Thread by @WarintheFuture

At the NATO summit in Madrid this week, among the outcomes was an agreement about a new NATO Strategic Concept. What is it, and what might it mean for the war in #Ukraine? 1/22 🧵 #natosummit2022

2/ The #NATO Strategic Concept is designed to describe how NATO and its constituent nations will respond to the challenges, opportunities and threats to their security and defence. The development of the new version was an outcome of the 2021 NATO Summit: nato.int/cps/en/natohq/…

3/ This is the first update of the NATO Strategic Concept since 2010. The NATO website has a pretty cool summary of all previous strategic concepts, and the rationales for the development of each, at its website. nato.int/cps/en/natohq/…

4/ This new version is a recognition of the fundamental changes in the global security environment in the past decade. It is also a reinvigoration of the alliance, giving it renewed purpose for the 21st century. Lets briefly review the contents of the 2022 Strategic Concept.

5/ The new Strategic Concept has three key elements: 1. NATO values & purpose; 2. The strategic environment; and 3. NATO’s response to the environment, described as its ‘core tasks’. nato.int/strategic-conc…

6/ Part 1: Purpose & values:
- Ensure collective defence, against all threats, from all directions.
- A defensive Alliance.
- Common values: individual liberty, human rights, democracy and the rule of law.
- Commitment to Charter of the US & North Atlantic Treaty.

7/ Part 2: Strategic Environment:
- Euro-Atlantic area “not at peace”.
- Authoritarian actors challenge interests, values & democracy.
- Russia the most significant & direct threat to security

8/ Part 2: Strategic Environment (II):
- NATO does not seek confrontation and poses no threat to the Russia.
- Will continue to respond to Russian threats and hostile actions in a united way.

9/ Part 2: Strategic Environment (III):
- China’s stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values.
- China strives to subvert the rules-based international order.
- Partnership between China & Russia runs counter to our values & interests.

10/ Part 2: Strategic Environment (IV):
- Terrorism the most direct asymmetric threat to the security of citizens and international peace & prosperity.
- Cyberspace contested at all times.
- Climate change the defining challenge of our time.

11/ So, that is a summary of the strategic environment as viewed from a NATO perspective. What is the response? There are three elements: 1. Deterrence and defence; 2. Crisis preventaion and management; 3. Cooperative security.

12/ Deterrence & defence. This is a range of military responses including deterring & defending forward; collective readiness, interoperability and deployability; expedited digital transformation, secure use of space / cyber, NBC defence; and nuclear force as ‘supreme guarantee’.

13/ Crisis preventaion and management. This is a much smaller section than the one on deterrence and defence. And while not an after thought, clearly #NATO sees this as an important but probably a secondary mission moving forward.

14/ Cooperative security. This examines #NATO membership and the partnerships that NATO has with non-NATO parties that share its values. It also reaffirms previous decisions about Ukraine from the 2008 Bucharest Summit.

15/ What does this mean for #Ukraine? In the short term, it provides a strategic narrative that underpins Ukraine support to Ukraine, as well as for new members joining NATO’s alliance. The summit declaration also reaffirms NATO’s ‘Open Door Policy’. nato.int/cps/en/natohq/…

16/ The reinvigoration of NATO at the summit is also good for #Ukraine in the medium to long term. It should hopefully mean a resurgence of European defence capacity, which will underpin Ukraine's transition from a Soviet equipped and supported military, to a NATO standard.

17/ But reality is that a substantive reinvigoration of NATO – and ongoing support to Ukraine - is predicated on more investment in defence by NATO countries. The majority of members are not yet at the 2% of GDP defence spending benchmark. nato.int/nato_static_fl…

18/ If countries such as Germany, Canada, Spain & Italy remain laggards in this regard, NATO will not be able to implement its expanded view of deterrence & defence. Deterrence is underpinned by a transparent commitment to increased defence spending – not business as usual.

19/ Many NATO nations that have given arms & munitions to Ukraine don't have large war stocks. At some point these must be replenished. Greater investment in defence industry will be required for both NATO and long term support to provide arms and ammunition to Ukraine.

20/ Words and relationships in alliances matter. So the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept is an important statement of strategic intent, and a recognition of the need to adapt to a changing strategic environment. And it provides the rationale for ongoing support to Ukraine.

21/ But increased defence industrial capacity is critical – war is again being fought at a scale that requires expanded industrial capability. If the NATO Strategic Concept drives this, it will assist Ukraine’s transition to NATO munitions, and its capacity to fight on. End.

22/ Thank you to the following, whose images I used in this thread: @NATO, @jensstoltenberg, nato.int, Kyivindependent.com & time.com.