Thread 🧵consolidating updates from April 18 – April 24 on the large scale unit repositioning and resupply efforts ongoing in Ukraine. This thread will be incorporated into my primary thread on combat losses, which will be linked at the bottom once complete
It may be helpful for context to read the consolidation I put together last week
Combat Strength
The US most recently assessed Russian combat strength at 75% of what was committed at the beginning of the war. Here is the history of US estimates of Russian combat strength
Of an estimated 120 Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) committed by Russia to the invasion, it is believed there are currently between 82 BTGs in Ukraine as Russian moves and reconstitutes its forces
Russian manufacturing is also taking significant losses recently, such as this critical factory that produced a significant percentage of Russian solvents and reactives used in other manufacturing processes. This is an under appreciated issue. Great read
Russia has apparently been accepting donations of unusual military accessories from non-government organizations that are fundraising expressly for this purpose
However, the speed with which the Russians are trying to resupply and reposition units may cause these problems: “The Russians have not taken time to refit troops moving from Kyiv or Mariupol before recommitting them to combat operations.” understandingwar.org/backgrounder/r…
Captured Equipment
Due to the increasing rate at which we are seeing anecdotal evidence of captured equipment put to use, I will begin to add these figures into my larger thread on available forces, but I will use a conservative estimate of captures suitable for short term reuse
Here is another example of a captured vehicle being upgraded prior to reuse
Repair
There were many updates on repair facilities in last week’s consolidation, so check that if you are interested. The major update for this week is that the Czech Defence Ministry has said that it’s companies will repair Ukrainian heavy equipment
Last week’s update consolidation had many announcements about armoured vehicles and tanks. These are some of the latest similar updates.
Slovak tanks are seen in use
However, some hoped for transfers are still being delayed, such as a reported Swiss veto on the transfer of ammunition to go along with Marder armoured vehicles
Training of Ukrainian personnel
The primary update on training Ukrainian personnel was the noted US training on artillery systems. See last week’s update for several previous training announcements
April 24 Full update to thread 🧵 on estimates of #Russia and #Ukraine losses compared to available forces, using RU and UKR claims along with the best available #OSINT observations and estimates
I have decided to include a graphic with a more complete picture of my spreadsheet, as there are now columns for captured equipment and military aid. In order to allow people to follow the process. I’m working out the best way to present this. Please excuse the graphics quality
Summary
OSINT % losses of Russian Committed (Russian total) vs Ukrainian total
Personnel 33.2(7) vs 7.6
Armor 45.5(9.5) vs 11.7
Tanks 45(16.6) vs 14.2
Artillery 14.3(4) vs 3.6
Aircraft 7.3(1.7) vs 15.2
Helicopters 15(3.7) vs 10.9
April 17 Full update to thread 🧵 on estimates of #Russia and #Ukraine losses compared to available forces, using RU and UKR claims along with the best available #OSINT observations and estimates
Summary
OSINT % losses of Russian Committed (Russian total) vs Ukrainian total
Personnel 32.1(6.8) vs 10.4
Armor 41(8.6) vs 11.4
Tanks 42.2(15.3) vs 14.5
Artillery 13.8(3.9) vs 3.5
Aircraft 6.4(1.5) vs 13.6
Helicopters 14.2(3.5) vs 8.7
Thread 🧵consolidating updates from April 11 – April 17 on the large scale unit repositioning and resupply efforts ongoing in Ukraine. This thread will be incorporated into my primary thread on combat losses, which will be linked at the bottom once complete
It may be helpful for context to read the consolidation I put together last week
Were there #nuclear weapons on the #Moskva? Unravelling a game of telephone.
It starts with this tweet from an account that bills itself as belonging to a “Data & Covid expert”. It cites BlackSeaNews as saying “Moskva was equipped with 2 nuclear warheads”.
The linked Facebook account has no recent posts that mention nuclear warheads on the Moskva
However, the account of Andrii Klymenko, the co-founder of the BlackSeaNews, had a post saying “there are 2 nuclear warheads… on board of the Russian Federation Moscow”. The seriousness of this is clear by the statement that it is a matter for the UN and IAEA (MAGATE in Russian)
The main shareholder of the company is Gasunie with 60%, and Uniper and Fluxys both own 20%. Gazprom had an option for 9%, in exchange for a 9% share of Nord Stream AG. The BBL Pipeline would allow Gazprom to supply gas to the British market via the Nord Stream pipeline
“The pipeline has a regulatory exemption from the two-ways gas flow until October 2018. Until this, the direction of gas flow is from the Netherlands to the UK”
Ukraine: Personnel 6/
RU claim
30,500* (14,000; 16,000; 500 POW)(KIA; wounded; POW)
30,500/196,600 = 15.5%
*not updated since Mar 25
My evaluation is 4,500 Ukrainian KIA and 3x that wounded
OS 18,500 (4,500; x3=13,500; 500(per RU)) (KIA; wounded; POW)
18,500/196,600 = 9.4%
Ukraine: Aircraft
RU claim 127/125 = 100+%
OS Photo 15/125 = 12%
OS Expert* 70/125 = 56%
*‘roughly 55 fighter jets’, quoting Dave Deptula, of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies nytimes.com/2022/03/22/wor…
IISS states 125 combat capable jets, implying a loss of 70 jets
Helicopters
Note that the OS percentage loss of Russian helicopters has actually declined since last week. This appears to be due to a reclassification of certain losses by the OSINT analysis source that I rely on