Seeing a lot of chatter about Ukraine needing to 'prepare for insurgency' but also that they can't do insurgency.
And I think this is a definition problem because depending on how your define insurgency, Ukraine is either 1) already doing it or 2) probably won't ever do it.
1/
And I think this is a definition problem because depending on how your define insurgency, Ukraine is either 1) already doing it or 2) probably won't ever do it.
1/
If what you are expecting by 'insurgency' is something that looks like AQI in 2006 or the Taliben in 2011, that's unlikely to happen for the simple reason that the Ukrainian army still exists and as a result Ukraine has other options to resist with. 2/
As I've noted elsewhere, insurgency in this sense - operating in territory the enemy controls (rather than just moves through) using the population as covering terrain without the support of a conventional military - that sort of insurgency is a hard way to fight. 3/
Insurgents generally suffer very unfavorable casualty ratios in that kind of fighting, while their action can causes their enemies to lash out against the civilian populace which is defenseless.
You don't do that kind of fighting unless you have no other choice. 4/
You don't do that kind of fighting unless you have no other choice. 4/
Ukrainians have other choices and that doesn't seem liable to change soon.
But if by 'insurgency' you mean that the Ukrainians will continue to operate behind whatever 'line of control' is being shown on maps on CNN or Fox, then yes, that is already happening. 5/
But if by 'insurgency' you mean that the Ukrainians will continue to operate behind whatever 'line of control' is being shown on maps on CNN or Fox, then yes, that is already happening. 5/
First off, those 'lines of control' are a lot less clear on the ground. More detailed maps like the one below, showing likely unit positions, give a better sense of a frontline that is a jumble, with lots of vulnerable Russian supply lines:
6/
https://twitter.com/HN_Schlottman/status/1501581105560006657
6/
So we're seeing both regular Ukrainian forces and territorial defense units striking Russian logistics and convoys in rear areas within Ukraine. We're also seeing the civilian population mobilized in political actions (protests, etc). Russian 'control' exists mostly on maps. 7/
This is part of why I focused on 'protracted war' as a whole (acoup.blog/2022/03/03/col…) as a framework for understanding what is going on in Ukraine rather than just "insurgency" in a relatively vague sense. 8/
You have insurgencies that are doing insurgency-style warfare because they have no other options, but protracted war imagines insurgency-style activities (what Mao calls guerrilla warfare) as a component of a larger effort which also includes regular forces. 9/
Given the obvious success, I'd expect Ukraine to keep this up - try to infiltrate more regular forces and weapons into rear areas.
For Russia, the problem is a lot trickier. COIN (counter-insurgency) is a manpower-intensive, generally slow kind of warfare. 10/
For Russia, the problem is a lot trickier. COIN (counter-insurgency) is a manpower-intensive, generally slow kind of warfare. 10/
So long as the Ukrainian army continues to exist and pose a conventional threat, it's going to be hard for Russia to spare the personnel to secure rear areas against Ukrainian units that can vanish into the countryside or the populace. 11/
Things get easier if the Russians could get the front to a natural border like the Dnieper, but obviously they've been trying to do that for almost two weeks now and so far Dnipro might as well be on the moon.
That may change with the next Russian push (if/when), of course. 12/
That may change with the next Russian push (if/when), of course. 12/
Before war started, there were concerns that an insurgency would run into Russia's fearsome apparatus of internal repression, but the potential of finding not a cell of poorly armed civilians but a platoon-sized element of Ukrainian SOF makes using that apparatus harder. 13/
That's the advantage of the protracted war strategy here: it puts the enemy in a terrible bind. Securing the rear means pulling forces from the advance and accepting the 'strategic stalemate' (move to Phase II), but fail to do so and the front runs out of gas, literally. 14/
Of course one can't bank on the Russian Armed Forces just standing oblivious and helpless in the trap, so conditions are likely to evolve.
But right now it looks like insurgency will both never happen and is already happening, depending on how you define it. 15/
But right now it looks like insurgency will both never happen and is already happening, depending on how you define it. 15/
Consequently, I don't think 'insurgency' is actually a really useful term to be using here. Honestly, I think the three types of warfare Mao lays out (Positional/Mobile/Guerrilla) is more helpful in understanding the sorts of things Ukraine is doing.
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Updated link for the map above:
https://mobile.twitter.com/HN_Schlottman/status/1501605875169083402
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