The last 48 hours have seen quite a lot happening in #Ukraine. While the southern offensive continues, the Ukrainian operations around Kharkiv have achieved a significant penetration of Russian defences on the Kupiansk-Izium axis. What might this mean? 1/25 
2/ I would caveat that much remains unclear about these offensives. And, as every military leader knows, first reports can be wrong! But, there is sufficient information - without compromising operational security - to draw initial conclusions about operations around #Kharkiv.
3/ It is clear that the Ukrainians have achieved surprise against the Russians in the #Kharkiv region. The Ukrainians attacked what appears to have been a thinly defended area and have achieved a significant penetration into Russian rear areas.
4/ That they were able to exploit this opportunity indicates that Ukraine maintained a significant mobile operational reserve, containing combined arms teams supported by fires and logistics.
5/ And once again, the Ukrainians have been able to pull off a good operational level deception plan. While the focus was on the south, they assembled and launched an operation in the north. Kudos (again) to Ukrainian leaders and planners.
6/ While the southern offensives continue, and is vital to Ukraine’s economic future, the #Kharkiv offensive has tactical and operational implications for that region and the war more broadly.
7/ First, it will compromise Russian operations on their eastern front, particularly if both Kupiansk and Izium are captured by Ukraine. It compromises Russian supply routes and introduces a larger psychological issue with Russians fighting in the east.
8/ It also makes it difficult for Russia to continue to fight in the east without dealing with this threat to their rear areas and logistics.
9/ The Ukrainian advance deep into the Russian-held areas of Ukraine in the north will demand that Russia rush reinforcements here - potentially impacting their ability to defend parts of the south. Perhaps the new Russian 3rd Army Corps is an option?
10/ The shifting of Russian forces means they can’t be used while moving between different parts of the country. This redeployment of forces will also create other weaknesses and opportunities that the Ukrainians can exploit.
11/ Potentially, we could see cascading Russian tactical withdrawals and failures in various regions as a consequence. This is, having a superior tempo to the enemy and a rapid identification and exploitation of opportunities, is the essence of operational art.
12/ There are outcomes for influence operations from this operation in the north. Especially for Russia and it’s supporters. But it also shapes the current ‘supporters of Ukraine’ meeting in Germany and popular opinion/support in the west.
13/ The Ukrainians will be going through a lot of fuel and ammo, but these offensives are the kinds of operations for which good military organisations stockpile for well in advance (and the Ukrainians are good).
14/ Deception has been central to all Ukrainian preparations for this phase of the war. The Ukrainians have obviously taken care to quietly stockpile military resources and place units in reserve to be able exploit opportunities like what has occurred in the north.
15/ There are likely to be significant Russian material losses in the north, given the speed of the Ukrainian advance. Overrunning Russian supply depots (especially with artillery ammo and fuel) will further hurt the Russians and help Ukraine.
16/ We might also see large numbers of Russian prisoners in the north. Not only are these hard to replace, given Russian recruiting problems, it is a strategic influence coup for Ukraine. And a real problem for Putin.
17/ This #Kharkiv offensive also represents an excellent marriage of operational art and military strategy. Operationally, the Ukrainians are sequencing, prioritising and adapting their tactical battles across time and geography to meet strategic objectives.
18/ Strategically, the Ukrainians continue to implement their strategy of corrosion, which attacks Russia at their weak points, and destroys their logistics, C2, and morale to corrode front line forces from within. smh.com.au/world/europe/t…
19/ Clearly there are tactical and operational risks. A Russian counterattack might ‘pinch off’ the penetration & isolate the advancing Ukrainians. But the Russians need to move quick to do this, have sufficient reserves, as well as defend other areas on exterior lines.
20/ But as we have seen so far in this war, the Ukrainian command philosophy of delegation and exploiting opportunities is superior to the Russian more centralised, plodding method. It will be hard (not impossible) for Russia to respond to the current Ukrainian operational tempo.
21/ The Russians, while not beaten, are in real trouble at the moment. Because of this, we should watch for some unexpected reaction from Putin. He has shown no signs of wanting to pull back from this invasion.
22/ And lest we get too triumphalist, we should remember that Luhansk and large parts of Donetsk and southern #Ukraine remain occupied by the Russians. Subsequent Ukrainian offensives will be necessary to clear these areas.
23/ Despite all this, we must give the Ukrainians their due. There is a way to go, but they have achieved surprise, deceived the enemy about their intentions and conducted a series of offensives that have thrown the Russians onto the back foot.
24/ Ukraine probably now has the initiative as well as tactical and operational momentum going into the winter. The war is far from over, but perhaps the tide is finally turning. End. washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/…
25/ Thank you to those whose images I used in this thread: @DefenceU @IAPonomarenko @WarMonitor3 @UAWeapons @War_Mapper @MilitaryLandnet @ChuckPfarrer @TheDeadDistrict @nytimes @MaxBoot @EliotHiggins
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