Hello @Uber! We know breaches suck. Wanted to reach out and support with some interesting information on the #uberhack. If you need any more details, feel free to contact us.
On September 16, vx-underground posted screenshots with evidence of access to #Uber internal systems, including #SentinelOne, #Slack and #AWS. The screenshots have been attributed to the threat actor teapots2022.
During Group-IB’s analysis of the screenshots, interesting artifacts have been found in the recently downloaded files tray. First 2 files are zip archives and have the same format: "LOGID-\d{7} with names LOGID-4952307" and "LOGID-4953756".
The name format of these files allowed Group-IB researchers to identify them as logs from #stealers that were sold on one of the underground marketplaces.
Group-IB identified that these logs were put up for sale on September 12 and 14, which means that this was very fresh data, because the hack that utilized them was revealed from 15 to 16 September.
As shown below both of these logs contain authorization data for uber.onelogin.com — an identity and access management provider. These logs indicate that at least 2 Uber employees (from Indonesia and Brazil) have been infected by stealer #malware: Racoon and Vidar stealers.
The version of @Uber hacking through the purchase of logs that contained data for authorization on uber.onelogin.com is confirmed by the same screenshot, where you can see that the very first tab in the browser is called "OneLogin".
In addition to the #logs shown in the screenshot, the attacker could also have purchased logs to enable them to sort through all the accounts in search of accounts with privileged access to critical internal network resources.
These other logs also contained multiple access credentials to other resources, including Slack, Facebook, Google, Instagram etc. These credentials could have been used by the attacker to advance through Uber’s network using social engineering.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Crypto giveaway scams continue to soar: Group-IB has noted a fivefold increase in the number of domains used for #crypto giveaway #scams that involve fake #YouTube streams in the first half of 2022: bit.ly/3eWN0eL
According to Group-IB, 63% of the new fraudulent domain names were registered with Russian registrars, but the #fake websites are primarily designed to target English and Spanish-speaking #crypto investors in the US and other countries: bit.ly/3eWN0eL
In the first six months of 2022, @CERTGIB identified more than 2,000 domains registered explicitly to be used as #fake promotion websites. This figure increased almost five-fold compared to the second half of 2021 and 53-fold in comparison with H1 2021: bit.ly/3eWN0eL
About a week ago, @TalosSecurity team shared some insights related to a recent cyber attack on @Cisco. According to Indicators of compromise, mentioned in this article (bit.ly/3K76lFJ), we have known this group of attackers since the beginning of 2022.
Group-IB's researchers has discovered their TTPs in a series of attacks using #CobaltStrike, #Sliver and #Covenant tools. Our internal name of this group is #TridentCrow.
One of the domains that was published by @Cisco (ciscovpn2[.]com) has a self-signed SSL certificate with unique values. According to Group-IB Threat Intelligence database, out of more than 2 billion certificates, only 39 have similar values and mimic well-known IT companies.