A thread about how we report supposed victories in war (this one and others), why they dont matter nearly as much as people claim, and how they actually deceive us into understanding what really matters. Partly motivated by this @nytimes headline.
The New York Times is reporting this morning that the Russians are making 'significant' gains in Ukraine. In specific they are pushing into Mariopul, and they have hit two Ukrainian military facilities with long-range missile bombardment. Pretty dramatic and breathless stuff.
However, these are within the course of the war either unimportant, or actually signs of Russian defeats. In particular the attack on Mariopul. This is a humanitarian disaster and war crime, first and foremost. Militarily its a sign of Russian defeat, even if they seize the city.
The Russians have been besieging the city for weeks, have suffered significant attritional losses there. Even if they take the city, they will have to deploy significant forces to hold it. The whole campaign has been an indicator of Russian strategic failure.
Its worth taking a look at a more cogent analysis of what the campaign in Mariopul actually means, by the Institute for the Study of War. The siege of Mariopul has weakened the Russian campaign--portraying them taking the city as a sign of success is bonkers.
Now the missile strikes which have supposedly had 'devastating' impact. There was the barrage earlier in the week that hit Ukrainian logistical facilities in the west (weapons storage) and the very recent attack on the Marine Base near Mykolaiv
Do these matter, sure. Are they signs of dramatic events that are turning the war--no. Indeed their drama comes from pictures as much as anything else.
The attacks on the west might cause problems, but so far Ukrainian resupply seems to be occurring pretty regularly, and in the scheme of things Ukraine is being sent so many new weapons and advanced weapons systems, that the destruction of one depot should make little difference.
Its worth noting that none of the reports can actually name specifics of what are damaged. WIthout an idea of real losses, these claims are dramatic hot air.
Then there was the attack on the Marine Base near Mykolaiv. That looks to have levelled a good deal of the facility and killed a large number of Ukrainian marines. The number varies between 'dozens' to 80. The whole facility only held 200 marines.
Losing 80 Marines is terrible, but the Russians are losing approximately 1300 soldiers and a regular supply of trucks and AFV every day. Why therefore should this one attack be considered significant? Ans: it shouldnt unless it was part of an overall increase in Ukrainian losses.
The big meta stories in the war over the last few days are not to be affected by the stories that the NY Times and others see as signs of great successes. What is not being reported is the steady attritional Russian losses in transport, soldiers and AFV. That tells the real story
Analysts retweeting the worst war porn from the Mykolaiv assault as if somehow to make a point about Russian success, might think about what they are doing. @KofmanMichael has linked to some of the most terrible pictures with a claim that its a 'disaster' for Ukraine.
Will not link to these pictures because they are grotesque but here is a screenshot of the tweet. I would like an explanation of how this is such a great disaster for the Ukrainian military in an overall sense.
So, the sensational stories can be compelling and horribly eye-catching. But they distort more than convince in describing where we are in the war right now.
Looks like the @nytimes might have realized a need to change the narrative
Btw, this thread is not a specific dump on the New York Times. Much of their reporting has been really good. It’s generally a critique of how the media reports on war with a focus on the visual and dramatic. So using it as an excuse to hammer one paper misses the point
Later today will try to explain the vision of war that has developed in my research to better explain what I think matters.
The most interesting/important story of the morning in terms of how the war might develop. The Ukrainian military is claiming that the logistics crisis that the Russians have been operating under since the start of the war is reaching acute crisis. see @guardian
Almost all military's have a supply crunch not long after the start of a war, as they usually under-estimate (sometimes spectacularly) the amount of stuff they will need to fight the war. War is so destructive that it consumes far more than people can imagine ahead of time.
One of the most famous of these supply crises was the First World War shell crisis which beset everyone. After only a few months of war the expenditure of ammunition was so much higher than expected, that artillery shells ran out and had to be rationed. encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/shells…
Been puzzling about this U.K. MOD intelligence update since it was released this morning. In particular the last point that Kyiv is still the top priority for the Russians and they will ‘prioritise’ attempts to surround and take the city.
U.K. intelligence has been pretty good throughout, though this seems at odds with recent reporting and surmising that the Russians are turning to a southern and eastern strategy or a ratcheting down of Russian maximalist demands.
Also seems that Russian forces have moved sparingly to the northwest and northeast of Kyiv (this map has not changed for more than a week). If anything reports are that Russian forces are taking up more defensive positions.
What happens around Mariupol in the next few days should reveal alot about the state of the Russian Army--in a ghastly way. The 'demand' that the city be surrendered was really a plea. Saying to the Ukrainians, 'we really dont want to send our army into the town.'
This Ukrainian rejection will force the Russians to do the one thing they have so far been very reluctant to do in this campaign--go into a defended city. This is precisely because by their own actions, they have allowed the Ukrainians time to prepare.
The Russians have so far continued what they have been doing, long-distance bombardment. But that doesnt help them much at this point as theyve already blown up most of the city.
Ok, some people have asked for a summary of my views on war (why my analysis of the Ukraine war has been so pointed), so I thought I would make this thread with reference to my research (where possible free or library access material).
My view of war is in many ways profoundly boring. War is a struggle about the control of communications--which run from the raw materials needed to produce a good until that good is delivered to the battlefield.
It argues that the focus on bravery/cowardice of destruction/tragedy while compelling as a human story, tells us nothing of value about why wars are won and lost.
Still think it’s worth saying that a Russian use of chemical/biological weapons would be considered such a crossing of a escalators red lines that NATO could respond with a NFZ. That would make Russia think very very seriously before acting.
Im no expert in Russian Biological/Chemical weapons doctrine, but if they use them I assume that they would be used specifically to terrorize the largest Ukrainian cities (Kyiv, Kharkiv, Lwiw, Odessa. Hitting the Ukrainian army, which is close to the Russian army, would be hard.
Such attacks would be the types of war crime that, imo, that could countenance a NFZ.