Thread by @WarintheFuture

We are now at the 129 day mark since Russia began its invasion of #Ukraine. There are conflicting claims about whether the Russians have siezed #Lysychansk. Today, an assessment of options for Russia’s next moves. 1/16

https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1543383524681695233

2/ Currently, Russian forces are closing the Luhansk Pocket. The Russian operational objectives here have been to draw the Ukrainians into a battle of attrition (Russia’s preferred war of war), as well as to capture the remaining Ukrainian held territory in Luhansk.

3/ If Russia captures the remainder of Luhansk in the short term, what might be their next move?

4/ First, Russia would leverage a victory for its strategic influence campaign. It would communicate this as a victory to its domestic audience, to support recruiting campaigns & provide a further rationale for the Russian Duma’s 30 June “special measures in the economic sphere”.

5/ Russia will seek to use a ‘victory in Luhansk’ message globally to show that the tide of the war had turned, and that ‘supporting Ukraine is only delaying the inevitable’. newyorker.com/news/annals-of…

6/ Militarily, what are Russia’s options for its next operational objectives? First, it might assume a defensive posture to rest, resupply and regenerate forces in the east. This, however, risks wasting the tactical momentum they have created in that region.

7/ The Russians, having drawn the Ukrainians into a more attritional fight in the east, may also make an assessment that no matter how exhausted Russian troops & logistic systems are, the Ukrainians may be more exhausted. War is about relative advantages, and exploiting them.

8/ Therefore, a more likely option is that the Russians may elect to continue advancing to secure move of Donetsk. They may conduct a broader envelopment in the east, with the Sloviansk-Bahkmut line one obvious next operational objective.

9/ Several other considerations will impact on this however. The Russians are under continued pressure in the south. In Kherson, the Ukrainians are continuing to chip away at territory seized by Russia earlier in the war.

10/ As I wrote a couple of weeks ago in @smh, the war in the south is the more decisive front in this war; it permits Russia to economically strangle #Ukraine. So the Russian’s can't afford to allow the Ukrainians to make too much progress here. smh.com.au/world/europe/p…

11/ As such, in the wake of any Luhansk success, Russia may have to rebalance its forces between the east and the south. The challenge in the south is magnified for the Russians by the Ukrainian resistance activites in the region.

12/ At the same time, the Ukrainian #military high command has a east-south challenge. How much does it invest in defending the east, and how does it invest in offensive activities in the south? At the same time, the north and north east will draw some forces away as well.

13/ While tactical momentum is with the Russians, they still have issues with regeneration of combat forces. They have tactical & operational choices available, but all have logistic, air support & other challenges. How long can they sustain advances in #Donetsk is unknown.

14/ Both sides are tiring, but they also have the will and the means to continue the fight over the long term. Predicting any particular outcome, based on single tactical wins & losses, and with limited information, is fraught with danger.

15/ The longer term prospects, assuming continued Western support, tend to favour Ukraine. But this relies on continued (and increased) military, intelligence & economic aid, sanctions, influence operations & a level of strategic patience not always in evidence in the west. End.

16/ Thank you to the following, whose images were used in this thread: CNN.com @thestudyofwar @criticalthreats nytimes.com @war_mapper @reuterspictures newyorker.com @NATO @ORatushniak