examining a must-read @ForeignPolicy piece on the #geoeconomic dynamic. 1/
China's land transport corridor across Eurasia is imperiled, both by the war and by sanctions. @Andreebrin of the @RISAPOfficial notes, "Poland is home to train routes connecting China to Europe along the New Eurasian Land Bridge. 2/
This railway corridor that crosses all of Eurasia—running through Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus—has become an important branch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), dubbed the iron silk road." 3/ foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/01/bel…
Reporting that the Biden administration is preparing measures that would stop the import of Russian oil to the United States is a stunning turn around. Only a few short months ago, the Biden administration was pleading with Russia, Saudi Arabia, and others to increase production.
The political team around the president was insisting that high prices at the gas pump was political toxin. Russia last year surged to become the second source of imported oil for the United States.
Either the president believes that the American people are prepared to pay a higher price in order to punish Russia for its invasion of Ukraine, or he is prepared to pay the domestic political consequences.
This is the map of how countries voted in the UN to condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine. @aallermann spells out the coding: blue voting in favor, red voting against, not voting or abstaining (in other words, not to actively condemn Russia). A geopolitical lesson. Another 🧵1/
In 2019, I penned a paper for @IERES_GWU discussing Russian grand strategy in the Middle East. A concept I've been trying to flesh out is how one part of Russia's approach is keep other major powers "invested in the maintenance of Russia as a great power capable of exercising 2/
influence and projecting power." In other words, channeling Bill Gates, we have to find a way to make them need us. 3/ centralasiaprogram.org/wp-content/upl…
Since @RadioFreeTom tagged me in a post on Cold War history, and he has been having spirited debates on his feed about managing escalatory risks with Russia over Ukraine (the no-fly-zone won't lead to nuclear escalation argument), I thought I'd develop a🧵on Cold War rules. 1/
And @RadioFreeTom, @20committee, @MinerPhD, @andrewfacini and others, feel free to jump on in. Starting premise: as restated by many senior U.S. officials, U.S.-Soviet confrontations could never rise to the level of open combat between U.S. and Soviet units. 2/
That, of course, did not mean "do nothing." The U.S. and Soviets would engage in proxy conflicts all over the world during the Cold War. But what happens if one side was directly engaged in hostilities? What were the "rules"? 3/