The #Ukrainian counter-offensive in #Kharkiv and northern Donetsk Oblasts continued to make gains near #Lyman on September 25 and September 26.
#Russian forces continued conducting offensive operations around #Bakhmut and west of #Donetsk City.
#Ukrainian military officials maintained operational silence about the progress of #Ukraine’s southern counter-offensive on September 25 and September 26.
The Kremlin faces a daunting task in trying to calm the #Russian people while still mobilizing enough men to keep fighting.
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NEW | Russian forces are reportedly preparing to conduct long-range strikes against substations powering Ukraine’s nuclear power plants. (1/5)
This warning comes as Russia continues its long-range strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure, resulting in widespread blackouts. (2/5)
Russian state media amplified a Kremlin-affiliated former Ukrainian politician’s statements to prepare the Russian domestic populace for the Kremlin's rejection of peace in the near-team amid ongoing US, Ukrainian, and European negotiations. (3/5)
NEW | Somalia canceled all bilateral agreements with the UAE on January 12, which legally annuls UAE access to key Red Sea ports and military bases, potentially affecting UAE anti-Houthi operations and weapons shipments to the RSF in Sudan.
Somalia’s move could also have negative implications on counterterrorism efforts, given the UAE’s support for Somali federal and state forces combating al Shabaab and IS Somalia. 🧵1/6
Somalia cited the UAE’s alleged “hostile and destabilizing actions undermining national sovereignty” when justifying its decision.
The UAE reportedly facilitated Israel’s recognition of the breakaway Somaliland region. The UAE then evacuated the STC leader through Somalia following the STC’s failed takeover in Yemen, which Saudi Arabia and Yemeni government forces foiled. 2/6
The SFG’s move would degrade the UAE’s strategic depth in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea region if enforced.
The UAE would lose access to military bases along the Gulf of Aden in Puntland and Somaliland that it uses to support operations against the Iranian-backed Yemeni Houthis and other maritime security operations. The loss of access would hinder the UAE’s ability to supply the RSF, as Puntland’s port of Bossaso is a transit point for UAE weapons shipments to the RSF. 3/6
NEW | Al Qaeda's Sahelian affiliate JNIM has escalated the objectives of its blockade to expand and strengthen its governance efforts across parts of southern Mali, as it begins to enforce shari'a law.🧵
A JNIM spokesperson announced that it would continue its ongoing fuel blockade until the Malian government fell or agreed to apply shari'a law nationwide.
The spokesperson simultaneously said that JNIM would unilaterally implement certain shari'a provisions across the country.
The group has since started enforcing the veiling of women and gender segregation at checkpoints.
Civilians leaving Bamako have reportedly abided by these provisions, highlighting JNIM's ability to disrupt civilian life and psychologically coerce civilians across the country. 2/4
JNIM has likely opportunistically diverged from its original objectives due to its success in sustaining the blockade, marking a major inflection.
The group initially demanded that the Malian junta lift a ban on fuel sales in rural villages across Mali and demanded that local transport companies cut cooperation with state forces.
The group has continued ambushing fuel tankers and stopping buses. However, it is now using its presence along these same roadways to enforce shari'a law.
The Malian junta’s inability to ease the blockade is heightening public tensions. 3/4
NEW | Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate JNIM has established control over Farabougou, a key crossroads and symbolically important town in central Mali.
The capture is another blow to the Malian junta following an alleged coup attempt in early August. 🧵
JNIM overran the Malian army base in Farabougou on August 19.
JNIM fighters remained in the adjacent town in the following days and took videos of Friday prayers on August 22.
The group has since signed an agreement with local leaders to allow civilians who had fled the town to return. Returnees must pay taxes and follow JNIM-interpreted shari’a law, including provisions on music, alcohol consumption, and clothing.
Farabougou is near the RN31 highway, which connects central and southern Mali via the northern parts of the Ségou and Koulikoro regions along the Mauritanian border.
The capture of Farabougou will expand JNIM support zones along the Mauritanian border, enabling greater pressure in southern Mali on towns like Nara.
NEW | US-supported Somali forces are encountering strong resistance as they try to clear IS Somalia Province’s (ISS) cave complexes in northern Somalia’s Puntland region.
The ongoing operations are likely targeting IS global leadership and some of ISS’s final strongholds.🧵
Puntland forces with US air support have been conducting operations against ISS in the Ballade valley for over a week.
US and Puntland officials said on August 26 that they had concluded a two-week joint operation against “ISIS leadership safe havens.” x.com/USAfricaComman…
Puntland forces have continued their operations, however, and ISS ambushes, sniper fire, and suicide commando attacks since August 22 have allegedly killed more than 50 Puntland soldiers, although Puntland officials have disputed these figures.
The operation is likely targeting high-ranking ISS and possibly IS global leadership, who have so far evaded the 2025 counter-ISS offensive.
Global IS leadership figures, including suspected IS emir or global operational head Abdulqadir Mumin, are likely present in the area.
Qatari-brokered peace talks between the DRC and Rwandan-backed M23 rebels will likely drag out as both sides have been unwilling to make concessions on the central issue of M23’s territorial control, making a sustainable long-term agreement unlikely.
The lack of clarity around this issue will likely be a major obstacle in the upcoming round of talks tentatively scheduled for August 8.🧵
The DRC and M23 signed a Qatari-brokered statement of principles in late July that committed both sides to a ceasefire but deferred negotiations over the “root causes” of the conflict to be resolved in the second stage of talks aimed at reaching a final peace deal by August 18. 2/8
The two sides will likely be unable to clearly resolve the issue of M23’s territorial control and other points of divergence in a sustainable fashion that includes agreed-upon dispute-resolution mechanisms within the 10-day time frame in mid-August, however.
The DRC and M23 have refused to make major concessions on territorial control in the talks and have signaled they are unlikely to do so. 3/8