I get the signaling value of more defense $. But w/ (1) Russia possibly facing an extended COIN war, (2) having suffered significant losses, (3) showing much less capacity for large scale warfare than we assumed, and (4) EU bolstering its own budgets ... breakingdefense.com/2022/03/no-dou…
2/ ... it's hard to see the argument that the Russian threat to Europe is operationally *greater* than before in a way that demands a bigger budget. If anything, now and for several years, the objective Russian operational threat is likely to decline
3/ The Russian military on display seems less capable of rushing through the Baltics, or Poland, than we thought. @KofmanMichael and others have rightly warned about tilting too far in the other direction. But this isn't an urgent crisis of mil. power warontherocks.com/2021/11/feedin…
4/ Some will say, Putin isn't rational, he'll go on a surge of aggression unrestrained by such concerns. That is definitely a risk. And if it is, a 10+% increase in US defense spending is entirely pointless, because its effect will get swept aside by his wishful thinking
5/ US also has plenty of heavy forces that can be sent to Europe to bolster deterrence w/o increase in budget. Problem for US = CONUS forces likely ain't getting to any distant fight in time. So move a few forward into non-provocative NATO locations warontherocks.com/2020/04/toward…
6/ A different approach: This crime has reawakened security concerns in NATO nations more than anything since 1989. US policy should be to support NATO as its member states step up. Greater burden sharing from EU spending matched by greater US posture, cooperation, integration
7/ Change US export control + ITAR laws/regs to allow much deeper co-development and co-production partnerships w/NATO allies. Get serious about interoperability + combined operational capacity. All that = likely to result in bigger operational effect than $
8/ You end up w/an alliance w/more burden sharing, more effective + efficient, still benefiting from the value of US leadership and of course US offering a decisive military backstop. Pouring $30-40B more a year into defense w/o those reforms would be unnecessary and inefficient
9/ This crisis = once in a lifetime chance to overcome some of the political + other barriers to reforms that have been stuck in blue-ribbon commission purgatory for 30 years. Much rather see a burst of reform aimed at tighter NATO integration than throwing money at the problem
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The argument for increasing clamp-down on energy, given the callous nature of Russian operations, is persuasive. But I'm increasingly worried about a historical parallel which, while imperfect/many differences, offers tremendous reason for worry: Japan 1941 [THREAD]
2/ Spent the last 2 days (re)reading two superb accounts of the road to war in 1940-1941. One = Eri Hotta's "Japan 1941," which has to be one of the best accounts of a nation's decision for war ever written. Worrisome parallels to Russia today, including: penguinrandomhouse.com/books/203635/j…
3/ --Country infuriated by sense of being discriminated against by a US-led int'l order
--Rise of anti-Western hyper-nationalism, including some sr officials
--Aggression (v. China) undertaken w/wishful thinking + vague sense of goals which triggers condemnation + sanctions
The shaming of Mearsheimer as a Russian stooge is wrong + dangerous. But this interview does illustrate another point: His theory, and especially its application to specific cases, is totally incoherent when it gets beyond the most generic truisms THREAD newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/w…
2/ For one thing, the dialogue w/@IChotiner shows how Mearsh's perspective simply can't incorporate normative issues. Chotiner keeps trying to distinguish great power machinations from legitimate Ukrainian aspirations; Mearsheimer can only see it via great power interests lens
3/ More broadly, a consistent problem w/offensive realism is its refusal to accept the role of norms and institutions, despite ample evidence of their real-world effect. Mearsh. can't explain the global normative reaction to this invasion belfercenter.org/publication/in…
100% right. This is an understandable emotion but not a considered policy position. Publicly taking that stance = zero incentive for compromise from Putin or anyone close to him, creating the most dangerous possible situation
Remember what McNamara learned from Castro about the Cuban missile crisis in 1992: In the event of a US invasion, Castro was prepared to endorse the use of nuclear weapons even though he knew the Cuban people would "disappear" armscontrol.org/act/2002-11/fe…
Embracing regime change would also shift the narrative in wholly self-destructive ways. Potential to fragment global consensus vs Russia. W/in Russia, it would endorse Putin's lie that this is all a necessary response to Western aggression + potentially boost his support
I so respect and agree w/most of what @KoriSchake writes, but am surprised by the implicit message of this new piece--specifically that a major part of "the Biden problem" is that the president isn't willing to threaten military force to defend Ukraine nytimes.com/2022/02/11/opi…
2/ *No one* wants Russia to invade or considers the threat to Ukraine a minor issue. It would be a human catastrophe and a major assault on shared norms. But the security of Ukraine is simply not a vital US interest; there's no way to escape that brutal fact
3/ Kori writes, "Biden is sending the message that the US is afraid of confronting Russia militarily," and even if we don't plan to attack, "it’s a big bargaining advantage for Russia if ... we’re ultimately reassuring it that it doesn’t need to worry about us"
This may be true. But increasingly US policy toward Russia and Iran, *at least publicly* seems to be, "we refuse to take your interests seriously and claim the right to pursue our favored norms as we wish. But we demand that you play by the rules of the road we have laid down"
An unqualified, normative interpretation of the rules-based order worked from 1990 to maybe 2007-8. Now we need engaged, order-seeking statecraft: Not retrenchment, not abandoning the idea of a rule-based order, but being willing to qualify + condition norms on the edges
The idea that allowing any exceptions will produce a cascade of violations + collapse of the norm doesn't match historical experience. Plus, the US has claimed for itself many exceptions we seek to deny others, ranging from controlling foreign forces in Cuba to invading Iraq
Theoretical / conceptual arguments about the role of US global engagement don't capture the real texture of this issue. Interviewed loads of US officials, FSOs, + military officers who confirm that these ties *do* convey significant influence ... defensepriorities.org/explainers/pha…
... in ways that aren't always apparent outside the negotiating room, or may take years to develop, but can be critical. Looking for unqualified influence judges US global role by the wrong criterion; this essay misses many aspects of these rich + complex relationships
For example: "Yet on issue after issue, the South Korean government has butted heads with Washington" is a far too simple + misleading summary of the US-ROK relationship, especially through ROK admins of striking different political stripes. Allies + partners have ...