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May 16

NEW | Talks between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and leading national opposition coalition over a constitutional and electoral dispute collapsed as Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s controversial term extension took effect on May 15.

The FGS and opposition are now at an institutional impasse, which will likely lead to clashes between their affiliated forces.🧵⬇️

The talks were meant to produce a resolution between the FGS and Somali Future Council (SFC) opposition coalition over Mohamud’s term extension and the holding of elections.

The talks collapsed over the FGS’s insistence upon direct elections in upcoming state and federal elections, which the SFC has described as a non-starter due to the opposition’s preference for the current clan-based quota and indirect voting system. 2/7

Tensions between the two sides have significantly increased since the FGS’s approval of a new constitution on March 4, which extended Mohamud’s term by one year, delayed federal elections until 2027, and mandated direct elections.

The SFC denounced the new constitution as a power grab by Mohamud and has said that he is not the legitimate Somali president after his original term expires May 15. 3/7

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Critical Threats

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May 6

NEW | Iran seeks to achieve positive strategic objectives beyond the negative objective of surviving the war. Iran’s principal positive strategic objective at this time is to secure recognition of its sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, which would fundamentally remake regional and global maritime norms in a manner extremely detrimental to US interests. (1/7)

Long-term control of the Strait would require Iran to secure US recognition of its claims to the Strait of Hormuz through a negotiated agreement so that Iran could order ships to comply with its rules legitimately and then intercept those ships that fail to comply. (2/7)

Iranian negotiators increasingly prioritized securing its control over the Strait in negotiations, likely because it believes Iranian control over the Strait would act as a safeguard against future wars between Iran and Israel and the United States. (3/7)

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May 4

NEW | Somali pirates have conducted the most hijackings in Somali waters in a 10-day period since the end of the peak of the Somali piracy crisis in 2012.

Sustained piracy off the Somali coast would degrade security in another vital global shipping lane amid the fallout from the Iran war and create opportunities for al Shabaab to benefit financially and further its ties with the Houthis. 🧵⬇️

Somali pirates have attacked one vessel and hijacked three others since April 21, including two international commercial ships.

A US-led multinational maritime force and the EU’s maritime force in the Indian Ocean have upgraded the threat level for the Somali coast, recommending that vessels exercise increased vigilance. 2/5

Sustained piracy off the Somali coast would degrade security in another vital global shipping lane amid costly global supply disruptions from the Iran war.

Up to 30 percent of global container traffic uses the Red Sea route, but Somali piracy and Houthi strikes on commercial ships have caused increased insurance costs and reliance on less efficient, and therefore more expensive, alternate routes in the past. 3/5

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Critical Threats

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Apr 21

NEW | The United States is increasingly involved in direct competition with Russia in Africa as the United States seeks to cultivate influence with Russian-aligned, authoritarian regimes in Africa as part of its transactional approach to the continent.

These African states have shown openness to US engagement as part of efforts to diversify their partnerships but are ultimately seeking to balance ties among several countries. ⬇️🧵

US President Donald Trump’s approach is a departure from that of former US President Joe Biden’s administration, which oscillated between pragmatic engagement and more confrontational approaches with non-US-aligned authoritarian or coup governments.

Russia and the United States are also competing with increasingly prominent “middle power” actors, such as Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), as these African countries look to diversify their partnerships and balance several external partners. 2/6

In West Africa: The Alliance of Sahel States (AES) countries have continued increasing defense and other cooperation with Russia so far in 2026.

The AES countries have also been gradually diversifying ties with other actors, however, including the United States, as the United States looks to reenter the Sahel. The United States is primarily pursuing security-related interests, in addition to exploring opportunities for cooperation on critical minerals and other economic areas.

Turkey has also strengthened economic and defense partnerships with the AES countries, particularly Niger.

These same external partners are battling for influence in Togo, which is also seeking to diversify yet balance its external partnerships, and other coastal West African countries. 3/6

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Critical Threats

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Apr 19

NEW: The Iranian political officials who will reportedly negotiate with the United States in Islamabad, Pakistan, on April 21 neither have the authority to independently determine Iran’s negotiating positions nor are driving decision-making in Tehran.

US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner will attend the talks. Iran’s negotiating delegation is expected to include Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.

The upcoming talks appear focused on extending the ceasefire, which is set to expire on April 22. Iranian sources familiar with the negotiations stated that Iran expects that the ceasefire will be extended and that additional talks will occur if the negotiations on April 21 go well.

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Critical Threats

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Apr 18

NEW: The IRGC appears to be controlling Iranian decision-making instead of Iranian political officials who are engaging with the United States in negotiations, particularly Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi. (1/7)

Araghchi previously announced on April 17 that the strait was “completely open” to commercial traffic. The IRGC, however, harshly criticized Araghchi’s statement and outlined specific conditions for vessels to transit the strait that amount to Iran retaining control over maritime traffic through the strait. (2/7)

The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters, which is functionally controlled by the IRGC, announced that Iranian forces have reinstated strict management and “control” over the Strait of Hormuz. The headquarters cited the US naval blockade on Iranian ports as the reason for the reimposition of Iranian "control" over the strait. IRGC-affiliated Fars News previously warned on April 17 that Iran would “close” the strait if the United States continued its blockade. (3/7)

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