So, there finally is some movement in the 🇩🇪 arms delivery debate. A "swap deal" seems to be on the way with 🇸🇮: Germany will give #Marder IFV and #Fuchs APC to Slovenia, in turn Slovenia will give M-84 MBT to 🇺🇦. faz.net/aktuell/politi…
The M-84 is a Yugoslav copy of the T-72, with inferior armour compared to the T-72B and T-64 UA is using right now. 🇸🇮 uses 14 for training and has further 32 in store.
While of course one may wonder why 🇸🇮 wants to trade an MBT with an IFV, the low numbers indicate that these...
... Marder are from the 100 Marder that wetre phased out and do not belong to the Bundeswehr anymore. Most of them are in a bad shape and need extensive overhaul, but the roughly 40 in question could be delivered rather sooner.
Notewothy however, up until yesterday, the government, particularly @Bundeskanzler and @BMVg_Bundeswehr maintained that no Marder were available, and any delivery of them would weaken the Bundeswehr as it would have to come from their stock.
In practice of course everyone knew that that was not true, and the discrepancy between reality and political statement created considerable distrust abroad as well as infighting in Berlin.
The communication desaster was made worse by SPD pundits discrediting/attacking critics.
Generally, such a "swap" deal is the best way to make use of the Marder IFVs in the first place, and it would have been smart if the government would have stated from the beginning that it would seek such a sollution instead of now falsifying their own arguments from 2 days ago.
There were several other #EU/#NATO allies who from March onwards proposed similar swaps for the BMP-2 in their inventory.
The government would have done itself a favour if it would have stated it would consider such options, instead of leaving them in the dark.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
1/ Mein heutiger #servicetweet in 🇩🇪 zur #Marder Debatte, da sich hier auch im #Miltwitter gehörige Fehleinschätzungen breit machen!!!
1⃣ Die in Frage stehenden Marder stammen NICHT aus beständen der Bundeswehr. Es handelt sich um ausgeschiedene Fahrzeuge, die wieder ...
2/ ... beim Hersteller stehen.
2⃣ laut Hersteller würde die logischische Vorarbeit und Einschulung des Wartungs- und Bedienpersonals sowie einer "Ukrainisierung" des Fahrzeuges 4 Monate dauern.
3⃣ Allerdings sind diese 100 Marder in keinem guten Zustand, die BW hat nicht umsonst
3/ ... genau diese ausgesondert. Sie bedürfen alle einer mehr oder minder großen Generalüberholung. Kleinere Tranchen zur Ausbildung könnte man im Sommer bereitstellen, aber die Masse der SPz wäre erst nächstes Jahr wieder fit.
4⃣ Schneller könnte es gehen wenn Schützenpanzer ...
1/ So, again a tweet replaciong comment, trying to wrap up where we are in the war. Last week I did an @ecfr podcast on this.
It is April 1st, and this is an important draft date for the Russian army. Why does this matter for the war in 🇺🇦? New conscripts are not sent to battle,
2/ but as the term of service is 12 month, those who got called in spring 2021 have left/will leave the armed forces as ready trained soldier. Or could apply for a contract (24month) to serve as contract soldiers and be sent to 🇺🇦.
Last year's spring draft was 134000 men.
3/ Most conscripts serve in the land forces, this again is what is needed right now.
Russian forces have taken heavy casualties (roughly 2/3 of what 🇺🇦 claims may be considered as real), so roughly 12000 dead, and 2-3 times the number in wounded.
There were Russian advances, but some of them not very sustainable. Company or battalion sized detachments rushed along the roads, but once Ukrainians counter-attack...
... they have to withdraw. Sustainable advances, where Russian forces can actually hold territories are much slower. And only after some days you know which one it is.
Still Kyiv is the centre of effort of the Russian military effort. It is stalled, and Ukraine was ...
So, finally, the evening tweet. Tomorrow at 1000h CET @ecfr will also host a briefing with me & @KadriLiik, so this will be a bit shorter.
In terms of territorial control, the situation remains unchanged from yesterday. Here is an @osw report that pretty much covers it. osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/…
However, we have arrived in the bruta phase of the war. Putin wants to achieve his aim - the destruction of Ukraine as a nation - by brutal force and terror.
Dropping a termobatic bomb on Kharkiv is a first glance of what that means.
As I get a lot of press request about Russia's nuclear threat, I'll add a post here. You should look into RUS principles of nuclear deterrence to find the answer, but the website seems to be down. Anyway, I commented it 4 @ecfr some time ago: ecfr.eu/article/commen…
Yes, first and foremost, Russia wants to deter the West from intervening in Ukraine, and Putin may actually fear it to some extend.
But he will not not ressort to this unless larger formations as such go into Ukraine, which they don't and won't.
Weapons deliveries and other forms of support will not cause such a move. We saw that during many other proxy wars, including thoise were whe gave weapons and support to friends fighting the RUS army directly.
There are implicitly agreed playbooks for this.
So, my evening tweet, still reluctant to write something bigger 4 @ecfr . War means very short shelf-life...
Although there was again little change to yesterday, I don't know if phase B - being more brutal - will start tonight or tomorrow. Hence my hesitation.
It was again a very bloody day for the invaders. Wherever the Ukrainians put up resistance - Kyiv, Kharkiv, Sumy, Mariupol, they repell them and inflict heavy losses. In the North, Russia uses artillery more freely, I fear this will continue to grow. Still no success.
I am completely puzzelt why Russian forces make mounted dashes into Ukrainian cities only to be ambushed and eliminated.
RUS morale sems to be low too. A lot of them expected a "flower campaign" and then there was full scale war. Victims of their own propaganda.