@johnsweeneyroar hits the nail on the head about what's happening in Russia: the Church of Putinology, which is becoming a death cult. This fits with the picture of Putin's psychopathic, dark narcissistic traits (see below).
Putin has the traits of a psychopath: Expert opinion by @zivezracohen Ziv Cohen MD, Clinical Assistant Professor of Psychiatry at Weill Cornell Medical College of Cornell University
Is Putin a Psychopath? Dr. Arthur Cassidy, psychologist specialising in celebrity and political psychology who has been studying Putin's behaviour. The "Dark Triad": psychopathy, Machiavellianism, dark narcissism 👉 rte.ie/radio/radio1/c… (9 mins) via @RTERadio1
A collection of traits of cult leaders that give us hints as to their psychopathology, by Joe Navarro, former FBI National Security Division's Behavioral Analysis Program psychologytoday.com/us/blog/spycat…
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First, the view that US/NATO should refrain from enforcing a #NoFlyZone over Ukraine due to the risk of an all out NATO-Russia war is "mired in appeasement thinking". 2/
Wrong. It has nothing to do with appeasing Russia. There is a very real risk of tipping Russian decision making across the nuclear threshold. A #NFZ involves US/NATO combat missions against Russian aircraft, ground-based and naval air defence systems, and airfields. 3/
"In the worst scenario, if the war is going badly, Putin could reach for a tactical nuclear weapon out of desperation. While this is still unlikely, the risk is not zero. And increasing that risk is unacceptable." scientificamerican.com/article/limite…
"No one knows if using a tactical nuclear weapon would trigger full-scale nuclear war. Nevertheless, the risk of escalation is very real. Those on the receiving end of a nuclear strike are not likely to ask whether it was tactical or strategic."
"No one should imagine, however, that it makes sense to use a tactical nuclear weapon. A thermonuclear explosion of any size possesses overwhelming destructive power. Even a “small-yield” nuclear weapon (0.3 kT) would produce damage far beyond that of a conventional explosive."
"We estimate that Russia today has approximately 1,912 nonstrategic nuclear warheads, potentially fewer, assigned for delivery by air, naval, ground, and various defensive forces." 2/ thebulletin.org/premium/2022-0…
"Russia retains the right to use nuclear weapons. This does not mean that Russia will use such weapons, and deterrence at the strategic level appears to be robust. At the tactical level, however, the situation is different." 3/ thebulletin.org/2022/03/read-t…
Zelenskyy offers Russia the last chance to off ramp. But Russia won't take it. Putin's pyschopathic traits are growing stronger. His paranoia is increasing. He is approaching the chaotic end stage of malignant narcissism, which is fraught with danger (see below). #StopRussia
NB. I don't believe we're anywhere near nuclear warfare in Europe. But the possibility exists. Putin, Shoigu and Gerasimov have executive authority to go nuclear. Senior Armed Forces commanders already have devolved authority to use tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield. 1/
The probability of nuclear warfare happening remains extremely low. But the possibility exists and the probabilities can change very quickly depending on events and changes in Russia's win vs lose perceptions. Ultimately, it's a power decision, not a military one. 2/
The primary executive control of nuclear weapons use exists with Putin. It is hoped that both Shoigu and Gerasimov have to concur before activation; if not, they too have indpendent executive authority in case of leadership decapitation. 3/
When analysts estimate the number of 🇷🇺 troops required to occupy an area of 🇺🇦 they often use a rule of thumb that expeditionary operations require a minimum troop density of 10 to 15 troops per 1,000 civilians depending on how hostile the local population is. However.. 1/
This assumes there are 1,000 civilians at the start of 'policing' an occupied area. If that figure can be reduced by 25%, 50%, 75% through displacement (shelling and bombing cities, towns and villages to terrorise people into fleeing, as in Syria) a wider area can be occupied. 2/
Approximately one-third of an expeditionary force is needed for 'policing' duties, that is, for combat in a counterinsurgency environment. The remainder are available for more traditional policing and other occupation duties. Combat may continue on the periphery. 3/