The remaining Russian forces in #Severodonetsk will need to cross the Siverskyi Donets River into #Lysychansk from Severodonetsk or its surrounding settlements to participate further in the Russian offensive.
This movement could require some time since the Russians destroyed the three main bridges across the river. However, Russian officials have claimed that Russian forces have already crossed the river from Kreminna and are building bridgeheads for further attacks on Lysychansk.
ISW cannot independently verify such claims, but if they are true, and Russian forces threaten to complete the cauldron by pushing from the north and SW of Lysychansk, then Ukrainian forces will likely abandon the city and conduct a fighting withdrawal to more defensible lines.
A notable acceleration of Russian attacks from the south of Lysychansk or from across the Siverskyi Donetsk River would likely indicate that the Russians have completed a redeployment of forces from Severodonetsk, but ISW has not yet observed such indicators. /End
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Ukraine’s expulsion of Russian forces from Snake Island is a significant accomplishment for Kyiv and an important defeat for Moscow.
However, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and land-based anti-ship systems in Crimea and Kherson Oblast can still threaten ships sailing to Odesa. Thread:
Ukrainian forces are unlikely to reoccupy Snake Island, but they don’t need to - they needed to get the Russians off it, and they did. (2/6)
Russia needed Snake Island to threaten the sea route to Odesa along the Romanian coast, which is the safest way for ships to skirt the blockade of grain and other exports. (3/6)
Russian forces have made substantial gains in the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk areas and Ukrainian troops continue to suffer high casualties, but Ukrainian forces have fundamentally accomplished their objective by slowing down and inflicting heavy losses on Russian forces. (2/6)
Ukrainian troops have succeeded for weeks in drawing substantial quantities of Russian personnel, weapons, and equipment into the area and have likely degraded Russian forces' overall capabilities while preventing them from focusing on more advantageous axes of advance. (3/6)
Russian forces focused on maintaining positions to the SE of #Izyum and west of #Lyman but did not make any confirmed advances towards #Slovyansk on June 20. Russian forces remain unlikely to advance on Slovyansk as they concentrate resources on the capture of Luhansk Oblast.
Russian forces continued efforts to interdict Ukrainian lines of communication east of Bakhmut along the T1302 Bakhmut-Lysychansk highway but did not make any confirmed advances on June 20. isw.pub/RusCampaignJun…
- Russian President Vladimir Putin declared that Russian forces will attack Ukrainian positions near #Donetsk City but reiterated that the new tactic will require additional time during his address at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum.
- Ukrainian forces are likely conducting a counteroffensive northwest of #Izyum intended to draw Russian forces away from offensive operations toward #Slovyansk and disrupt Russian supply lines and are making minor gains.
More from tonight's assessment, with axis-specific updates to follow:
Kremlin-sponsored outlet Izvestia published and quickly removed an appeal by the First Deputy Head of the Russian Presidential Administration Sergey Kirelenko for Russia to rebuild Donbas on 6/12. (1/3)
Izvestia likely intended to save the article for a later date to set informational conditions for Russian annexation of Donbas and blamed hackers for what they (likely falsely) claimed was a “fake publication.” (2/3)
#Russian forces continue to struggle with generating additional combat-capable units. Pro-Russian sources are continuing to spread disinformation to sow anxiety and resentment among the #Ukrainian population.
The UK Ministry of Defense reported on June 12 that Russian forces have been trying to produce more combat units by preparing to deploy third battalion tactical groups (BTGs) from some units over the last few weeks.
The UK MoD further noted that Russian brigades and regiments normally can generate two BTGs; however, doing so leaves the parent units largely hollow shells, as these third BTGs will likely be understaffed and rely on recruits and mobilized reservists.