Share this page!

Bret Devereaux Profile picture
Twitter logo
Mar 8 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
It seems relevant to point out that the Russian strategy of fostering 'frozen conflicts' in Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan create a number of crisis points where, if Russian state backing suddenly evaporated, we could see hostilities reignite.
By contrast a lot of comments in the original thread are focusing on things that only happen in Risk games (China invading Siberia).

But imagine there are discussions right now in Chisinau, Tbilisi and Baku trying to figure out what Russian success OR failure means for them.
Though I wouldn't expect this to 'save' Ukraine or anything like it; I doubt anyone will jump until they're sure which way the wind blows. More likely that Russian failure in Ukraine, if dramatic enough, may trigger a series of 'Ukraine War Afterparties' as Russian power recedes.
Alternately, Russian success in Ukraine may do something of the same, encouraging separatists in Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan that, by ratcheting up the tensions, they too might improve their position by inviting Putin to show the power of his Great Russian State.

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
　

Keep Current with Bret Devereaux

Bret Devereaux Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @BretDevereaux

Bret Devereaux Profile picture
Mar 9
Seeing a lot of chatter about Ukraine needing to 'prepare for insurgency' but also that they can't do insurgency.

And I think this is a definition problem because depending on how your define insurgency, Ukraine is either 1) already doing it or 2) probably won't ever do it.

1/
If what you are expecting by 'insurgency' is something that looks like AQI in 2006 or the Taliben in 2011, that's unlikely to happen for the simple reason that the Ukrainian army still exists and as a result Ukraine has other options to resist with. 2/
As I've noted elsewhere, insurgency in this sense - operating in territory the enemy controls (rather than just moves through) using the population as covering terrain without the support of a conventional military - that sort of insurgency is a hard way to fight. 3/
Read 17 tweets
Bret Devereaux Profile picture
Mar 9
People need to prepare themselves for what the end of hostilities in Ukraine might look like, though it doesn't seem imminent.

Because peace agreements are rarely clear, clean things AND also because folks need to be prepared for NATO and Ukrainian interests to diverge. 1/
Ending a conflict like this one - especially in a shorter time-scale - is likely to involve messy compromises. A truly protracted war might have a clearer, cleaner ending, but involve much more death and destruction, as we've discussed: acoup.blog/2022/03/03/col…
2/
I think regime change in Kyiv is, at this point, an unlikely outcome; I don't think Russia has the juice for it. Instead, negotiations seem to revolve around the Donbas, Crimea, and Ukraine's joining the EU and NATO.

There are lots of possible combinations in that space. 3/
Read 13 tweets
Bret Devereaux Profile picture
Mar 7
You know it is the most trite thing, but the thing that keeps popping into my head watching the ramshackle Russian operations in Ukraine is that scene in Kingdom of Heaven where Saladin patiently explains to his subordinate how battles are won.
"...battles are determined by God, but also by preparation, numbers, absence of disease and availability of water. One cannot maintain a siege with the enemy behind."

That last line could be the caption to every photo of a burned out Russian truck.
Of course that line is a bit funny in context because at Acre in 1191 the crusaders absolutely did maintain a siege with *Saladin* behind counter-besieging, so, you know, no absolutes.

Still a bad sign when movie strategists appear to understand it better than a real world army.
Read 4 tweets
Bret Devereaux Profile picture
Mar 3
This week on the blog, we're talking about the theory of protracted war - a strategic framework for a militarily weaker power looking to outlast and eventually defeat a much stronger enemy (with a brief discussion of implications re: Ukraine): acoup.blog/2022/03/03/col…
Decided to post this one early because events are moving quickly and it seemed like an accessible primer on this sort of warfare could help people to understand what is happening in Ukraine and how the conflict may evolve.
Of course there are potential outcomes that don't involve a protracted conflict - a sudden outbreak of conscience in Moscow, or the collapse of the Russian Armed Forces. But I think these are, unfortunately, substantially less likely than a protracted war.
Read 4 tweets
Bret Devereaux Profile picture
Mar 2
John Mearsheimer's interview w/ Isaac Chotiner is...a lot.

It's so painfully evident that he has just resolutely decided not to reassess priors even as Putin's recent statements and actions and ::gestures at everything:: directly contradict his views.

newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/w…
You know, they say as you get older, you become less flexible in your thinking, but goodness - it comes across like he just didn't watch either of Putin's pre-invasion speeches or read the transcripts.
Instead he just keeps repeating that one quote from 2000 as if Putin said that yesterday and it was very probative; I mean, shoot, in 2002 Putin said Ukraine was a sovereign state and conversations about joining NATO would be "entirely appropriate."
Read 6 tweets
Bret Devereaux Profile picture
Mar 2
👀
It's not clear to me how accurate our information here would be, but goodness if even remotely true.

As longtime ACOUP readers know - if you don't get an army's logistics right, nothing else matters.
I don't have a primer on modern motorized logistics, but I have literally just got my copy of @BA_Friedman 's On Operations: Operational Art and Military Disciplines (2021) and as a first-entry primer, it has a lot to recommend.

I, of course, mostly look at pre-modern logistics.
One of the major differences is that almost all pre-industrial logistics is subsistence supplies (read: food, fodder and water), but as Friedman notes, modern armies that's only around 10% or so of transported logistics, with ammunition, fuel and spare parts making up the bulk.
Read 6 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!

This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us on Twitter!

Like this author's thread?

Get emails when @BretDevereaux has new unrolls!

Check out other threads from @BretDevereaux!

Read all threads by @BretDevereaux

:(