In Syria, "it was Russian air power that changed the game. And they wielded their air power in a devastating way, where they were targeting not just rebel positions but markets, hospitals, schools, with, in many cases, huge civilian casualties". newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/r…
"Isis, of course, was quite brutal, but the other jihadi groups that were anti-isis and anti-regime certainly did commit crimes, but I think nothing on the scale that the Syrian regime or the Russians committed. And so the Russian massacres were numerous."
"The UN shared a list of hospitals and clinics in Idlib Province with the Syrian government and the Russians basically in the hopes of getting the Russians to avoid accidentally hitting these places. And, instead, the Russians used this list to target these hospitals."
"So it was part of the Russian strategy—to attack hospitals. And that was, I think, partly to break the morale of not just the rebel movement but the population."
"I saw hospitals that were underground because the Russians would target anything that looked like a humanitarian center or a hospital."
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Deutschland hat zwei Außenpolitiken, eine moralische und eine kommerzielle. Was immer noch fehlt ist die strategische Außenpolitik: klare Ziele bei der Gestaltung der Außenwelt setzen und diese mit entsprechenden Mitteln verfolgen, basierend auf einer Vorstellung der Interessen.
Der Kurzschluss bei Habeck und Baerbock ist gegenwärtig, zu glauben, es gehe um einen Konflikt zwischen Moral (Mitgefühl für Ukraine) und harten Notwendigkeiten (nur ökonomisch definierten Interessen).
Beides ist wichtig, aber ausschlaggebend muss Strategie sein, die längerfristigen Interessen, die sowohl materielle als auch ideelle Aspekte haben. Was für eine Ordnung wollen und brauchen wir in unserer östlichen Nachbarschaft, was können wir dafür tun?
Das Kosten-Argument wird in der Debatte über einen Energieboykott immer gewinnen, wenn nicht auch der Nutzen klar dagegen gestellt wird -- die Wahrscheinlichkeit zu erhöhen, dass Putin in der Ukraine nicht gewinnt und der Krieg früher gestoppt wird.
Derzeit scheint die Regierung vor allem die internen Folgen im Blick zu haben -- weitaus weniger die externen Folgen. Damit setzt die Ampelkoalition eine bundesdeutsche Tradition fort, mit der sie ja explizit brechen wollte.
Ohne das Fortbestehen der externen, geopolitischen Stabilität aber sind die Kostenberechnungen für einen Energieboykott längerfristig hinfällig, weil sie von einem unverändert stabilen externen Umfeld ausgehen. Es werden diese Voraussetzungen einfach nicht eingepreist.
Interesting: "The only Western leader that Mr. Putin took seriously was Germany’s previous chancellor, Angela Merkel. Now she is gone and it’s time for Russia to avenge the humiliations of the 1990s." nytimes.com/2022/03/10/opi…
I was wondering about this too. Merkel and Putin were in constant dialogue. By talking to Merkel, Putin could get a feeling about where the west stood; and maybe she could correct some of his assumptions from time to time.
Talking to Macron or to Scholz probably very different.
Ukraine's existence as a sovereign and independent state -- the outcome of 1991, when the Soviet Union fell apart.
Russia's further identity and character: a nation state that accepts to be limited by international borders (the outcome of 1991) -- or an empire that is using military power in order to gain territory and control about others?
Zelensky: "in the future Ukraine must have a collective security agreement with all its neighbors and with the participation of the world’s leading countries - the United States, France, Germany and Turkey"
Which obviously must be more than the Budapest Memorandum 1994 which was just a piece of paper. It can only work if these countries are actively involved in guaranteeing Ukraine's borders. At a minimum they must help Ukraine quickly build a strong military force.
Something they failed to do after 2015 because they were afraid of a Russian reaction -- yet this reaction was exactly what happened in 2022. It was Ukraine's military weakness that has encouraged Putin to wage war.
Yet every offer that leaves Ukraine without protection against Russia is just a demand for surrender.
Ukraine can be protected with substantial own forces (armed with the help of the west), through Nato membership or through Western troops guaranteeing Ukraine's borders (like Western Germany during the Cold war).