2/n Specifically, within the EU's statement is the commitment to increase LNG imports from the US by:
15 Bcm in 2022
50 Bcm by [2027]
Seems pretty doable? Until you actually dig into it.
3/n This chart from @politico is old, but it helps paint the picture of just how f*cked Europe is.
Even if 100% of outbound US LNG cargoes flow to Europe, they will still have a supply deficit. Also, that won't happen.
4/n Here's the detail on that for anyone who cares.
5/n In February and Marc, 70-80% of outbound US LNG cargoes flowed to Europe. But, that's largely because #TTF (Dutch LNG settlement hub) has priced above #JKM.
That pricing relationship won't last. And, before long, US LNG cargoes will once again be heading to Asia.
6/n Europe doesn't seem to realize this yet, and has been dragging their feet on signing contracts. In the mean time, China has wasted no time snapping up spare #LNG capacity.
9/n Separately, it seems that American investors are taking for granted the likelihood that domestic #LNG projects secure financing. Chariff Soukhi ( $TELL) said something about financing being the easiest thing he's done in his life.
And yet, no financing! 👀
10/10 In summary: it's going to be an interesting decade.
1/n I am no expert on geopolitics. For that, I defer to @Geo_papic @JacobShap, @reziemba, and @Bob_McNally, among others (and fade everything @PeterZeihan says).
But I do have some thoughts on the energy implications of this week's attack by Hamas on Israeli citizens. 🛢️
2/n Firstly, this weekend's attacks in isolation has little to no impact on physical oil flows.
The run-up in crude prices this morning feels overdone, although there is certainly the potential for a move higher in crude prices based on what happens in coming weeks.
3/n There are several Qs that I think will define the energy market implications:
1. What happens to US sanctions on IR? 2. What happens to IR export volumes? 3. What happens to Saudi-US oil agreement and related Israel-Saudi détente? 4. Are there American hostages in Gaza?
@PotenPartners deep dive on the outlook for US LNG is beginning momentarily. The focus is on the slate of pre-FID projects that may or may not greenlight new projects in the near-term.
I'll be channelling my inner @ed_fin in the upcoming thread. 👇
Ahead of the presentation, see below five of the US projects I've been keeping an eye on.
Offtake contracts are key for FID decisions. So too is securing necessary regulatory permits, bank financing, and EPC commitments.
As I've noted before, my view is that the sense of security in Europe is misplaced. The next two winters will remain a challenge.
1/n Russia crude exports have been robust (including this January), flows have shifted considerably, China and India have fantastic bargaining power.
2/n Russian oil on water has risen considerably (especially post-Dec 5th), in part because of longer seaborne voyage time. Also, potentially, because Russia is struggling to find buyers.
Turkey has also trimmed Russian oil imports considerably in the last few months.
A really great piece by @Bruegel_org with some surprising takeaways from the past year. Most surprising has been the resilience of EU's manufacturing sector.
"Russia spent almost 50 years building its energy market in Europe. President Vladimir Putin destroyed it in under 50 weeks. Finding a replacement will be almost impossible."
"The flow of refined products is following the same trajectory ahead of similar sanctions that come into effect on Feb. 5."
Except the pre-embargo trajectory for Russian diesel has differed materially from crude.
"While Russia may be able to salvage some sort of an energy relationship with Europe after the war ends, which it inevitably will, it’s unlikely that EU countries will ever allow themselves, or need, to be as dependent on Russian gas as they were just a year ago."