When the CCP came to power in 1949 it insisted that China was a single, inseparable, multi-nationality state. But it also admitted that this vision of national unity was not reflective of reality on the ground. 1/
Instead inter-community relations in many ethnocultural borderlands were marked by alienation, distrust, and violence. Party leaders made clear who was to blame. Ethnic DIS-unity was a legacy of what (borrowing from the USSR) they called 'Great Han chauvinism' (da Hanzu zhuyi) 2/
Mao and others insisted that disunity was caused by centuries of Han exploitation and discrimination against non-Han people. By crafting 'minorities' as historical victims of the Han majority, the CCP positioned itself as both 'savior' and 'liberator' of 'weaker nationalities'.3/
If nationality disunity was caused by Han chauvinism, the solution was to eliminate HC. A second obstacle was "local nationalism" among 'minorities.' But because LN was considered a response to Han oppression, it would disappear naturally after Han chauvinism was eliminated. 4/
So the CCP set out to prove to non-Han communities that it was different than previous Han regimes by promising equality, respect, prosperity, and to make them "masters of their own homes" via regional autonomy. But ending Han chauvinism was easier said than done. 5/
As Uradyn Bulag and others have argued, Han chauvinism was baked into the CCP's DNA. Even while declaring the equality of nationalities, each was placed on a scale of evolutionary development from primitive to advanced with the Han at the the top, the 'vanguard nationality'. 6/
Essentially 'minority' culture was deemed incompatible with socialist modernity. Frustrated by the slow pace of change, in 1957 LN was declared to be an independent, even treasonous deviancy, far worse than HC, bent on sabotaging socialism and even dividing the nation. 7/
Having been officially equated with backwardness, feudalism, and/or separatism, from the Great Leap Forward through the Cultural Revolution many non-Han communities suffered tremendous violence against themselves and their cultural, religious, and linguistic heritage. 8/
HC was again criticized in the 1980s. Yet both the socialist and post-socialist projects in China are embedded within a quest for ethno-national salvation that ID's many non-Han people as backward (demanding Han-led development) and/or disloyal (demanding state-led discipline).9/
Terminologies have changed but under Xi Jinping the CCP again has openly embraced what was one called Han chauvinism while echoing earlier attacks on local nationalism by likening expressions of ethnocultural difference to existential threats to the Party and nation. 10/
-BW
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
In recent years, China under Xi Jinping seems to have embraced a "second-generation ethnic policy," the latest iteration of a century+long effort to find a formula that can forge a nation-state out of the ashes of empire. 1/
Since the 1911 revolution that toppled the Manchu Qing Empire, Chinese statesmen no matter their political stripes have been near unanimous in claiming the territorial extent of the old empire as natural boundaries of the new nation. 1/
But they've disagreed on how to do so. After all, on what basis might people whose main connection had been that they were subjects of the same sovereign now agree to form a horizontal political community- a nation? 2/
For today’s daily dose of women mystics in medieval Islam, we’ll be looking at marriage, sex, and inter-gender relations between pious Sufi men and women. Let’s see what Hasan al-Basri has to say about his religious sessions with the famous woman mystic Rābi’a al-‘Adawiyya 🧵~mq
‘I was with Rābi‘a for one full day and night. I was talking about the Path and the Truth in such a way that the thought ‘I am a man’ never crossed my mind, nor did ‘I am a woman’ ever cross hers. In the end when I got up, I considered myself a pauper and her a devotee.’
It is often posited that Sufi women lacked access to all-male religious spaces because of anxieties over interactions between genders. But to what extent is that really true?
Thanks to #TweetHistorians for the chance to talk about some of my work on gender and medieval Islamic mysticism this week! Let’s jump right in with some choice words from a 10th-century woman mystic, who has the following to say about that elusive concept of ‘manliness’ 🧵 ~mq
"Ḥusayn b. Manṣūr Ḥallāj had a beautiful sister who claimed the rank of manhood on the Sufi way. Whenever she came to Baghdad, she covered half her face with a veil and left the other half unveiled. An eminent person saw her and asked, ‘Why don’t you veil your entire face?’
‘First show me a man so that I might veil my entire face,’ she replied. ‘There is only half a man in all Baghdad, and that’s Ḥusayn. If it weren’t for his sake, I wouldn’t even cover this half.’"
Relatedly,
❓Where is #Tibet?
❓Are all Tibetans #Buddhist?
❓Do all of them revere @DalaiLama?
❓Are there Tibetans (other than #exiled pop"n) outside Tibet?
❓Do all #Tibetans identify as... erm ..Tibetan?
3/ 🚨🚨🚨 Of the 8 reps of #TibetanBuddhism in the current Parliament in Exile– two each from Gelug, Kagyu, Sakya, Nyigma sects– **all** are monks; so are the two members from pre-Buddhist Bon religion.
(Though ~1/3 of MPs from provinces U-Tsang, Dhotoe+ Dhomey are women.)
Yesterday, we looked at how #Tibetans perceived India+ how the @DalaiLama walked in the path of many of his countrymen before him when he came into exile in India.
Let's turn the gaze in the other direction today.
2/ Indians have at least two vantage points from where to view #Tibet. Parts of #Himalayan India border Tibet👇. Thanks to older connections of religious patronage, pilgrimage, and trade, the perspective from these regions is often v. diff from the capital in New Delhi.
~SC
3/ Indian cities of Gaya, Sanchi+ Sarnath were imp pilgrimage sites for Tibetan Buddhists; as was Kailash Mansarovar in Tibet for Hindu+ Buddhist pilgrims from India. The imagination of an “Akhand Bharat” (Undivided India) often included #Tibet.