It is unclear if #Russian forces can encircle, let alone capture, #Severodonetsk and #Lysychansk even if they focus their efforts on that much-reduced objective.
The #Ukrainian counteroffensive around #Kharkiv is also forcing the #Russian command to make hard choices, as it was likely intended to do.
#Russian forces continued to conduct air and artillery strikes against #Ukrainian positions in the Azovstal Steel Plant on May 12.
#Russian forces attempted to improve their positions along the Southern Axis and continued to fire on #Ukrainian troops but did not make any confirmed advances on May 12.
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NEW | Russian President Vladimir Putin likely orchestrated a meeting with Kursk Oblast officials on May 20 to set conditions to justify the renewal of Russian plans to seize Sumy City and illegally annex Sumy Oblast. (1/9)
Russian forces are highly unlikely to be able to seize Sumy City in the near- to medium-term given Russia's demonstrated inability to rapidly seize even much smaller settlements in Ukraine in the past three years. (2/9)
Russia continues to promote the false narrative accusing Ukrainian forces of "neo-Nazism" as part of dual Kremlin efforts to justify continued Russian offensive operations in Ukraine despite ongoing peace talks, and to prepare the Russian population for a Russian rejection of any future peace agreement. (3/9)
Iran threatened to disrupt international commercial shipping if the U.S. conducted strikes on Iranian nuclear or energy facilities.
Recent instances of GPS interference in the Strait of Hormuz and possible Iranian harassment of a commercial vessel in the Persian Gulf suggest that Iran may be trying to signal to the U.S. that it can threaten freedom of navigation through the Persian Gulf to deter a potential US strike on Iran.
Iran may have jammed vessel navigation systems in the Strait of Hormuz on May 18 in order to set conditions to seize vessels that inadvertently enter Iranian territorial waters as a result of navigation issues.
Iran previously conducted GPS jamming in 2019 to try to lure vessels into Iranian waters in response to US President Donald Trump’s maximum pressure strategy.
The GPS disruptions on May 18 come after a possible Iranian vessel recently harassed a commercial vessel in the Persian Gulf on May 10.
The UK Maritime Trade Operations reported that a small craft collided with a merchant vessel. The merchant vessel later received Very High Frequency messages from unidentified individuals claiming to be local authorities.
NEW | Iran is preparing for a potential escalation with the United States by positioning military assets on key islands in the Persian Gulf and signaling its intent to target US bases, commercial shipping, and regional allies.
Iranian officials continued to categorically reject US demands for zero uranium enrichment, which may stall US-Iran nuclear negotiations.
Houthi air defenses appear to have prevented US forces from establishing air supremacy over Yemen, though the Houthis did not create sufficient disruption to prevent US operations.
NEW | The Kremlin is strengthening its strategic relationship with the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)—Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.
The AES helps the Kremlin supplant Western influence, pose as a great power, and create opportunities to threaten NATO's southern flank.🧵
The three foreign ministers from the AES states traveled to Moscow to meet with Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov on April 3 and 4 as part of the first sessions of “AES-Russia consultations.” 2/7
The AES is a strategic project for Russia that advances its goals to supplant Western influence in Africa and assert itself as a revitalized great power.
The AES functions as a pro-Russian economic, military, and political bloc. 3/7
Reports of Houthi fighters’ formation of the Nasrallah Battalion in Iraq and Houthi fighters’ integration into PMF units, if accurate, may be consistent with growing Houthi cooperation with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in recent months.🧵
Yemeni Media Minister in Aden, Muammar al Eryani, claimed on March 26 that 700-1,200 Houthi fighters who fled from Syria after the fall of the Assad regime have formed the “Nasrallah battalion” in Iraq.
The director of the Iraqi Observatory for Rights and Freedom similarly stated on April 1 that the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) is integrating Houthi fighters from the Nasrallah Battalion and Houthi drone and missile experts into PMF units in Diyala, Baghdad, and Jurf al Sakhr.
The director is likely referring to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that are part of the PMF.
NEW | Al Qaeda’s Somali affiliate al Shabaab is attempting to overwhelm Somali forces around Mogadishu and in central Somalia.🧵⬇️🇸🇴
Al Shabaab has escalated attacks around Mogadishu, including an attempt to assassinate the Somali president, and increasingly infiltrated the capital outskirts since the beginning of Ramadan at the end of February. 2/9
The group had not escalated the rate or severity of its attacks in Mogadishu or its southern outskirts as of mid-March.
The brazenness of al Shabaab's activity, however, highlights the group’s infiltration around Mogadishu and the heightened publicization of this activity. 3/9