1/24 At the beginning of the war, Russia had a total advantage in all parameters. 1.5 times more soldiers, 4 times more tanks, 6 times more armored vehicles, 2 times more artillery. The advantage in aviation, navy and long-range systems is 10 times or more.
2/24 In the first phase of the war, Russia suffered heavy losses.
Many soldiers who participated in the storming of Kharkiv and Kyiv refused to fight further.
However, Russia managed to stop this process.
3/24 In May, Russia significantly changed its tactics. The last defeat of a large column of armored vehicles, which tried to break through our defenses, took place near Beilohorivka back in mid-May. Then the Russians lost about 100 pieces of equipment and 500-1000 soldiers.
4/24 The storming of Popasnaya and the subsequent attack on Severodonetsk-Lysychansk developed according to a different scenario: prolonged massive artillery shelling, destruction of all buildings and structures, attack by mobile groups with infantry support.
5/24 Tanks no longer tried to break deep into the defenses, creating a springboard for a massive attack. This tactic was effective in World War II, but not now. Russians, albeit slowly, are still learning.
6/In addition, the Russian command began to rely more and more on separatist units of the self-proclaimed "LDNR" and mercenaries of the "Wagner" group. It was they who were allowed in the first line of attack, and the regular troops of RFA were mainly in the second line of attack
7/24 But the number of Ukrainian troops is constantly growing. Currently, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine claims about 700,000 military personnel (obviously this figure includes support personnel and those who have not yet finished training).
8/24 However, we can talk about the superiority in the number of Ukrainian troops on the front line by 2 times.
You can often come across the phrase: "Ukraine lacks troops", but in reality, there is a lack of heavy weapons.
9/24 The Russian army no longer has room to reduce the number of its forces. It is necessary to either shorten the front line, that is, retreat from certain directions. And this is a failure in the eyes of Russian "patriots".
10/24 Or reduce the intensity of fighting and "freeze" most of the front, which Ukraine will not agree to. Or look for new mobilization reserves.
11/24 It is obvious that the experience of the formation of the third army corps shows that even for a "high salary" there are not as many people willing to fight in the Russian Federation as needed.
12/ Mass forced mobilization will lead to the fact that the situation at the front will become badly managed. The number of non-compliance with orders or surrenders will increase. This measure puts Putin on hold for the worst-case scenario. And it cannot be implemented quickly.
13/ The situation with tanks is the best for Ukraine, because Russia has already lost from 30 to 50% of all the tanks it had at the beginning of the war.
Ukraine managed to capture a large number of tanks, as well as receive 300-400 T-72 tanks from Poland and the Czech Republic.
14/24 In terms of the number of armored vehicles and the number of artillery, Russia still has a total advantage. First, Russia has significant reserves that are easier to mobilize than tanks. Secondly, Ukraine is losing more artillery systems than it is gaining.
15/24 Of the 1,500 Soviet artillery systems that Ukraine had at the beginning of the war, more than half were lost. First of all, due to the lack of Soviet-caliber projectiles and extensive wear and tear of old systems.
The Allies compensated only 25-30% of these losses.
16/24 I do not appreciate the role of aviation in the war, because aviation mostly performs an atypical role for it: shelling unguided missiles at a shallow depth. It looks impressive, but it is more reminiscent of the role of MLRS.
17/24 Tactical position on the side of Ukraine. Ukraine has open rear and flanks. Instead, Russian troops are cut off from their rear by natural barriers: Kherson - the Dnipro River; South - the Crimean Isthmus; East - Siversky Donets river and Oskil reservoir.
18/24 Russia depends on narrow logistics routes. Which are difficult to protect.
This creates conditions for attacks in different directions.
I wrote about it back in July: forbes.ua/inside/dolya-v…
19/24 Also, Ukraine has a significant advantage in the quality of intelligence. But reconnaissance alone is meaningless if the artillery does not have time to destroy the targets.
20/In one of the reports from advanced positions, a Ukrainian scout complains that Ukrainian artillery does not have time to destroy all the targets found by the scout. Howitzers move quite slowly along the front line and do not always manage to arrive in time for a counterattack
21/24 Ukraine is also forced to use non-typical methods. For example, mortars instead of artillery.
"We approach the enemy at 2-3 km and shoot at their rear at 4-5 km, instead of using self-propelled guns, because there are not enough of them...
22/ ...And that's why we are forced to substitute our mortars," said a scout from mortar squad "Svyat". Unfortunately, he died during the counterattack on Kherson.
23/ Unfortunately, the lack of heavy weapons forces Ukrainian troops to take risks. This risk brings greater losses than if the Ukrainian army had enough armored vehicles and artillery.
Therefore, it is worth remembering that every howitzer saves someone's life. Dozens of lives.
24/24 Now Russia is at a dead end or on the way to it. But if this moment is missed and Russia can regain its strength in the winter and spring, everything can change.
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2/17 There are different assumptions about what is currently being will happen near Kherson.
Someone is talking about an attack on Kherson. Someone is about probing weak spots in the RU defense. Someone claims that the counterattack "failed" (@JulianRoepcke).
3/17 If Ukraine planned to attack Kherson, it probably would not have talked so much about this offensive in the last 2 months.
All this time we have seen informational pressure. "It will start very soon". Now it has turned into military pressure.
2/25 Tempos are more important. Rates of losses and rates of mobilization of reserves.
If you lose more than you can mobilize - your army is shrinking.
If mobilization exceeds losses, your army accumulates reserves.
3/25 At the beginning of the war, the Russian forces consisted of:
a) 150-190K - Regular troops of Russia
b) 30K+ - Forces of the separatist LDNR
c) 5-10K - Russian Guard
d) 1K+ - Wagner Group businessinsider.com/russia-up-to-1…
2/17 Russia's war against Ukraine seems to many people to be local and not too big on a global scale. But if we compare it with World Wars І and II, then in terms of the level of destruction of artillery, Russia is not inferior to the artillery of the USSR in 1941-1942.
3/17 If you divide it by the length of the front line, then the destruction caused by Russian artillery is comparable to the scale of the destruction of Hitler's army in 1941-1944.
We see one of the most destructive wars right now. And it is difficult to call it a local conflict.
2/7 But at the end of April, the war entered the second phase - an artillery battle.
Ukraine is experiencing a shortage of shells for Soviet artillery systems.
Because of this, the number and intensity of Soviet artillery in Ukraine are constantly deteriorating.
3/7 In April-June, Ukraine received quite a lot of artillery systems from the Allies. But since July, this process has slowed down.
Most likely, the US is betting on weapons of deterrence, not weapons of attack.