Many of us have wondered why the battle for Severodonetsk was quite lengthy, but AFU could not hold that long in Lysychansk, which is on higher ground and across the river. Ukrainian Brigadier General Dmytro Krasylnykov about Lysychansk and morale of UA soldiers:
My translation:
"Unfortunately, it turned out that for some reason, everyone forgets the problem. I have always said that the main problem is not the top-down, not the altitude or the lowlands. The main problem is logistics and provision because you can be courageous. /1
You can be fearless. You can be super prepared, have three night-vision eyes, and all that. But what happened to Severodonetsk?
Three bridges that connected Lysychansk and Severodonetsk were destroyed. That is, any supply could have been conducted by what? /2
By pontoon crossing or by boat. Even if this Severodonetsk could be filled with ammunition, in advance, water, food – anything. But you can't evacuate the wounded in advance. The wounded appear during the battle.
The main problem is evacuating the wounded soldiers. /3
If there is no evacuation of the injured, as soon as there is no medical assistance in time, that's it. We can consider that the unit is already lost. /4
Because everyone starts thinking, "aha, if I get wounded, what if I'm bleeding just the same, waiting for someone to come by boat or something?" /5
How many times have I heard the rationale of that Severodonetsk, why we needed Lysychansk, we did not need Severodonetsk, stand to the death, and so on - you can do anything. /6
Especially since at that time in Severodonetsk, there were those units of the SDF, the National Guard motivated, which could generally conduct the defense. But again - for what? /7
So they could complete the defense until this defense was more valuable than the withdrawal to previously prepared positions.
Everyone hoped that would happen with Lysychansk, but what happened with Lysychansk is that the enemy went to Lysychansk from the other side. /8
So we moved reserves to Severodonetsk, and the enemy broke through the oil refinery to Lysychansk from the southern side.
How did this happen? Well, again, everything has a limit on patience, a limitation on endurance, and so on. /9
That is, I saw a unit that had been repulsing all the attacks for three months, had been counterattacking, had been chasing the enemy. And then the moment came when - bang! And everybody refused to do the mission. Just abruptly, that's all. So there was some breakdown. /10
When there are very few experienced and motivated service members, they no longer affect the morale of the entire unit. /11
And when many of the mobilized servicemen arrive, who have no experience, skills, desire, nothing, they override with their panic any rational grain of those people who make up the backbone of the unit. /12
In my opinion, we need to look clearly: as soon as the unit becomes somewhere around 50% of the regular unit, it already needs to be withdrawn for at least 5, 7 days to recover, even to a second line. /13
So let's say not to the "mainland" part of the country where there are no hostilities, but even 20 km, 30 km from the front line. So that at least they are not hit by gun artillery. The main task is to get them out from under the barrel artillery. /14
And there, they can quietly reformat and ditch the units coming in for re-staffing.
I mean, what's the problem? Even if this sergeant wanted to pass on some of his experience to a soldier new to the unit, he couldn't pass it on. Why not? /15
Because he's here, he's in a different position. There is a constant battle. You can't just talk about anything, and you can't teach anybody anything. Just simply to put his head on straight. There's no time. And there's just no opportunity. /16
So it is necessary to keep a specific limit of fatigue, a boundary."
PART 6 (the last one) of the interview with gen. Kryvonos made by Mark Solonin and translated by me.
Topic: Why did Putin start the war?
Original video:
(I): We've had a lot of conversations already. But what a normal, peace-loving country, an ordinary, peace-loving people, was not going to. For 30 years, they didn't prepare for war with their neighbor. /2
Here is also a thread of different parts of the interview. There is also some information about Kryvonos' background and views, as there are many questions about those.
(I): Now, we move on to what has been called the second phase, from late April to Early July. Here's this protracted months-long battle in the Donbas in the northern part of the Donbas. /2
Here is also a thread of different parts of the interview. I have added some information about Kryvonos' background and views, as there are many questions about those.
Translation:
(I): Okay, we're done with the beginning of the war, and we go straight to the conclusion of the first phase, which is the end of March. /2
PART 3 of the interview with gen. Kryvonos was made by Mark Solonin and translated by me.
Topic: battles for airfields around Kyiv. Defense of Zhyliany airport.
Here is also a thread of different parts of the interview. I have added some information about Kryvonos' background and views, as there are many questions about those.
Translation:
Interviewer(I): Right. Nevertheless, the enemy did not pass Bucha in a day, not in two, not in a week, not in a month. And in particular, as far as I understand, they did not manage to capture and use the landing craft for landing. /2
Who is General Kryvonos? My thread about his interviews exploded. Thanks everyone for the support. I decided to write a short thread about his background and views because there many questions about those.
First, as my professor in the Journalism course said, no one is objective; it is a challenging task for a human. So, I recommend taking the interview with a grain of salt. /1
Kryvonos is a Ukrainian officer with a lengthy career, which started in 1988 when he was conscripted into the USSR army. According to him, during 2003-2004, he was in Iraq, and the US army's organization impressed him. That's what he says about his experience: /2