I was asked to think about possible end states and European security for an expert roundtable. It is still very early to discuss this, but here are my thoughts. I organize them around the question of the existence of an independent UA state, 🧵1/12 #RussiainvadesUkraine
because this is what this war is about: RU has attacked to destroy UA as an independent state; UA fights back to preserve their independent statehood.
4 scenarios:
1. RU wins, UA ceases to exist as an independent state. Moscow installs some kind of puppet regime in Kyiv, 2/12
large parts of UA will be permanently occupied by RU and proxy troops; like BY UA will become an integral part of the space controlled by RU, and this space will have a direct boundary with the EU and NATO. 3/12
The European security order will remain confrontational for a long time, deterrence will be a key element of Western policy in this security order.
2. UA wins and continues to exist as an independent state; that would require at least partial military victory and a durable 4/12
ceasefire agreement in which RU makes major concessions. UA might “pay” for such an outcome by temporarily giving up on NATO ambition and/or loosing control over some (more?) of its territory, but will continue to closely cooperate with EU, NATO, including on sec guaranties 5/12
The European security order will still be confrontational, deterrence against RU and support for security of UA and other countries in Eastern Europe will still need to be a key element of Western policy. At some point, lifting of some sanctions, some kind of détente 6/12
through arms control talks or CBMs might be possible, but it will take a long time after this war. RU is facing accusations of war crimes, even genocide. This raises the issue of post-conflict justice vs impunity. It will stay with UA, with us all. 7/12
3. Military stalemate as a result of a war of attrition, here a brittle ceasefire or no ceasefire agreement are thinkable. This would be extremely unstable and likely lead to new war.
4. Internationalisation of the war: a direct military confrontation between RU and NATO. 8/12
“Stalemate” and “internationalization” are not end states but stages in a development towards more escalation.
The outcome of “RU wins” and “UA wins” could be relatively stable. In the “RU wins” scenario European security would resemble a Cold War situation, 9/12
but it would be more volatile and precarious because we don’t live in the age of bipolarity.
The “UA wins” scenario would give UA and its partners some breathing space, but RU’s aggressive attitude would most likely persist. Clearly, this is the most desirable outcome 10/12
from a UA and Western perspective, so Western policy needs to do its maximum to make it happen (sanctions + weapons supplies).
Any kind of more positive development long term will depend on and require substantial change of RU’s policy - 11/12
which is unlikely while Putin stays in the Kremlin. Unfortunately it does not become a lot more likely looking at the different possible trajectories Russia could take if and when things start to move inside the country. I wish I could be more optimistic...
12/End of 🧵
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
I had no hope anything would come of the meeting of FMs #Kuleba and #Lavrov yesterday. 2 days ago I wrote that Moscow was beginning to feel the sanctions pressure – and looking for diplomatic wiggle room, without, however, dropping its maximalist positions: #RussiainvadesUkraine
demilitarisation of Ukraine and neutrality, recognition of Crimea annexation + DLNR. At his presser today Lavrov even went back to blustering about the „fascist junta“ in Kyiv. There was a lot of talk afterwards about Lavrov’s remoteness from the centre of decision making... 2/10
...in the Kremlin. This has been a well-known fact for many years. And yes, he seemed nervous and fiddled during the presser. His position has changed – from a professional and experienced diplomat, feared, loathed, but also respected and even admired by some in the West, 3/10
Moscow is starting to feel the pressure. What makes me say this? 1. RU seems stuck militarily. A big chunk of the RU force is already involved in the war. There are problems with reinforcements, heavy casualties and equipment losses. #RussiainvadesUkraine 1/8
The goals of the „spec-op“ have not been reached so far. RU seems hesitant to storm Kyiv or Odesa – street fighting in 2 big cities would be a major risk under the circumstances. The idea to occupy the whole or large parts of the country seems even more unrealistic.
2/8
2. Unprecedented sanctions imposed with unprecedented pace start to bite. So does international isolation, even if Beijing signals continuing support. Western weapons supplies to UA not to be underestimated in this context either.
3/8
My take of the talks so far and the failure of the humanitarian corridor around Mariupol: RU is not serious about the negotiations. Putin and his cronies do not care about humanitarian suffering either. I rest my case: 1/6 #RussiainvadesUkraine
2/6 the composition of the RU delegation said it all, from the very beginning. Medinsky and Slutsky are policy clowns sent there to mess with the Ukrainian side. I do believe that the RU military is under pressure to end the operation. They have problems with reserves...
3/6 ...and supplies, and they suffer more losses than they ever expected. But Putin is not ready to consider retreat, compromise. Plus the majority of RU population are either supportive or silent with exhaustion. The protests are limited to the unhappy minority, which...
Some thoughts about why the Kremlin could miscalculate so catastrophically on basically everything: the steadfastness of the UA leadership, the resolve to resist in UA society, UA military capabilities, and their own capability to figth this war.
I see three factors:🧵1/11
1. There is a blatant lack of knowledge and understanding in RU about political and societal developments in neighbouring countries. They used to be part of the Soviet Union until 1991. After independence RU was first too poor to fund proper research on basically anything. 2/11
In the 2000s, attention shifted to other topics, notably China/Asia. I remember the director of a big research institute telling my once that their attempt to create a department about Russia’s immediate neighbourhood was met with indifference if not ridicule. 3/11
Now I understand why he wrote that article about Ukraine last summer: to have something to base this speech on... today's Ukraine is entirely a product of Russian policy... and off he goes.
"We will show Ukraine what real decommunisation is" sounds like a very serious threat to dismember the country.
Meanwhile in Moscow: Russian NSC is discussing situation in DLNR, Ukraine. Live translation via @ru_rbc This doesn’t bode well… reader.rbc.ru/share/8R8C9EsH…
Kozak explaining (at Putin‘s request) how Ukraine is not implementing but undermining Minsk Agreements.
Both agree that it is outrageous to think Russia interferes with UKraine's domestic affairs. Insist that Ukraine and Western partners chose to ignore all proposals made by DLNR. Ignore that Ukrainian steps should be agreed with DNLR.