Thread by @WarintheFuture

This is a very interesting short report that has been posted by @Osinttechnical. There are a few insights on war and #leadership that we might gain from this summary, assuming the account from a 'Russian soldier' is authentic. 1/15 🧵

https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1557550990705958913

2/ First, the most lethal thing on the battlefield remains a human. But, the most lethal and effective weapon system on the ground in #Ukraine is artillery. The decline in the amount & use of #artillery since the Cold War must be fixed in western armies.

3/ But, as recent studies (including some really excellent reports from @RUSI_org) have shown, the industrial base for weapon and munitions production has declined. This will need to be redressed quickly.

4/ Second, the 'detection to destruction' time - on both sides, has shortened compared to previous conflicts. Some reports note this is in the 3-5 minutes range, and sometimes shorter. Better meshing of sensor networks (which include UAVs) with fires & commanders is the reason.

5/ This means that deception and camouflage remain vital in land forces. It can't be a discretionary thing for commanders, at any level.

6/ At the same time, battlefield mobility is more important than ever. Static command posts, towed artillery and logistic stocks that are not 'on wheels' are now more vulnerable than ever. There are important force design considerations that emerge from this.

7/ And this reference to land force design leads to my third point - command culture. The 'mission command' approach used in many western military organisations is an important command philosophy which we must continue to nurture (even though it is hard work to do so).

8/ Because it is intent based, it permits flexibility and rapid adaptation to tactical events without having to constantly to refer back to higher command levels. This is important for the survivability of a land force in an era of reduced 'detection to destruction' times.

9/ But it is also vital if we want commanders who can recognise opportunities and exploit them on the battlefield. Mission command provides intent, as well as guidelines for exploiting opportunity. If done well (which is rarer than you might think), it is very powerful.

10/ Which is why mission command remains a foundational command philosophy for training western officers and NCOs. But it requires establishment of mutual trust, experience as well as good doctrine, procedures, battlefield discipline and training.

11/ On the other hand, military forces like the Chinese PLA is investing a huge amount of research in #AI for automated tactical decision making. It is unlikely this will replace the creativity of humans, nor their capacity to understand context.

12/ Finally, it is interesting that a junior leader is writing this & sharing their thoughts in this way. While they might be the enemy, this is a powerful way of sharing lessons in a military institution, and nurturing a bottum-up learning culture. It should drive #adaptation.

13/ Whether that is possible in the short term in the Russian Army is probably unlikely. But we have also seen wide sharing of lessons among western junior military leaders expand in a type of #Cambrian Explosion of lessons and ideas sharing since the start of this century.

14/ The massive expansion in the use of social media for reporting, mapping, targeting and assessment during the war in #Ukraine will only see wider use of this capability (if used wisely) to share lessons and #adapt based on observations of the war.

15/ So, thanks to @Osinttechnical for sharing this. Sometimes short reports or narratives can possess quite profound lessons on the future of #war, and in developing people in the profession of arms. End.