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Mert N. Matsumoto (松本信秀) Profile picture
@ArveloaMert
Sep 8, 2022 • 100 tweets • 40 min read • Read on X
As #Ukraine started a counter-offensive versus Russian forces, battlefield become much more dynamic and contested. For avoiding a premature conclusion I waited to make an extensive analysis of counter-offensive strategy and tactics. But I think now it is time. Let’s start; Image
Before starting a detailed analysis of an counter offensive, we have to look to the timeline that brought us until now. Since May, after the Russian decision to relocate its main target from whole of Ukraine to Dombass and Southern Ukraine, Russia focused on an all-out offensive.
3 - Russia’s strategy of blending attrition and maneuver warfare to exhaust Ukrainian troops with immense amount of firepower and violence earned little as Ukrainian defences remained solid and well-structured. Russia over-spended its vast amount of ammunation and man power.
4 - Ukraine answered these moves with a shift to power-saving approach by continuing limited hit and run attacks. As Russia spend vast amount of capabilities, Ukrainians tried to replenish them in that time span. Now tables have turned.
5 - Ukraine’s success depends upon one of Clausewitz’s main warnings as he warned that the goal in a defensive warfare is to assure your military to survive rather than achieve a tactical goal. Ukrainian military survived that mixed Russian strategy. Image
6 - Ukrainian defensive positioning also paid much against Russia. Their use of extensive defensive positioning and limitied use Cordone Defence contributed them against Russians to conduct raids with small groups of troops that equipped with anti-armour weapons. Image
7 - #Ukraine’s defensive poisitioning also has some important lessons that one should take from Clausewitz. As Russian military divided to three theatres (East, Northeast and South) and supported by a secured back, Ukraine fed and supplied its extensive positions.
8 - Even Russia’s wide range and intense denial by the use of artilleries fire power, Ukraine also achieved to limit Russian advance. This allowed them to use a Defu-tart which means delaying an enemy advance by retreating to better positions and breaking enemy fire power.
9 - A Defu-tart naturally ends with a counter-offensive which is the situation that we are now in. In a counter-offensive, it looks like Ukraine is again up for an indirect approach which defined by Liddel Hart. Image
10 - Liddel Hart defined a Fabian Grand Strategy where a power concentrate on peripheral organization of enemy rather than a peer-to-peer combat with enemy’s center of gravity. Ukrainian forces targeted peripheral targets like logistics. It will continue in counter-offensive.
11 - Arrival of HIMARS and other long range artilleries also solidified Ukrainian capacity to target Russian supply depots, bridges and ammunation depots. It easened the Ukrainian efforts to conduct a Fabian GS. Image
12 - Another important issue beside HIMARS is the supply of anti-radiation missiles to Ukraine. Hellfires were also in their course to the battlefield. HARMs strengthened the hand of Kyiv in neutralizing Russian air defences which opened a path for limited control.
13 - What are the main requirements for making a successful counter offensive? The first one is of course MANEUVER: Offensive party requires to take the initiative for extensive mobility. Which means Kyiv should have enough mobile forces to dictate the course of war over Russia. Image
14 - The main strength that Ukraine showed in Kharkiv is sourced from the mobility of forces where UAF dictated the war in accordance with its maneuvers against ill-prepared Russian forces.
15 - The second one is FIRE POWER: For a maneuver, a warring party has to neutralize area-denial capabilities of the enemy which also connects with a capacity to deny the movements of the enemy. Image
16 - The main capacity of Ukrainian counter-denial is the issue of counter-battery and limited aerial control with MLRSs and drones. Ukraine could deny Russian movements after Russia over-use of ammunation stocks and loss of its supplies. Ukrainian fire power is still average.
17 - This weeks offensive in Kharkiv showed the efficiency of speed and shock part of counter battery. As Ukrainians pushed hard against ill-prepared Russian artillery forces, many Russian crew abandoned them. It would be a state-of-art if Ukraine could do more of them.
18 - The third dimension is PARTISAN WARFARE. As Russian forces garrisoned in South, partisan activity is so important to push them out. Diminished Russian capacity to provide basic needs could encourage the people to join and support the resistance.
19 - Partisans costs men, time and supply for garrisoned power while also create a paychological and menthal pressure on them. Remember the Germans in Paris in 1945 and Japanese in China. It is hard to both control the territory and to defend vs an counter-attack simultaneously. Image
20 - Mao’s thoughts on partisan warfare is valuable in that sense. Partisans could initiate political and smaller operations to weaken the Russian garrisons. They could than unite with the rest of UAF. Many COIN campaigns failed in modern era but Ukrainians have a potential. Image
21 - Ukraine use successful tactics to shock Russian forces whereas they initiated a full scale conventional attack against Rosgvardia (whose strength came from COIN but not from a full scale war). While they hit Russian army with divided battle groups and partisans.
22 - The fourth things is MORALE and TRAINING: As Russian forces spend their most of professional forces, Ukrainians steadily train reservist via extensive help of the Western powers. While readiness and morale is clearly on the side of offensive party. Image
23 - And the fifth and the most important dynamic is LOGISTICS. As Ukraine focused on an indirect approach and a Fabian GS, logistical sides also become game-setter. Even Ukraine has an advantage in being the home team, they still have problems due to Russian artillery+missiles. Image
24 - But even Russian side relies on railroads of Kherson and Melitopol and land communication lines through Izyum and Belgorod, they are also vulnerable. The main determinor of this counter-offensive will linked with whose logistical strategy will fail first.
25 - Lets came to the geographical side of the counter-offensive. First: SOUTH: Ukrainian goal is to first push Russia out of the are beyond the Dineper. Kherson is the main target. But as Russia packed South with the troops, Kyiv act more cautiously because they don’t want...
26 - lost too much forces and material. Their advance will be slower and look for suitable condions. It will clearly maneuver warfare where Ukrainian forces slowly but surely bite Russians until Russians feels either to go out from garnisons to fight or wirhdrew. Image
27 - NORTHEAST: While many people waited a counter offensive from the South and even Russians relocated troops from the East and Northeast. Main and flash attack came at Kharkiv. It was a surprise and totally broke the Russian defences around the city.
28 - Northeast offensive is key in Fabian GS as if Ukraine could advance towards Volokhiv and Kupyansk, the Russian logistics could fell and end with a suffering winter for the troops in the East and a limited logistics from the insecure rural roads of Dombass to Russia. Image
29 - Russia could be squeezed between South and Northeast which would mean relocating more forces from the East that could eventually stall the main line of operations and could bring more strategic and political problems.
30 - Many war theoreticians defined offensives as blessed. But they are also risky. CAUTION should be one of the main thing that Ukrainian forces to have. Kyiv should remain distanced from the mistakes of Russian offensive. Image
31 - Ukrainians should not be overstretched and advance via deep lines within the enemy-held territory. As underlined earlier, 🇺🇦 army survived via its strong defensive lines. They should continue to advance them via stable and secured way. Their caution in Kherson came from here Image
32 - What Russians can do? Now, Russia could shift to an approach to power-save by defu-tart but their efforts would have to continue in terms of partisan warfare. Stabilizing an invaded territory in an counter-offensive is hard because future is uncertain. Image
33 - Russia could only deal with more pressure and authoritarian stance against Partisans. This could backfire even more. While saving their power, Russians could look for gaps in Ukrainian lines to cut off deeply advanced offensive forces. This is why caution is everything.
34 - Ukraine should always keep in mind that war could not end with this offensive. They have to protect their forces. Russia could speed its training of reservist but a pre-mature use of untrained reserves could even end with more tragedies as Russia is now low on talents. Image
35 - As winter is ahead, the end of this offensive is yet far from the horizon. Ukraine needs to show it could retrive its lands for continuing support from the West. While the main motive, for now, is not defeating Russian forces totally but to force them to a rethink this war. Image
36 - This is not surprising as the West is also not in for a full scale support to totally humiliate Russia. Both Ukraine and the West want to show Moscow, the door to exit Ukraine. It would be war and the fog that surrounds it will be the main determinor of this door.
37 - An unconfirmed map of Ukrainian advance in Kharkiv that target Kupiansk. This is a risky move but annihilation of Russian forces in this week’s offensive made taking risky possible in this theatre. 🇺🇦 should have to secure its advances in Kupiansk in a very short time-span.
38 - Speaking of moral and morale this is one of the most important aspect that give Ukrainian forces the determination of fighting and doing offensives even with a lack of adequate fire power.
39 - War is all about bearing the risks at a right time and environment. Look how #Ukraine teared the Russian positions in #Kharkhiv. Ukrainian mobility brought the capacity of maneuver and an ability to dictate a fight in place and time that Kyiv desired. Image
40 - #Ukraine, now, undertakes a double lines of ops. It could shift to a concentric attack around Izyum. Or they could continue as divergent lines if Russians fail to organize a defence. Deep and long lines are still risky. The direction would be settled by logistics+resistance.
41 - Unconfirmed reports claims that #Ukraine started a fresh counter-offensive against #Lyman. If it is true, it is a direct result of Russian decision to support Izium from the troops in Lyman. A clear example of maneuvre warfare which is a state-of-art strategy. Image
42 - More reports claimed that #Russia's elite 237th "Guard" Airborne Assault Regiment annihilated almost totally while more troops remained commandless. UAF repelled smaller counter-offensives to many villages in #Kharkiv.
43 - Deploying rapid response teams from neighbouring towns barely provide a solution to counter an offensive. Without proper time for organization+pos. problems in C3, relocated forces become easy targets even before organizing themselves. This could allow #Ukraine to do more.
44 - Another important supply that helps #Ukraine is the growing nightvision capabilities. Western allies supplied 500+/month kits since June. Use of better nightvision abled Ukrainian military to pursue and further paralyze retreating units at night.
insidedefense.com/insider/army-s…
45 - Wide range communication outages also reported from the Russian side in #Kharkiv. While they try to hold in Kupyansk and Izium, sending reinforcements is quite hard and risky until the morning. Comm outages could end with paralyzation and accidental friendly fire incidents.
46 - More Russian forces relocated to #Kharkiv from Central forces. I am not sure whether they can hold the Ukrainians or not. Also reports underline that more Chechen fighters land in #Kherson. While #Russia called for a mobilization of reserves via failed conscription program.
47 - Unconfirmed reports (interestingly this time from Russians) claims #Ukraine retook Izium and Kupyansk. This rumours went online since the last night. Not a surprise but shows real power of Ukrainian counter-offensive. OPSEC surrounds the environment.
48 - #Russia tries to form a defensive line in Starıyy Karavan (Old Caravan) vs. #Ukraine while another attempt to set one in Svatoe is also in a brink of collapse. Svatove is too far from both Kupyansk and Oskil. It could turn to a full-scale disaster.
49 - MOD of #Russia announced that they are 'planning to retreat from Izium-Balakliya to so-called Donetsk People's Republic to organize a new line of defence'. This means that #Ukraine almost nullified Russian gains in the Northeast since 2022 invasion.
50 - A Russian ground-support aircraft claimed as downed. Today, milint officer from #Ukraine underlined the importance of HARM missiles in neutralizing Russian air defences while allowed Gepards and MANDPADs to exploit the blinded 🇷🇺 air ops much more.
51 - Countering a partisan warfare requires a cooperation between local people and invaders. One of the main dynamic that allow #Ukraine in their offensive operations is intelligence gatherings from local population. Russian troops clearly feel a psychological surveillance.
52 - There is a rising social media fog around Ukrainian advance. While Russian field communications and information gatherings failed to sustain in doctrinal vertical manner. As they use social media and communicate horizontally, rumours spread fast.
53 - Ukrainian control of discourse+attention on social media easened their capacity to dictate the psychological status and field actions to a phase which contributed to #Ukraine in increasing its capacity of operational and strategic maneuver. Horizontal communication is risky. Image
54 - Time for converging my two long Twitter threads. Looks like #Russia is searching a way for retaliatory strikes by risking a small amount of missile launcher ships. Possible targets are the South and the East. They could push for a naval A2/AD Zone at the Southern offensive.
55 - #Russia conducted missile strikes against critical infrastructure that led wide range of blackouts. An attempt to slowdown #Ukraine and create a way to give a chance for Russian troops to flee. Also looking for creating psychological impact.
56 - Russian Air Force is literally crumbling. Not only war-related strategic issues like MANPADs and Air Defences. Their air wing is struggling with skilled ground services, spare parts and maitainance due to sanctions.
57 - It looks like an effort of GPS Spoofing. Not really shure which side is up for it. GPS spoofing involves location information being sent to the GPS receiver which is clearly false. (For more: crfs.com/blog/how-to-de…)
58 - It could be the part of bigger EW picture. Both sides, Ukrainian forces use GPS for their networked offense and for systems like HIMARS and Excaliburs. While it could also be against further Russian strikes. Or simply it could be a result of backouts that crippled IT system. Image
59 - A perfect example from #Ukraine on Psychological Warfare. Kyiv’s use of social media and other technologies are so innovative. May be nobody will surrender with this card but it is a clear disruption for Russian command cycle to solve.
60 - Some 🇷🇺 sources claimed that they are engaging with Ukrainian partisans in the centre of #Kherson. It is highly unlikely as Ukrainian partisan warfare is concentrated on stealth-actions rather than direct confrontations. UAF is still far from the city
61 - Issues in the Ukrainian Counter-Offensive continues. But as everybody expected after Russian forces retreated from Kharkiv, the pace of operations lost its momentum. Now, Kyiv is forcing the Russian defenses around East Kupyansk, Lyman and Kherson.
wsj.com/articles/ukrai…
62 - As Ukrainian air defences become more solid, Russia started to use Shahed (not really state of art) loitering munitions more to reduce the loss of missile and warplane numbers. It is not really effective way for precision aerial support but CE.
63 - Now, 🇺🇦 again will wait+attrit 🇷🇺 to crumble their supplies+logistics and search for a new initiative via tracing possible 🇷🇺 mistakes. Mobilization will limitedly be effective for short-term but 🇺🇦 need more weapons to seize the initiative forcefully
64 - Remembering the issues with loitering munitions. Even if they are state-of-art they are still in experimental phase. Their most prominent promise is evading ADs with relatively little costs. Defendinf against them requires more conventional ways.
65 - Remember old concepts of 'nightwatching' where 🇺🇦 could create human-deployed watch towers and could coordinate with local people to locate these munitions. 🇺🇦 could use nets and other firearms to protect Administrative Building's. An app for loi-track could be effective. Image
66 - Ukrainian military almost totally encircled Lyman which cut the communications and logistics of Russia. The city is a crucial railroad crossroad that supplied DNR and somepart of LNR. Also geography of the city so complex and 🇺🇦 perfectly handled it.
67 - An important point is river crossings. You can remember how numerous times Russians failed to cross rivers. As 🇷🇺 efforts for 'Dutch Defences' failed, 🇺🇦 military cross the rivers in a speed-of-light. A clear advantage for preventing defensive lines.
It is also closely related with reduced efficiency of 🇷🇺 reconnaissance, aerial+artillery power. But also as many Ukrainian groups pass the rivers by smaller reconing forces, it became harder to detect them. After these SOFs and recon groups ensure the security, main line follows
69 - #Ukraine used geography+mobility via dispersed forces to target Russian river crossings who massed troops to insecure and hostile riverbanks in May while this time 🇺🇦 again uses geography and mobility to make dispersed river crossings while Russian forces idled in towns. Image
70 - Another succesfull counter-offensive by #Ukraine through the direction of Beryslav. Kyiv again use the way of peripheral advances to encircle Russian forces. The success of these ops. clearly game from successful reconing and pin-point mastery of rural Kherson and landscape.
71 - This is also really important. #Ukraine successfully use light armour like MRAPs and other armoured personal carriers to ambush Russian units in rural Kherson, Kharkiv and Luhansk. Light armoured vehicles are ,now, turned as essential source of Ukrainian mobility to maneuver
72 - They are weaker against tanks and other heavy armour but free from the logistical constraints of heavy armour. While 🇷🇺 military took a blow from logistics as their intense military consumes ammo and fuel which tie them to the main artelleries and constrain them in rural.
For fire power, US supply more HIMARS and heavy artillery to support those MRAP teams versus tanks and other heavy artillery. Anti-Armour mines are also important as they could even be laid by SOFs or Partisans. While MRAP groups have enough Javelins and ATGMs vs dispersed tanks.
74 - #Russia started to dig a fortification of anti-tank obstacles and trenches around north of Donetsk and South of Lugansk. Kind a rational as we can see Russia finally do something for a defence. But their defensive planning include Lyschansk but not Sieveredonetsk or Kreminna
75 - If they did not really think they could not hold North of Lugansk than throwing waves of soldiers to take Bakhmut is quite irrational. Could be workable for slowing Ukrainian advance and maneuvers but also a clear move for Russian will to freeze the conflict.
76 - Freezing the war around Dombass will not deliver anything to Russia as Ukraine could re-arrange its forces in elsewhere like Zaporizhya for a renewed push. Clausewitz called entrenched lines as obsolote. The only way to hold them is to accumulate a huge man and fire power. Image
77 - Without proper reservists a long entrenched line is just undefendable without natural obstacles. This means an entrenched line is mostly for reconning and simply waste the neccessary men and equipment that could be used in elsewhere. Image
79 - So main purpose here for Russia is to convince people that the government is doing something to defend these new lands and to gain time to protect the new arriving reserves and train them before a surprise offensive. But the amount of 🇺🇦 men+fire power is also important. Image
80 - Reports claim that Wagner tries to recruit militia forces (historically Opolcheniye) from the border state Belgorod. Those militia forces will probably not registered as official soldiers and will have a de-centralized command.
81 - Another sign of Wagner's attempt to over-ride Russian command control and conventional military. Opolcheniye has a huge propaganda meaning as it was attributed with patriotic wars and nationalistic sacrifice. In terms of strategy, it still had grave problems. Image
82 - But Clausewitz underlined that armed militias could become successful when the war is in the deep inside of that country. This is the source of the success of Ukrainian Territorial Defence Forces. Also militia's need help and security that provided by regular army. Image
83 - Both Clausewitz and Jomini warned that militias should be put under the command of central command and control structure. It is because both of them had a belief that armed militias without proper command could turn the guns and topple the Government. Remember 1872 France. Image
84 - #Russia is planning to recruit (or force) these militias from the illegally annexed territories of #Ukraine. The critical thing will be whether these militias could be indoctrinated enough. Militias are easy to break and flee if they are not well doctrinated with the cause. Image
85 - Now, #Ukraine is winning in their counter offensive and time is also on their side. It would be a stupidity to do such an act that will harm the legitimacy of this victory. Nuclear plants were one of the Russia’s first targets in their campaign.
86 - They take Ukrainian nuclear plant workers as hostage than just denied their entrance to the plants since August. Their C2 is now, more radicalized and Wagner is enough powerful to made+use a dirty bomb and to over ride any check and balance mechamism in Russian military. Image
87 - #Ukraine needs decon units and hardware in reserve. Not sure on whether this war go nuclear either by TNWs or dirty bomba. But the West had to be sure that Ukrainian forces could operate in contaminated battle zones. This would deterre Russian will to use NWs. Image
88 - Until now, only Japan send NBC protective gear to Ukraine. Japan is quite good in this issue. It may seem extreme but Ukraine and the West should took it serious. We have to be sure that no limits will remain in arming Ukraine by the West in NBC use.
mil.in.ua/en/news/japan-…
89 - There is an increased risk of a possible targeting of Nova Kahovka Dam by #Russia. Local Ukrainian population was almost de-populated while Russian soldiers looted monuments, art works and Church heritages. The only thing that prevent this is remaining Russian soldiers.
90 - There are also increasing reports from the Southern Bank of Dnipro River. Russians deploy concrete fortifications to the region. It could be either defensive or for strengthening the bank against a tide of blasted dam. There is no need to refer that it would be a war crime.
91 - Possible destruction of the dam would led to flooding of half of Kherson City Centre. But it would not completely stop the Ukrainians contrary it will give Kyiv a chance to divert its military to another region. A wider Dnipro would also kill any Russian plans to re-attack.
92 - A clear indication of Prigozhin’s Narodnoe Opolcheniye will not only recruit from #Ukraine. His eyes were on Saint Petersburg. The Governor decided to open a criminal case since nobody can recruit soldiers in paralel to 🇷🇺 military. Prigozhin tried to overwhelm the Governor.
93 - This package contains many important things. Let alone 90 modernized T-72Bs, there are 40 armoured riverine boats. These boats will be important if Russia withdrew from the north of Dnipro. They would assist SOFs+patrols and also support #Ukraine if Nova Kakhovka dam blasts.
94 - A significant turning point for this war as #Russia decided to withdrew from Kherson to the Southern Bank of Dnipro. Russia realized that its goal to annex the territory beyond the river is absurd. Than what are the next options for them?
95 - Now, Russia will try to hold existing territories via using rivers and concrete lines of defences. While they will continue their offensives in Donetsk Front. As they will try to re-arrange their logistics, earn time to train reserves and replenish their arsenal. Image
96 - While river defenses could push this war to an idled phase where both sides continue to attrit each other with surprise attacks. Ukraine could shift its focus more to Lugansk and Zaporizhya. But there are still doubts about Russian discipline, reserves and logistics. Image
97 - We could enter to a phase when covered or third party talks could increase. We could also see the rise of nuclear talks more. It is a clear time for both states to recalculate their next moves. But Russian problems in situational awareness is still problematic. Let’s see. Image
98 - #Ukraine still doubts this announcements of withdrawal. No need to hurry and rush to Kherson as time is with Kyiv. Battlefield traps /deceptions could be highly dangerous. Kherson is a pocket around the Dnipro River. Russia could secretly arrange artillery firing positions..
99 - ... across the river or could try to level down the city via concentrated air strikes. It is better to control the city without entering it, with dispersed forces and awaiting for reconing activities within the opposite bank of river. (Don’t count a nuclear strike as a trap) Image
100 - Coincidence or not, withdrawal from Kherson could be real as it would create a great loss of morale within the Russian military. This is may be why Kremlin is now talking about a potential visit of Putin to Donbass. Let’s wait for further details.
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More from @ArveloaMert

Mert N. Matsumoto (松本信秀) Profile picture
Oct 21, 2023
Lets start the twelfth and the newest thread on the strategy of the Russo-Ukrainian War that will cover fall offensives. #Avdiivka #Bakhmut #Ukraine #Robotyne #UkraineWar #Kherson #UkraineRussiaWar️ #Melitopol #Zaporizhzhia #Kyiv #Berdyansk #Verbove #Novoprokopivka #Tokmak Image
1) Here is the previous thread on the strategy of the Russo-Ukrainian War that includes issues like information warfare, Allied trainings for Ukraine, situation in #Avdiivka offensive and #Kherson counter offensive, Zaporizhzhia and modern day fortified wars and other issues.
2) Lets talk about #Russia’s losses of officers in #Ukraine. Russian Military lost unbelieavable number of 3000 officers in Ukraine from different ranks. However, the lion share the losses were concentrated on junior officers like Lieutenants and Majors. This group is important.
Read 109 tweets
Mert N. Matsumoto (松本信秀) Profile picture
Aug 23, 2023
Lets start our tenth and the newest thread on the strategy of Russo-Ukrainian War which will cover operations during the late August and early fall. #Bakhmut #Ukraine #Kreminna #Svatove #UkraineWar #UkraineRussiaWar️ #Melitopol #Zaporizhzhia #Kyiv #Mariupol #Berdyansk #Kherson Image
12) Few words on #Tokmak. We have to carefully asses the claims that state #Russia’s defences in the town is in the brink of imminent collapse. The town is one of the #Ukraine’s critical operational goals with Melitopol. Its South has key railroad link that makes the land bridge. Image
12) #Tokmak is heavily fortified town which increasingly become a target of #Ukraine’s long range strikes. But still the town is main position for #Russia to hold-on. Leaving Tokmak without a fight is highly irrational for 🇷🇺 as it would not only risk the theatre but entire war. Image
Read 92 tweets
Mert N. Matsumoto (松本信秀) Profile picture
Jul 15, 2023
Here is the ninth and the newest thread about Russo-Ukrainian War that includes #Ukraine’s counter offensive efforts in #Bakhmut. #Ukraine #Zapoizhzhia #Kreminna #Svatove #UkraineWar #Oleshky #UkraineRussiaWar️ #Melitopol #Zaporizhzhia #Kyiv #Mariupol #Berdyansk #Kherson #Wagner Image
1) You can find all earlier Twitter threads on war in #Ukraine and #Russia's unlawful invasion and more in this interactive map. Please remember that this map is not for showing the exact lines of contacts but to understand strategies.
2) Mistrust increasingly become visible after the #Wagner's mutiny within the Russian Command. After General Surovikin (who is the most senior officer that disappeared), Major Generals Popov and Vladimir Selivestrov were dismissed from their duties.
Read 45 tweets
Mert N. Matsumoto (松本信秀) Profile picture
Jun 19, 2023
Here is the eight and the newest thread about Russo-Ukrainian War that includes #Ukraine’s counter offensive efforts in #Zaporizhzhia #Ukraine #Bakhmut #Kreminna #Svatove #UkraineWar #Oleshky #UkraineRussiaWar️ #Melitopol #Zaporizhzhia #Kyiv #Mariupol #Berdyansk #Kherson #Wagner Image
13) The Attacker could use firepower to prevent this laying process. But just like the first aspect, defenders could increase their fire power which would decrease the operational pace. Russian decision to relocate troops from Kherson and further risking of air power shows this. Image
14) But different from what Malthus claimed, just like population all this laying and firepower increase process has a limit of production, resupply and logistics. In long run with long-range strikes #Ukraine could balance this rate if they can achieve to protect their equipment. Image
Read 97 tweets
Mert N. Matsumoto (松本信秀) Profile picture
May 28, 2023
Here is the seventh thread 🧵 about the strategy of the #RussoUkrainianWar for the early summer. Russia took the control of #Bakhmut while Ukraine is still planning its offensive efforts. #Ukraine #Russia #Soledar #Kreminna #Svatove #Wagner #UkraineWar #Leopard2 #Vuhledar Image
1) You can find all earlier Twitter threads on war in #Ukraine and #Russia's unlawful invasion and more in this interactive map. Please remember that this map is not for showing the exact lines of contacts but to understand strategies.
2) British MoD underlined that, as planned, #Wagner is now withdrawing from the center of #Bakhmut. The defence of the town will be transferred to so-called DNR forces combined with VDV units. This shows that Wagner will not be in defensive efforts.
Read 62 tweets
Mert N. Matsumoto (松本信秀) Profile picture
Apr 26, 2023
Here is the sixth thread 🧵 about the strategy of the #RussoUkrainianWar for the late spring.Russia continues to focus on Dombass while Ukraine is still planning its offensive efforts. #Bakhmut. #Ukraine #Russia #Soledar #Kreminna #Svatove #Wagner #UkraineWar #Leopard2 #Vuhledar Image
1) As always please take a look for understanding how a counter-offensive should be conducted, what are the goals and requirements and for the events that occured between September to November.
2) You can take a look to this thread for the first part of the Ukrainian Winter Counter Offensive which includes the situation and events between November to January.
Read 31 tweets

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