A study did a meta-analysis of 40 studies on campaign effects on candidate preferences in the US and conclude that "the best estimate of the effects...is zero": doi.org/10.1017/S00030…
(3/16)
Of course, US campaigns are not *real* propaganda.
So, let us look at Hitler.
There are quite a few studies on the effects of Nazi propaganda:
The conclusion? Hitler's propaganda didn't have much effect on Nazi support. It likely increased support among the anti-semitic, but backfired among others.
What may have had effects were concrete problem-solving (roads) & indoctrination in schools, not radio propaganda.
(5/16)
Turning to Russian propaganda, we already know someting.
For example, most interactions with Russian disinfo during the Crimea invasion were countering it (nature.com/articles/s4159…) 👇 & Russian bots generally fail to reach new audiences: ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc…
(6/16)
But why is propaganda not effective?
Because our psychology prioritizes prior beliefs. This makes us resistant to new information. We ignore inconvenient facts. But we also ignore misinformation.
Because Russian disinfo doesn't fit Western world views, it likely fails.
(7/16)
That doesn't mean that propaganda doesn't have effects on the already devoted ingroup. As argued in my own research, propaganda helps the already devoted coordinate their response against the enemy: doi.org/10.1016/j.cops… 👇
But that is an effect on *them*, not on *us*
(8/16)
Let us say we agree that we aren't harmed by Russian propaganda. Does that mean that we shouldn't ban it?
It does.
(A) It is antithetical to the values of an open society. This was recognized during WW2, where Nazi propaganda was *not* banned: theconversation.com/lord-haw-haw-p… 👇
(9/16)
(B) Having opportunities to explore Russian propaganda may help citizens understand what we are finding *against*.
My bet is that the claim that Putin seeks to "denazify" a country run by a president with Jewish background is a motivating factor rather than the opposite (10/16)
(C) If people want propaganda, they'll find it. For a tour of some of this, see this thread:
It can be difficult for fact-checkers to keep up with the de-bunking.
(B) Invest also in *pre-bunking*, i.e., empower people to be their own fact-checkers. People can learn to spot "fake news" with little instruction: doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1… (13/16)
(C) Rather than turning the power to platforms, turn the power to individual users.
People should be allowed to avoid propaganda during war. Platforms should enable users to purge their feed of problematic propaganda sites with a click in "Settings".
(14/16)
(D) The notion of an open society rests on the idea that the best antidote to conspiracy and falsehood is transparency. We have investigated this is the context of vaccine conspiracy: pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pn…. Transparency increases trust & decreases conspiracy beliefs. (15/16)
All in all, democratic principles & scientific evidence are aligned against banning information.
Disinformation is not so much a threat to democracy. It is the other way around: Democracy - the open flow of information - is the best weapon against disinformation. (16/16)
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Essentially, conspiracy theorists are engaging in moral grandstanding when it comes to rationality. Moral grandstanding has been linked to status motivations (journals.plos.org/plosone/articl…), which again predict the sharing of false, hostile rumors (psyarxiv.com/6m4ts/). (3/10)
Hvad betyder konflikten med Rusland for danskernes vurdering af hvem, der er en dygtig politiker?
I 2015 undersøgte vi lige præcist dét spørgsmål.
Vores forskning viser, at borgerne efterspørge nye, dominerende sider af politikerne - men kun så længe striden står på.
🧵(1/11)
Mød Christian Mortensen. En fiktiv folketingspolitiker, som 1524 repræsentative danskere blev præsenteret for.
Deltagerne mødte CM i én af to udgaver. For hver deltager var det tilfældigt, hvilken udgave, som de mødte. Èn var venlig. Èn anden knap så venlig. (2/11)
Her er det, som vi kalder den ikke-dominerende personlighed. Denne CM er en samarbejdende type, som sætter pris på andre.
Hvor mange har de seneste dage stillet sig selv spørgsmålet: Ville jeg gribe til våben?
I 2016 stillede vi faktisk 1012 danskere det spørgsmål bl.a. i lyset af, at "Rusland opfører sig mere og mere aggressivt".
Her er hvad de svarede. 👇
🧵 (1/6)
Efter introen, der beskrev en mere ustabil verden med bl.a. et mere aggressivt Rusland, blev det repræsentative udsnit af danskere præsenteret for en række scenarier, herunder dette 👇 (2/6)
Derefter spurgte vi, om deltagerne forestillede sig, at de ville protestere mod regimet, hjælpe modstandsfolk, deltage i modstandskampen og bruge vold.
31 % forestiller sig, at de "ville bruge fysisk vold for at fremme modstandsbevægelsens mål". (3/6)
I advised the Danish government on behavioral science during the pandemic.
In APS Observer, I wrote my advice on how to give advice when your discipline is (A) obviously important but (B) face discussions about replication: psychologicalscience.org/observer/scien…
I outline 3 lessons.
🧵(1/4)
1. Focus on decision-makers’ mental models.
Don't push single studies. Focus on broader models of behavior & help decision-makers *think* in the right way (e.g., "prioritize trust-building"). This facilitates better decisions even when you aren't there.
(2/4)
2. Focus on blind spots.
In a pandemic, there are many health advisors but few behavioral advisors.
You are your field's representative & should raise the problems & trade-offs that outsiders don't see (e.g., the perils of polarization & perceived control loss)
The rage & fear you feel after the Russian invasion are ancient parts of your mind preparing - like clockwork - for a world of conflict.
After 10 years of research in the lab & field, it is surreal to feel it unfold in my own mind
A 🧵 on what happens & with what effects (1/16)
I lived during the Cold War but never felt its threat. Many Westerns have never experienced anything remotely like war.
But you are more than your experiences. Your mind was designed by natural selection and the genes you carry are adapted to a different world. (2/16)
That world included violent, group-based conflict. Scholars disagree on the details of the prehistory of war. But group conflict is universal, ancient & significant enough that it may have shaped our basic psychology (doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a…) (3/16)
Individuals who fight in armed conflict tend to be anti-democratic.
With one exception: Violent resistance in defence of democracy.
🧵 on our research on the psychology of violence & why the ultimate defense of democracy requires understanding anti-democratic impulses. (1/14)
Democracy is the principled recognition of equality in power. Autocracy is the opposite.
Psychologically, an orientation to autocracy draws its strength from so-called dominance motivations (doi.org/10.1177/095679…). (2/14)
All humans seek status. But paths differ (doi.org/10.1037/a00303…). *Prestige* is status in exchange for problem-solving. *Dominance* is the desire to acquire status from fear via intimidation & aggression.
In the game of status, dominance is the strategy of the predator. (3/14)