We teach our students at @NavalWarCollege that major changes in world affairs can happen not only because of long-term evolutionary processes but sudden, discontinuous shocks. Over the past two weeks, we've seen that principle validated. Dramatic shifts in Germany & Japan on 1/
Russia. Up to February 2022, prevailing view in both Tokyo and Berlin was that despite Russian bad behavior, integration was the way forward. For Germany, policy was predicated on belief that long-term economic viability of Europe rested on interdependent integration 2/
with Russia's natural resource base and that European security rested on a cooperative relationship with Moscow to help manage the larger arc of instability surrounding Europe. Tokyo's view was that Japan needed to engage Russia to offset China and prevent closer 3/
Beijing-Moscow ties while also claiming its share of Russian resources. Successive governments in Tokyo and Berlin maintained a 2-track approach and never wanted to foreclose the engagement track. Now, both Germany and Japan seem willing to risk loss of access to 4/
Russia or even that the Kremlin moves closer to Beijing--because of the invasion of Ukraine. Also highlights how Putin's own maximalist approach damaged Russia. For years, Shinzo Abe was eager to cut a deal on the Kuril islands with Putin, offering major compromises. 5/
Putin never took those offers up, even though it might have permanently locked Japan into Russia's Far East and Siberia in a way that could not be easily disconnected. Successive efforts by Merkel and Scholz to try and find a compromise with Moscow over Ukraine and NATO 6/
likewise rejected. Seems to have been a view in the Kremlin that neither Germany or Japan would take the hit of rupturing economic ties with Russia--incorrect, as it turns out--and with the increasing chance that even the pre-February 2022 compromises may no longer be on offer.
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