Thread 🧵consolidating updates from April 11 – April 17 on the large scale unit repositioning and resupply efforts ongoing in Ukraine. This thread will be incorporated into my primary thread on combat losses, which will be linked at the bottom once complete
It may be helpful for context to read the consolidation I put together last week
Of an estimated 120 Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) committed by Russia to the invasion, it is believed there are currently between 65 and 75 BTGs in Ukraine as Russian moves and reconstitutes its forces
It is expected that the Russian concentration in the Donbas will increase significantly with the addition of dozens of new BTGs and tens of thousands of soldiers
Russian Equipment Manufacturing
There have been several reports over the past few weeks of production delays at Russian tank assembly plants and now there are unconfirmed reports of new stoppages
One item of interest to me was that Russian missile production is reliant on just two suppliers and I hope to dig into their material this week to see if we can learn anything about production capacity
While there is not enough certainty around captured equipment to incorporate it into the force estimates at this time, there are increasing signs that captured equipment will be useful
Training on captured equipment
Repair
The ability to repair damaged heavy equipment has been reduced on the Ukrainian side by heavy damage to the tank factory in Kharkiv and missile attacks on the factory in Lviv
Unfortunately, Russia has begun to target these facilities. There was a recent strike on a facility in Kyiv that was until recently a tank storage facility
In addition to the announcements of armoured vehicles destined for Ukraine from the UK, the Czech Republic and Australia we have many new announcements.
The first of the Australian Bushmaster vehicles have begun to arrive and video has circulated of what is believed to be some Czech and Slovakian equipment on the move towards Ukraine
On the note of domestically produced Ukrainian weaponry, we have background information on previous statements about production capacity for Neptune antiship missiles and some estimates of current inventory
Training of Ukrainian personnel
In addition to previously discussed training of Ukrainian military personnel in the US on the Switchblade systems and a Lithuanian training program, several other announcements have been made about training
It is reported that small units of the Ukrainian military will soon begin to be trained in Poland by the US military
April 17 Full update to thread 🧵 on estimates of #Russia and #Ukraine losses compared to available forces, using RU and UKR claims along with the best available #OSINT observations and estimates
Summary
OSINT % losses of Russian Committed (Russian total) vs Ukrainian total
Personnel 32.1(6.8) vs 10.4
Armor 41(8.6) vs 11.4
Tanks 42.2(15.3) vs 14.5
Artillery 13.8(3.9) vs 3.5
Aircraft 6.4(1.5) vs 13.6
Helicopters 14.2(3.5) vs 8.7
Were there #nuclear weapons on the #Moskva? Unravelling a game of telephone.
It starts with this tweet from an account that bills itself as belonging to a “Data & Covid expert”. It cites BlackSeaNews as saying “Moskva was equipped with 2 nuclear warheads”.
The linked Facebook account has no recent posts that mention nuclear warheads on the Moskva
However, the account of Andrii Klymenko, the co-founder of the BlackSeaNews, had a post saying “there are 2 nuclear warheads… on board of the Russian Federation Moscow”. The seriousness of this is clear by the statement that it is a matter for the UN and IAEA (MAGATE in Russian)
The main shareholder of the company is Gasunie with 60%, and Uniper and Fluxys both own 20%. Gazprom had an option for 9%, in exchange for a 9% share of Nord Stream AG. The BBL Pipeline would allow Gazprom to supply gas to the British market via the Nord Stream pipeline
“The pipeline has a regulatory exemption from the two-ways gas flow until October 2018. Until this, the direction of gas flow is from the Netherlands to the UK”
Ukraine: Personnel 6/
RU claim
30,500* (14,000; 16,000; 500 POW)(KIA; wounded; POW)
30,500/196,600 = 15.5%
*not updated since Mar 25
My evaluation is 4,500 Ukrainian KIA and 3x that wounded
OS 18,500 (4,500; x3=13,500; 500(per RU)) (KIA; wounded; POW)
18,500/196,600 = 9.4%
Ukraine: Aircraft
RU claim 127/125 = 100+%
OS Photo 15/125 = 12%
OS Expert* 70/125 = 56%
*‘roughly 55 fighter jets’, quoting Dave Deptula, of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies nytimes.com/2022/03/22/wor…
IISS states 125 combat capable jets, implying a loss of 70 jets
Helicopters
Note that the OS percentage loss of Russian helicopters has actually declined since last week. This appears to be due to a reclassification of certain losses by the OSINT analysis source that I rely on
April 10 Full update to thread 🧵 on estimates of #Russia and #Ukraine losses compared to available forces, using RU and UKR claims along with the best available #OSINT observations and estimates
Concept
When competing claims are made for losses, setting these claims against each other can narrow the range that actual numbers should lie within. Claims form a maximum and admissions form a minimum. NATO has stated that it uses a similar approach in forming its estimates
Thread 🧵consolidating updates from April 3 – April 10 on the large scale unit repositioning and resupply efforts ongoing in Ukraine. This thread will be incorporated into my primary thread on combat losses, which will be linked at the bottom once complete
Combat Strength
On March 25 US estimated Russia retained 85-90% combat strength