Thread by @Levitt_Matt

Some Middle East-themed takeaways from @ODNIgov Haines' annual threat assessment testimony, a thread:armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/…

2. No comment on China in Mideast, but notes "CCP is increasing its criticism of perceived U.S. failures and hypocrisy, including the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and racial tensions in the United States"

3. Russia: In the Middle East and North Africa, Moscow is using its involvement in Syria, Libya, and Sudan to increase its clout, undercut U.S. leadership, present itself as an indispensable mediator, and gain military access rights and economic opportunities.

4. Despite slow growth in defense spending, Russia will emphasize development & acquisition of new weapons that present increased threats to US & regional actors & continue foreign military engagements, conducting training exercises, & incorporating lessons from Syria &Ukraine

5. Moscow has the wherewithal to deploy forces in strategically important regions, but the farther it deploys from Russia, the less able it probably will be to sustain intensive combat operations.

6. Vagner group & other private security companies managed by Russian oligarchs close to the Kremlin extend Moscow’s military reach at low cost in areas ranging from Syria to the CAR & Mali, allowing Russia to disavow its involvement & distance itself from battlefield casualties

7. Iran will continue to threaten U.S. interests as it tries to erode U.S. influence in the Middle East, entrench its influence and project power in neighboring states, and minimize threats to regime stability.

8. Tehran will try to leverage its expanding nuclear program, proxy & partner forces, diplomacy, & military sales & acquisitions to advance its goals.

9. Iranian regime sees itself as locked in an existential struggle with the US & its regional allies, while it pursues its longstanding ambitions for regional leadership

10. The election of President Ebrahim Raisi in 2021 has invigorated Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to try to make progress toward his long-term vision of molding Iran into a pan-Islamic power capable of defending global Muslim causes while tightening its theocratic rule at home.

11. We assess that Iran will threaten U.S. persons directly and via proxy attacks, particularly in the Middle East. Iran also remains committed to developing networks inside the United States—an objective it has pursued for more than a decade.

12. Iranian-supported proxies will launch attacks vs US forces & persons in Iraq/Syria, & perhaps on other countries & regions. Iran has threatened to retaliate vs former & current US officials for killing Qasem Soleimani & previously attempted to conduct lethal operations in US

13. Iran remains a threat to Israel, both directly through its missile forces and indirectly through its support of Lebanese #Hezbollah and other terrorist groups.

14. Iran will remain a problematic actor across the region with its backing of Iraqi Shia militias, which is the primary threat to U.S. personnel in Iraq.

15. Iran’s economically and militarily propping up of a rogue Syrian regime, and spreading instability across Yemen through its support to the Huthis—including a range of advanced military systems—also pose a threat to U.S. partners and interests, including Saudi Arabia.

16. Iran’s ballistic missile programs, which include the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the region, continue to pose a threat to countries across the Middle East. Iran’s work on a space launch vehicle—including its Simorgh—shortens the timeline to an ICBM

17. We continue to assess that Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-development activities that we judge would be necessary to produce a nuclear device.

18. In July 2019, following the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018, Iran began resuming some activities that exceed JCPOA limits. If Tehran does not receive sanctions relief, Iranian officials probably will consider further enriching uranium up to 90 percent.

19. Iran was responsible for multiple cyber attacks between April-July 2020 against Israeli water facilities. Iran’s successful disruption of critical infrastructure in Israel reflects its growing willingness to take risks when it believes retaliation is justified.

20. The Middle East will remain a region characterized by persistent conflict, with active insurgencies in several countries, sparring between Iran and other countries, and terrorism and protest movements sparking occasional violence.

21. Mideast domestic volatility will persist as popular discontent & socioeconomic grievances rise, particularly as region contends with economic fallout from COVID-19 pandemic, increasing risk of internal or international conflict that would threaten U.S. persons & interests

22. Iran-backed Shia militias are likely to continue attacks against U.S. targets in Iraq, & ISIS remains a persistent threat. US personnel would also face danger if things get more violent re corruption protests, post Oct '21 elections dysfunction, & poor econ conditions

23. Conflict, economic hardship, & humanitarian crises will plague Syria during the next few years, & threats to U.S. forces will increase. Asad will rely on support of Russia & Iran & nascent progress he's made reintegrating Syria into the region to stall meaningful negotiations

24. U.S. forces in E. Syria will face continued threats from Iran, Iran-backed militias, & Syrian regime-aligned groups. ISIS & Hurras al-Din probably will plan & could attempt to launch attacks on the West from their safe havens in the country

25. There is some prospect to reduce conflicts that threaten U.S. persons and interests in the Middle East. Countervailing factors—heightened fear of Iran, doubts about U.S. reliability, and economic imperatives— are encouraging efforts to deescalate conflicts #AbrahamAccords

26. ISIS, al-Qa‘ida, & Iran & its militant allies will take advantage of weak governance to continue to plot terrorist attacks against U.S. persons and interests, including to varying degrees in the United States, and exacerbate instability in regions such as Africa & the Mideast

27. The iterative violence between Israel & Iran, & conflicts in other areas—including Africa, Asia, & Mideast—have potential to escalate or spread, fueling humanitarian crises & threatening U.S. persons, as in the case of Al-Shabaab

28. Conflicts in Mideast, Africa, & Europe, aggressive Russian actions on the periphery of Europe, possible renewal of Belarusian efforts to fuel migrant crisis along its border with Poland & Lithuania, & Taliban takeover of Afghanistan could trigger more migration to Europe

29. Terrorism remains a persistent threat to U.S. persons & interests at home & abroad. Individuals & small cells inspired by a variety of ideologies and personal motivations—including Sunni violent extremism & REMVE—probably present the greatest terrorist threat to US

30. ISIS, al-Qa‘ida, & terrorists aligned with Iran such as Lebanese #Hezbollah, probably pose the greatest threat to U.S. persons & interests abroad.

31. Consistent U.S. and allied counterterrorism pressure has degraded the external attack capabilities of ISIS and al-Qa‘ida, but they still aspire to conduct attacks in the United States

32. Communal conflict, insurgency, and instability almost certainly will provide terrorist groups continued opportunities to recruit members, acquire funds, and establish or expand safe havens from which to plot attacks—including reviving safe havens in Afghanistan.

33. Local insurgencies have at times bolstered their Sunni jihadist credentials to fully assimilate into ISIS and al Qa‘ida, allowing them to strengthen and resulting in increased attacks, lethality, and territorial influence and control.

34. Terrorists remain interested in using chemical and biological agents in attacks against U.S. interests and possibly the U.S. homeland.

35. The threat from ISIS against U.S. persons and interests probably will remain greatest in regions where the group has an operational presence; ISIS’s ideology and propaganda, however, almost certainly will continue to inspire attacks in the West, including in the United States

36. In Iraq and Syria, ISIS probably will prioritize attacks on local military and civilian targets to erode its opponents’ will to fight, maintain relevance among members and supporters, and stoke religious and ethnosectarian tension.

37. ISIS has slowed its operational tempo in Iraq and Syria, probably because of logistical, financial, personnel, and leadership shortfalls. The group remains intent on freeing some of the 10,000 ISIS fighters who remain in detention in northeast Syria.

38. In Afghanistan, ISIS-Khorasan is attempting to exploit an influx of funds and personnel from prison breaks to undermine the Taliban and build an external attack capability if it can withstand Taliban pressure.

39. AQ has increasingly devolved operational responsibility to regional affiliates as it has shifted away from centrally directed plotting.

40. Because of leadership & battlefield setbacks, AQ is constrained in its efforts to lead a unified global movement, but aims to maintain its presence in Afghanistan and capitalize on permissive operating environments.

41. AQ remains intent on striking U.S. interests; it's more capable of doing so in regions where its affiliates operate rather than in Homeland. The primary threat to the US abroad from AQ from countries where its strongest affiliates currently operate—Yemen, Somalia, & W Africa

42. Lebanese #Hezbollah will continue to work with Iran to develop terrorist capabilities as a complement to the group’s growing conventional military capabilities.

43. Hizballah seeks to reduce capability to target U.S. United States. influence in Lebanon and the broader Middle East, and maintains capability to target US persons & interests in the region, worldwide, & to lesser extent in U.S.

44. Foreign Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists (REMVE) very likely will continue to pose a threat to the United States and its allies. These actors continue to rely on transnational ties & adapt violent extremist narratives around current events like Afghanistan

45. In mid 2021, foreign REMVEs in Europe sought to exploit popular fears of a potential Afghan refugee crisis. Xenophobic sentiments have prompted an increasing number of individuals to engage with foreign REMVE groups in Europe.

46. In W Africa, volatile mixture of democratic backsliding, intercommunal violence, & terrorism threatens region’s stability. Some leaders who remain in power are turning to autocratic, state-centric, & religious governance practices, some ceding rural territory to jihadists