This π piece contains some dangerous assumptions, which appear to be gaining traction in Washington DC thinking regarding Russia's war against Ukraine. 𧡠#StopRussia #ArmUkraine 1/ atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukraineaβ¦
First, the view that US/NATO should refrain from enforcing a #NoFlyZone over Ukraine due to the risk of an all out NATO-Russia war is "mired in appeasement thinking". 2/
Wrong. It has nothing to do with appeasing Russia. There is a very real risk of tipping Russian decision making across the nuclear threshold. A #NFZ involves US/NATO combat missions against Russian aircraft, ground-based and naval air defence systems, and airfields. 3/
Imposing a NFZ involves force applied directly to Russian assets. US/NATO forces will out-compete Russian forces and control the skies. Russia will not treat this lightly and is likely to respond with the only available option it has in reserve: weapons of mass destruction. 4/
Chemical weapons may kill people in the order of hundreds but produce no strategic gain. Biological weapons are less predictable and pose more risk to Russian forces. Non-strategic tactical nuclear weapons remain the most likely weapon of choice. 5/
For example, a variable low-yield weapon (0.5 to 5 kiloton) detonated over a low population density target as a 'warning shot', delivered in conjunction with an ultimatum for Ukraine to surrender unconditionally and US/NATO forces to withdraw from Ukrainian territory. 6/
Second, this is not the "fear of provoking an already aggrieved Russia" as the author suggests.
This is a highly complex and dynamic 'problem cluster' involving power, personalities and cultural precepts as much as political expediency and military doctrine. 7/
This is a highly complex and dynamic 'problem cluster' involving power, personalities and cultural precepts as much as political expediency and military doctrine. 7/
Thw Western framework for how to deal with such a cluster generally fails because A) it relies on Western assumptions about how Putin, the siloviki and military will react, and B) it doesn't factor in changing psychological factors associated with personality. 8/
In order to forsee how the regime and command structures are likely to react, it is essential to think like them and see the world through their eyes. It is necessary to account for Putin's rational though changing psychopathic personality traits post 24 February. 9/
This is not "fear of provoking Putin". This is a logical and cautious approach to dealing with deep uncertainty regarding a malignant narcissist. Handle a poisonous snake with caution and confidence, not fear. To do that, one must first understand it is a poisonous snake. 10/
Third, the assumption that "Putin will not fight if challenged by the collective might of the West" is dangerous and illogical. There is no evidence to support that assumption. If anything, Russia's war against Ukraine may indicate the exact opposite. 11/
Putin's judgement regarding war aims and the invasion of Ukraine was obviously flawed prior to 24 February. That judgement may be even more impaired now as a result of events (failure to achieve objectives, stalled advance, etc). 12/
Assumptions are not linear: they are dynamic and must adapt with changing circumstances. What held true prior to 24 Feb doesn't necessarily hold true now. Putin may not have consented to war with NATO in 2014 or 2021, but we cannot be certain that he wouldn't consent in 2022. 13/
Fourth, "America could theoretically mobilize a broad coalition to protect Ukraine". Really? There is no certainty regarding whether the US could mobilise any coalition at all to war with Russia (because that's what this would entail). 14/
Regardless of its composition, Russia would see any 'coalition of the willing' as a quasi NATO endeavour on the basis that the US is the predominant (nuclear) force in NATO. In effect, a US-led coalition war with Russia would be little different to a Russia-NATO war. 15/
That would become apparent as soon as US forces in Europe were struck by Russian forces outside of Ukraine, on a NATO member's territory. Article 5 would come into play and the coalition framework would likely expand to a NATO one. 16/
Fifth, "a humanitarian No-Fly Zone. This is a potentially attractive idea that could serve as a compromise between advocates of a cautious policy towards the Kremlin and those who believe Russia will not ultimately escalate into open war with NATO." 17/
There are two notions of humanitarian NFZ: one that is agreed with Russia, whereby allied 'air policing' covers the sky above an agreed humanitarian corridor. The other, where air policing is imposed as a fait accompli over a corridor without Russia's agreement. 18/
Can anyone see Russia agreeing to US/NATO or coalition air forces operating in Ukraine along a strictly defined corridor sandwiched between Russian air defences while Russian ground and air forces continue to wage war? 19/
Does anyone think that Russia will simply allow allied air forces to 'sneak in' unopposed to provide policing without agreement while combat operations are ongoing? The Russians would think this was the opening phase of a NFZ and NATO combat operations. 20/
This ties in with the naive belief that allied Western forces can simply choose to walk in to Ukraine as a 'peacekeeping' mission. PKOs require the consent of the parties to the conflict. Otherwise they are potential hostile combat missions by additional belligerents. 21/
There needs to be some clinical, hard-headed strategic policy making if the West (US/NATO/EU) is to implement any solutions (in addition to arming Ukraine) to help Ukraine rather than throw Ukraine into potential nuclear victimhood or spark off an escalating Russia-NATO war. End/
β’ β’ β’
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
γ
