Twelve days since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began. In the past 24 hours, we have seen indications of forthcoming Russian offensives around Kyiv and in the east. Preparations for a Ukrainian insurgency is the focus today. 1/25 (Image - @IAPonomarenko)
3/25 In her excellent piece on a Ukrainian insurgency, @EHarding_DC writes “imagine, if you will, a headline from January 2032. It reads, “Cease-fire signed between warring parties in Ukraine, ending 10 years of fighting over control of Kyiv.” politico.eu/article/ukrain…
4/25 While an insurgency may or may not last this long, it is almost certain that if Russia does eventually overwhelm the conventional forces of Ukraine, an insurgency will follow. We should expect that this will manifest in both rural and urban areas.
5/25 What might an insurgency look like, and what preparations should Ukraine & the west be making now to ensure its success? By success, I mean long term political success. As Dave Galula writes, “insurgency is the pursuit of policy by a party, inside a country, by every means.”
6/25 Ukrainian policy for an insurgency would be the retention of national sovereignty, the removal of all Russian (and other hostile combatant) troops, and the freedom to determine its own destiny.
7/25 Other Ukrainian objectives may include war reparations from Russia and membership of international organizations.
8/25 These are important. They will provide unifying purpose to the leadership, and members, of an insurgency. It will guide their actions as well as the #strategy of any Ukrainian government that moves from Kyiv. As we have seen in the past 12 days, purpose matters.
9/25 In building and sustaining an insurgency, there will be five key challenges: preserving national leadership; sustaining military (and insurgency) C2; logistic and personnel support to the insurgents; maintaining the info war; and, international support.
10/25 Preserve national leadership. An essential pre-requisite for a Ukrainian insurgency is preservation of national leadership, maybe outside Ukraine. A big decision by Zelensky is, does he fight and die in Kyiv, or does he escape to continue leading and inspiring his people?
11/25 This is a critical challenge for Zelensky. If he escapes, does he remain in Ukraine or lead from another country? Whether it is Zelensky or another leader, Ukraine will require a legitimate government that can guide the insurgency while sustaining international support.
12/25 Sustaining insurgency C2. Insurgencies are driven by political purpose. Coordination is required to keep insurgent forces on the pathway of this purpose. Therefore, a form of military C2 will be needed, but disaggregated so it can't be destroyed by capturing one node.
13/25 In many situations, the personal characteristics of insurgent leaders are different to conventional military leaders. Insurgents fight asymmetrically and have limited resources. They are always the ‘small dog in the fight’.
14/25 Conventional military leaders focus more on combined arms and larger scale activities. Are the Ukrainian military leaders who have led this conventional fight the right ones to lead insurgents?
15/25 It could be argued that the Ukrainians have already been thinking & fighting like insurgents. They have focussed their strength against Russian weaknesses, and made the Russians pay a high price for small gains.
16/25 Logistic & personnel support. Insurgencies rely on arms, ammunition, explosives, communications and food. A network to provide these is needed, with cut outs to prevent compromise of the full system if one node is captured. washingtonpost.com/national-secur…
17/25 Aid must go to the right groups. As this piece notes, there is a risk that “supporting an insurgency means supporting—indirectly—illiberal elements and antidemocratic forces in Ukrainian society for the purpose of defending Ukrainian independence.” mwi.usma.edu/a-ukrainian-in…
18/25 There must also be a system for personnel replacements. Personnel must be recruited from Ukraine and beyond. A training system, probably including foreign military training in Ukraine and beyond, will be required.
19/25 Continuing the info war. Ukrainian information operations (including military operational security) has been superb. This must continue as part of an insurgency. It is essential to its legitimacy in the eyes of Ukrainians and international community. news.clearancejobs.com/2022/03/03/inf…
20/25 Info war must sow fear into the hearts of every Russian soldier in Ukraine - they are safe nowhere. This fear must also pervade the political & military high command in Moscow, reinforce the inevitability of Russian strategic defeat & shape war termination conditions.
21/25 I have just read Steinbeck’s novel about a WW2 occupation, “The Moon Is Down’. He wrote “thus it came about that the conquerors grew afraid of the conquered and their nerves wore thin & they shot at shadows in the night.” The Russians must grow very afraid of Ukrainians.
22/25 Finally, international support is vital. Thus far, the Ukrainians have been masterful in assembling an international community to provide lethal and non-lethal aid as well as economic and moral support. These, and sanctions, will be just as vital to support an insurgency.
23/25 One of the most important elements of international support is patience. This is something democracies generally are not good at.
24/25 But, if the west is to support Ukraine’s ability to determine its own future – and resist authoritarian regimes elsewhere – governments need to nurture this strategic patience in their societies.
25/25 That ends update 12. It does not assume a Ukrainian military collapse, but does think through the options available in the event of one. A clever, connected & legitimate insurgency is possible if the foundational elements described here are present. (Image @UAWeapons)
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Two weeks since the Russian invasion of #Ukraine began. Today I will examine the discovery of ‘old truths’ about war, and how it has impacted on leadership in this particular conflict. 1/25
3/25 The Russian invasion has led to the kind war that many in western society had imagined they would not see in the 21st century. It has featured the large-scale use of what many call ‘conventional forces’, brutal combat, civilian deaths and the destruction of cities.
Thirteen days since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began. Today I examine reports that Russia has committed 100% of forces assembled before the invasion, including what it means for their campaign. War, among other things, is also about maths. 1/25 (Image - @ForeignPolicy)
Eleven days since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began. In the past 24 hours, we have seen limited Russian progress in the north and east, and another broken Russian ‘ceasefire’. Today - the war in the south, and why it matters. 1/25
3/25 The southern theatre of the war is a vital element of the overall Russian campaign design for Ukraine. The south contains Ukraine’s 13 seaports, which in 2021 exported over 150 million tons of cargo. This represents 60% of exports & 50% of imports for Ukraine.
Ten days since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began. In the past 24 hours, we have seen limited Russian progress in the north and east, increased use of Russian air power, & some progress in the south. The capture of Kyiv is the focus of this thread. 1/25 (Image @IAPonomarenko)
3/25 At some point, the Russians will have to capture the Ukrainian capital. It is clearly a main effort for the Russian military forces – and for Putin’s desired political end state for the war.
Nine days since the Russian conquest of Ukraine began. The potential encirclement of Kyiv is the focus of my 9th daily thread. 1/25 (Image via @Osinttechnical)
Eight days since the Russian invasion of #Ukraine began. In the past 24 hours, we have seen limited Russian progress in the north & east, a continuing traffic jam, & progress in the south. My 8th thread, focussed on initial lessons from this war. 1/25 (Image via @IAPonomarenko)
3/25 As the Russians apply greater mass and firepower to surround, and attempt to seize, several Ukrainian cities, and apply greater use of air power, it is worth reflecting on what we have learned from their invasion of Ukraine so far.