Thread by @MMazarr

The argument for increasing clamp-down on energy, given the callous nature of Russian operations, is persuasive. But I'm increasingly worried about a historical parallel which, while imperfect/many differences, offers tremendous reason for worry: Japan 1941 [THREAD]

https://twitter.com/edwardfishman/status/1500496727526281220

2/ Spent the last 2 days (re)reading two superb accounts of the road to war in 1940-1941. One = Eri Hotta's "Japan 1941," which has to be one of the best accounts of a nation's decision for war ever written. Worrisome parallels to Russia today, including:
penguinrandomhouse.com/books/203635/j…

3/ --Country infuriated by sense of being discriminated against by a US-led int'l order
--Rise of anti-Western hyper-nationalism, including some sr officials
--Aggression (v. China) undertaken w/wishful thinking + vague sense of goals which triggers condemnation + sanctions

4/ --When sanctioned, reaction = self-pity + blaming West
--Tightening vise of nationalist groupthink in Tokyo; tougher for war opponents to speak up
--Recognition that escalating war = insane + likely to fail, but more willing to risk it than take humiliation of backing down

5/ Other book = Edward Miller's "Bankrupting the Enemy," an incredibly detailed account of sanctions regime in 1940-1941 esp financial piece. Demonstrates how desire to teach a lesson turned into something perceived as economic warfare to destroy Japan
usni.org/press/books/ba…

6/ Admitting huge differences--WW2 already underway then, whole world arrayed v Russia today, nuclear escalatory risk--still you cannot read these books w/o coming away terrified at the risks we are confronting. Reasons, among others:

7/ --When a nation w/extreme grievance + nationalist anger gets to the point of lashing out, it is already in a highly unstable mindset capable of fantastical degrees of wishful thinking
--Growing confrontation is likely to further entrench nationalism, rather than fracture it

8/ --Combination of freeze on all financial assets and transactions + energy embargo = hugely threatening and risks prompting extreme reactions
--The aggressor won't back down. Ideology won't allow it; domestic politics rule it out; ultra-hawks in military conspire to prevent it

9/ The potential for wishful thinking on the part of an aggressor in such a situation is huge. Convince themselves that escalation will create space for a diplomatic settlement on their terms. This was how Japanese leaders who knew better rationalized going to war w/the US

10/ Japan was responsible for the war. But the US plowed ahead w/demands w/o much sense of whether they would be accepted--and if not, what then. Path dependence + momentum, and a handful of aggressive mid-level officials, formed US policy more than careful analysis of outcomes

11/ Today we see many of the same patterns--statements that the sanctions won't = Russian withdrawal and so will just punish + weaken, but we have to go ahead anyway. OK, but Russia has a vote. Hints that pro-regime nationalism = growing. Very likely severe groupthink in Moscow

12/ Punishing Russia's criminal aggression = 100% justified. But one lesson of 1941 is that there is at least a serious risk that plowing ahead w/blinders on, *given the mindset the aggressor is likely already to have,* is more likely to produce escalation than backing down

13/ Simply forcing a devastating sanctions regime into place = hoping for the best isn't any better of a strategy today than in 1941. Putin has more constraints on escalation. But one lesson of 1941 is the potential for amazing levels of willful self-delusion by the aggressor

14/ The upshot is a requirement I readily admit I don't know how to fill: We need to be urgently pursuing diplomatic efforts that achieve part of our goals, and set the stage for Ukraine's full recovery, but somehow begin to relieve Russia of being in an existential choice frame

15/ Given Putin's goals, such space may not exist. But assuming possible outcomes are limited to (a) Putin backs down or (b) Russia slides into economic ruin is optimistic. There is also (c)--larger war. The 1941 case shows how an emotional, nationalistic aggressor can prefer (c)