Last Friday, I had the pleasure of catching up for lunch with a colleague who is also an ethicist. While our discussion was broad ranging, we kept returning to the notion of good and evil, and the idea of ‘just wars’ in relation to #Ukraine. 1/22 🧵
2/ At the same time we were discussing the ethics of war, the Organization for Security and Cooperation and Europe released its latest report that examined the horrific acts attributed to the Russian Army and its proxies in Ukraine. osce.org/odihr/522616
3/ The report notes that “some of the most serious violations encompass targeted killing of civilians, including journalists, human rights defenders, or local mayors; unlawful detentions, abductions and enforced disappearances of the same categories of persons…”
4/ It also describes “large-scale deportations of Ukrainian civilians to Russia; various forms of mistreatment, including torture, inflicted on detained civilians and prisoners of war.” smh.com.au/world/europe/w…
6/ As someone who spent 35 years honing my professionalism in the Army, these Russian acts are indicative of a professionally corrupt and morally hollow Russian military institution. But one does not need to be a soldier to be repulsed by the actions of the Russian Army.
7/ This latest round of revelations provides only more evidence about the mindset of Putin and his determination to erase the existence of #Ukraine. And it should provide further impetus, and indeed a rapid escalation, in western support to help Ukraine defeat #Russia.
8/ So, what does Ukraine need for the next phase of this war?
9/ First, they need mobile logistics and more artillery. This means lots of trucks and handling equipment to keep up with the supply of munitions. Read @TrentTelenko for expert commentary on this.
10/ And artillery systems donated henceforth also need to be self-propelled rather than towed. Towed artillery cannot move quick enough to escape the inevitable counter-battery fire of the modern battlefield.
11/ Second, they need enhanced air and missile defences to protect their people, their soldiers, logistics hubs and high value military equipment such as #HIMARS. This will need to be integrated in a secure digital network.
12/ Related to this is electronic warfare support. This helps the Ukrainians protect their own communications and drones, breaks down Russian command and control, and provides targeting against Russian high value targets.
13/ The Ukrainians, to conduct offensive operations & take back their territory, will also need armoured personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles. Like the Russians, they have suffered significant losses to their armoured vehicle fleet over the last 5 months.
14/ More counter autonomy systems to destroy Russian and Iranian drones will be vital. Ukraine needs more of these anti-drone systems to degrade the Russian targeting for their artillery & missile, as well as deny Russia the use of suicide drones. afr.com/world/europe/h…
15/ Concurrently, NATO must work on a more standardised equipment set (especially artillery & armoured vehicles). The Ukrainians currently have some of every type of western artillery system - this will be an increasing training and logistic burden.
16/ Finally, the West needs to stand by its commitments to support Ukraine. Backsliding on military assistance commitments, or on political support as inflation rises, may be expedient for some.
17/ But in the end, it will only assist Putin and embolden other authoritarian regimes who already doubt the commitment of democracies to actually defend democracy.
18/ In the TV series, Band of Brothers, the 9th episode was called “Why We Fight”. It showed American soldiers discovering a Nazi concentration camp. The message was that despite the sacrifices of the allies, they had been worthwhile to destroy a regime capable of such behaviour.
19/ The war in Ukraine provides us with the clearest example since WW2 of a war of good versus evil. The appalling, systemic and sickening acts of the Russian Army – sanctioned by a Russian government - should be a clarion call for nations in the West.
20/ We have a moral obligation to help Ukraine win this war as quickly as possible. After all, if we aren’t willing to do all we can to help Ukraine defeat Russia and end large-scale breaches of international law and human decency, what are we willing to defend? End.
The last two months have seen a different kind of War in Ukraine. And after a period of reduced tempo operations in the east, we should expect things to heat up again over the coming weeks. Both sides will want to make progress before winter comes. 1/20 🧵
2/ After their failures before Kyiv and Kharkiv, and manpower losses, the Russians have now settled into a different pattern of battlefield operations. Now, they let their artillery lead the way.
3/ While it has still been expensive for the Russians, they have managed to secure almost all of Luhansk region. In the wake of this ‘success’, the Russians reduced their operational tempo to prepare for a subsequent operation to secure the Donetsk region.
Earlier this week, I wrote about the impact that several HIMARS rocket artillery systems are having in #Ukraine. And while the focus of the article was Ukraine, I also explored HIMARS for Australia. 1/10 smh.com.au/world/europe/w…
2/ The genesis of this capability for the ADF was back in 2013-2014. It was envisaged as a deployable capability for Australia to execute what we called Joint Archipelagic Manoeuvre. You can read it here: researchcentre.army.gov.au/sites/default/…
3/ Despite some reticence in the Department of Defence, and from those who saw it as a threat to their more expensive strike projects, eventually it was agreed that the Army should have a 21st century long range strike capability. Like every other modern Army.
Over the past few days, the Twittersphere has been expounding on the impact that several #HIMARS rocket artillery systems are having in #Ukraine. And they are awesome! But some perspective is required before expectations for their impact get too overblown. 1/17 🧵
2/ HIMARS is a lighter, more deployable version of an older tracked launcher that used the same rockets. And because it is mobile, it can shoot and move quickly, making it a very survivable platform in an era of short times between detection and destruction.
3/ HIMARS, because of its range and accuracy, is a weapon that is designed to attack targets deep in the enemy’s rear. It is used to destroy critical communications nodes, command posts, airfields, and important logistics facilities.
More than four months have passed since the beginning of the Russian invasion of #Ukraine. During the war, Russian and Ukrainian strategy has evolved. Today, an update on Russia’s #strategy in Ukraine. 1/22
2/ The aim of this is to provide insights into how Putin has evolved his ‘theory of victory’ in #Ukraine, and therefore provide a foundation for developing Ukraine’s (and the West’s) defeat mechanisms against Russia.
3/ Throughout the conflict, many have explored Russia’s strategy for its subjugation of Ukraine. Because that is what Putin seeks – the absolute subjugation of the Ukrainian people, and the extinguishment of their sovereignty.
2/ This examination of the relationship between close combat and fires (direct support, as well as deep fires & air power) is superb. I have studied this campaign a lot, and it has made me rethink what I thought I knew.
3/ It does not diminish the importance of close combat. But it establishes the pivotal role of fires and logistics, which we sometimes under-study in our land-centric histories of the campaign.
Russian forces have apparently now completed their conquest of the Luhansk region. They have however only partially succeed in achieving their operational objective of capturing the Donbas. They have not destroyed the Ukrainian army in field, nor their steel will. 1/12 🧵
2/ The Ukrainians, having persevered in the face of Russian artillery & air power, conducted a disciplined retrograde operation to preserve their army. They have ensured the Russian forces have bled for every metre of territory gained in Luhansk. smh.com.au/world/europe/a…
3/ Russia will leverage this ‘victory’ for its strategic influence campaign. Putin, having already apparently declared victory in the past 24 hours, will want to communicate this as a success to his domestic audience.