1/ Ukrainian TVD, Day 58-64. The past week has seen Russian forces initiate an integrated offensive along the Siverskyi Donets Line & Severodonetsk Salient. Assaults resume against the Azovstal Metallurgical Zone; UKR forces execute several spoiling attacks. #WarinUkriane 
2/ Weather Impact. The 10-day forecast for eastern Ukraine favors Russian offensive operations. Partly cloudy skies will not degrade VKS sorties or UAV operations. Higher temps (16-21 C) will start to dry out areas with extensive mud, slightly improving offroad movement.
3/ Kharkiv OD. The Ukrainian General Staff estimates at least 7x BTGs of 6th CAA & Baltic / Northern Fleet Naval Infantry blocking Kharkiv and screening Russian movements east of the Siverskyi Donets. #Kharkiv
4/ Ukrainian forces inch closer to Kozacha Lopan, threatening Russian control of the E105 HWY from Ruska Lozova to Belgorod. Russian loss of the E105 HWY will place Belgorod under increased threat of Ukrainian long-range strike attacks.
https://twitter.com/JulianRoepcke/status/1518654154272616449?s=20&t=2_wJkVXeTJFZlLfEbCnLWw
5/ Severodonetsk-Donetsk OD. The Russians have expanded their initial limited probing / recon in force attacks of 19-22 April into a general dispersed offensive. Russian troops are pushing methodically on generally mutual supporting axes north and west of Slovyansk-Kramatorsk.
6/ In the Severodoentsk Salient it appears Russian forces are positioning to encircle the main urban sprawl of Severodonetsk-Lysychansk from the NE and SE while reducing Ukrainian defenses through massed artillery bombardment.
https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1518302915596898304?s=20&t=2_wJkVXeTJFZlLfEbCnLWw
7/ Further south on the Donetsk-Horlivka region, expect Russian offensive action to continue in Marlinka & Avdiivka as Russian & proxy militia forces attempt to break through the Ukrainian prepared defenses along the line of contact.
https://twitter.com/mhmck/status/1519674796811948033?s=20&t=2_wJkVXeTJFZlLfEbCnLWw
8/ Zaporizhzhia OD. Russian forces have made numerous small gains over the last several days along the Ukrainian defensive line running from Vasylivka, through Huliaipole, to Velyka Novosilka. These attacks may potentially threaten Zaporizhzhia if a breakthrough is made.
9/ So far Russian actions in this area appear consistent with my earlier assessment of the Zaporizhzhia OD being a disruption zone where the intent is to fix Ukrainian forces to ensure success of operations in the Severodonetsk-Donestsk OD.
10/ An assault on Zaporizhzhia, though not immediately likely, may well be an eventual action Russian forces will take. As the administrative center of the Zaporizhzhia Oblast it is an important political objective to hold to claim legitimacy of a propped-up proxy state.
11/ Mariupol. Russian forces renewed attacks against the Azovstal Metallurgical Zone over the weekend (23-24 April), most likely to secure the M14 HWY running through the industrial Zone. Operations also continue against pockets of resistance outside the Azovstal area. #Mariupol
12/ It is unlikely that Russian troops will storm Azovstal itself but will focus attacks on reducing the size of the defensive perimeter of the Steel Plant. There are indications that the north Azovstal may have been captured by Russian forces.
https://twitter.com/CanadianUkrain1/status/1519648275464400898?s=20&t=2_wJkVXeTJFZlLfEbCnLWw
13/ The siege of Mariupol illustrates how difficult it is for contemporary military forces to exert physical and/or virtual control of urban spaces. Virtually, cell phone saturation, social media, and cloud services render virtual isolation improbable.
https://twitter.com/ChristopherJM/status/1519309276568866817?s=20&t=2_wJkVXeTJFZlLfEbCnLWw
14/ Physically, moving from the periphery inward is problematic as complex highway interchanges, road congestion, innumerable subterranean and surface passageway access makes controlling movement difficult without a massive engineering effort to reshape the city itself.
15/ Odesa-Kherson OD. Oleksandrivka to the west of Kherson is reported to be under Russian control. Russian forces launch attacks in northern Kherson Oblast toward Kryvyi Rih. Ukrainian forces claim to have recaptured several towns along the M14 HWY toward Kherson. #Kherson
16/ Aerospace Assessment. VKS air sorties strike multiple railway hubs in western Ukraine with PGMs to slow the distribution of western military aid further east. PGM attacks also target Odesa. It is estimate Russia has expended 1,300 PGMs in Ukraine.
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1518180869575528448?s=20&t=c2PVewOHktgbu2aL8zHEBQ
17/ Ukrainian TV. It is unlikely that Russia & Ukraine will return to meaningful negotiations soon. Growing evidence of Russian atrocities & the Kremlin’s narrative of framing the war as one against “Western aggression” pushes both sides to seek a military solution.
18/ Humanitarian Impact. Ukrainian refugees total 7.1+ million with 5.6+ million in countries bordering Ukraine, another 1.5+ throughout Europe, and 7.5+ million internally displaced people throughout Ukraine (1.4+ million in eastern & 228K in southern Ukraine).
19/ There are an estimate 1,000 civilians in Azovstal, Russian forces continue to target Ukrainian civil & civic leaders throughout southern Ukraine for arrest to disrupt civil resistance to Russian occupation. Ukrainian partisan activity remains high.
https://twitter.com/nytimes/status/1517507041241227264?s=20&t=c2PVewOHktgbu2aL8zHEBQ
20/ Russia intends to create a proxy state in the south, with a referendum planned in Kherson possibly in the first week of May. Ongoing partisan activity & civil resistance may prevent this from occurring. Recent Russian rhetoric suggests a resumption of the Norossiya project.
21/ Lethal military aid from Western nations continue to arrive to their final European debarkation point before forward movement into Ukraine. US Secretary of Defense & State meet with Pres. Zelensky in Kyiv on 25 April to discuss continue aid.
https://twitter.com/Archer83Able/status/1519327794076999680?s=20&t=V3q0sThu01h9ZDesNyOXHA
22/ Overall Assessment. Russia needs a battlefield success(es) for any hope of drawing out concessions from Ukraine. Severodonetsk must be taken to claim victory in Luhansk. Therefore, Russia will go hard for Severodonetsk and the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk area.
23/ Russian forces will likely move SE from Barvinkove to Druzhkivka just south of Kramatorsk to cut the remaining GLOCs from the west and the north-south link to Avdiivka. The push north from Avdiivka is likely meant to link-up with Russian forces in the Kramatorsk.
24/ These maps have been created by me based off the most reliable information of activity in the Ukrainian Theater of War from a variety of sources. Errors will be corrected as soon as they are identified.
25/ Information regarding Ukrainian units are meant to be general, are based on Ukrainian General Staff statements and social media posts, official Ukrainian government press releases, and local news. It does not depict current unit movements. END
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