Individuals who fight in armed conflict tend to be anti-democratic.
With one exception: Violent resistance in defence of democracy.
🧵 on our research on the psychology of violence & why the ultimate defense of democracy requires understanding anti-democratic impulses. (1/14)
Democracy is the principled recognition of equality in power. Autocracy is the opposite.
Psychologically, an orientation to autocracy draws its strength from so-called dominance motivations (doi.org/10.1177/095679…). (2/14)
All humans seek status. But paths differ (doi.org/10.1037/a00303…). *Prestige* is status in exchange for problem-solving. *Dominance* is the desire to acquire status from fear via intimidation & aggression.
In the game of status, dominance is the strategy of the predator. (3/14)
Preferences for autocracy are dominance motivations at the national level.
On 3 continents (Africa, Europe & US), we found that autocratic people are more likely & more willing to use political violence & the link is a desire for dominance (doi.org/10.1177/095679…) (4/14)
In a large experiment in 🇩🇰 (a country with a history of resistance vs the Nazis), we found that democrats & autocrats were *equally* likely to report a willingness to violently resist in the defence of democracy (doi.org/10.1177/095679…) (5/14)
This reveals that there is a possibility of large-scale popular mobilization in defense of democracy because this aligns the goals of those motivated by dominance & those motivated by democracy. (By implication, always expect resistances to include a share of extremists). (6/14)
But it also reveals how antithetical the use of violence is to democrats, focusing on prestige rather than dominance as a conflict-resolution device. Thus, the surprising thing is that democrats are *no more* willing to fight for democracy than autocrats! (7/14)
Dominance motivations are not just found among the people. They are very much found among leaders too (doi.org/10.1016/j.cops…). Putin fulfils all characteristics. If true, it is key we understand that we are up against a person motivated by predatory rationality. (8/14)
This involves understanding how dominance contests differ from the regular games of prestige that democratic individuals are used to. And how success in dominance contests involves accepting & acting on impulses that are completely alien to prestige-oriented individuals. (9/14)
Is this possible? Our research suggest that it is and, in fact, that in the face of conflict, dominance motivations may naturally be activated. We have two studies that is tragically on point for the situation facing Ukraine & Europe. (10/14)
We conducted a study in Ukraine in 2014 when Russia invaded Crimea (onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.11…). Among those in the regions most exposed to the war, feelings of anger elicited dominance motivations in the form of preferences for dominant leaders. (11/14)
We have also conducted studies in Denmark, priming people with threats of Russian aggression (onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.11…). This prime elicited preferences for dominance in leaders. (12/14)
What does this all mean?
It means that to prevail we need to understand the predatory logic of dominance contests.
It means that this will feel difficult, alien & uncomfortable to most of us.
It also means that we may come to do so more easily as threat increases. (13/14)
A final note: I hope you will forgive me for offering nothing but psychological analysis while people in Ukraine are fighting & fleeing for their lives. As a researcher, this is my attempt to cope.
The rage & fear you feel after the Russian invasion are ancient parts of your mind preparing - like clockwork - for a world of conflict.
After 10 years of research in the lab & field, it is surreal to feel it unfold in my own mind
A 🧵 on what happens & with what effects (1/16)
I lived during the Cold War but never felt its threat. Many Westerns have never experienced anything remotely like war.
But you are more than your experiences. Your mind was designed by natural selection and the genes you carry are adapted to a different world. (2/16)
That world included violent, group-based conflict. Scholars disagree on the details of the prehistory of war. But group conflict is universal, ancient & significant enough that it may have shaped our basic psychology (doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a…) (3/16)
Et markant nybrud er, at den demokratiske samtale flytter fra forsamlingshuset til sociale medier.
Vi mangler viden & data. Derfor præges debatten ofte af myter fx om ekkokamre.
Men vi skal ud af ekkokamret om, ja, ekkokamre.
🧵 om de store spørgmål & forskningens svar. (1/15)
Når man skal forstå et fænomen på sociale medier, fx ekkokamre, misinformation eller had, bør man altid stille 3 spørgsmål:
1) Hvor udbredt er X? 2) Hvad er årsagerne til X? 3) Hvad er effekterne af X?
Hvad siger forskningen om de 3 spørgsmål ift. ekkokamre? (2/15)
Et første skridt er at erkende, at forskningen om sociale medier er i sin vorden. Mange antagelser har vist sig forkerte. Og et enkelt studie giver sjældent sandheden.
Man må basere sig på opdaterede reviews fra internationalt førende forskere. (3/15)
Political cleavages have previously been found to elicit prejudice (doi.org/10.1111/ajps.1…), e.g., exclusion from family relationships. Here we ask if there is prejudice between groups defined by COVID-19 vaccination status? (2/16)
Media, governments & influencers are often accused of "fear-mongering". Such strategy would clash with insights on risk-communication: doi.org/10.1111/bjhp.1…. Effective communication is clear about the threat *&* how to deal with the threat. Actionable advice builds hope. (2/8)
During the pandemic, we examined the relative efficacy of threat- & hope-oriented communication. The context was the race between the Alpha variant & implementation of vaccines. The need was to "buy time" via stronger interventions until vaccines took effect. (3/8)
PSA to anyone interested in informing public discourse about the severity of the epidemic situation in Denmark (and maybe elsewhere):
Show extreme care when sharing screenshots of cases & admissions from @OurWorldInData or similar
Let me explain in 3 plots. (1/6)
Omicron generates very high case counts but lower severity, disrupting the indicators & patterns we have all been tracking for 2 years.
The plots I'll now show are all from Danish Center for Disease Control's (@SSI_dk) weekly monitoring report: ssi.dk/-/media/cdn/fi…. (2/6)
#1
With a lot of infections many will be admitted with but not because of covid. The plot below shows the development. Red is "because of". Right now only 55 % of admissions with a positive test are because of covid. (3/6)