In the last few days, an interview given by the new Russian commander in #Ukraine, General Sergei Surovikin, was reported in the media. Noting that “the situation regarding the special operation is tense”, an assessment of his campaign options going forward is required. 1/25 🧵 
2/ Surovikin clearly understands the political intent for his campaign. As noted in the interview, the desired outcome is “that Ukraine was independent from the West and NATO, a friendly state to Russia.”
3/ Whether this is possible or not from our perspective, these are his marching orders from Putin. cablefreetv.org/the-first-inte…
4/ That is the political outcome desired. What kind of military campaign might #Surovikin implement to achieve it?
5/ We have seen the inklings of his thinking over the past two weeks. First, he is seeking to destroy the will of the Ukrainian people.
6/ As an air force officer, it is clear he has succumbed to the theory that populations can be shattered by aerial attack. While the increased attacks of the past fortnight reinforce Putin’s support base at home, especially the hardliners, #Surovikin has other aims.
7/ By targeting power and water infrastructure, he is clearly focussed on breaking the will of Ukrainian people in winter. The use of Iranian drones, which loiter before diving on their targets, also aims to terrorise civilians. apnews.com/article/russia…
8/ This is #Surovikin borrowing from his Syria playbook, where terrorising civilians to break their will to resist was a core part of the Syrian regime’s playbook – and it was wholeheartedly embraced by the Russians. president.gov.ua/en/news/usi-sv…
9/ Another impact of the Russian attacks from the air is confidence among those who wish to invest in Ukraine. As hardy as the Ukrainian defence has been, their nation still requires masses of foreign capital to rebuild homes, businesses and infrastructure.
10/ Finally, his targeting the will of the Ukrainian people has now embraced the declaration of martial law in the oblasts annexed by Russia. nytimes.com/2022/10/19/wor…
11/ So, Surovikin’s initial actions as unified commander have been focussed on breaking the will of the Ukrainian people. How else might he be thinking about achieving his mission from Putin?
12/ Clearly, he needs to rethink his military campaign. He has some flexibility, but the foundations of any future Russian military campaign have already been laid by the actions of his predecessors.
13/ Surovikin’s predecessors have bequeathed him territory already captured in the south and east. He also now possesses an army in the field, which is very weary, has a morale problem and has seen constant attrition of its manpower and best equipment.
14/ This is an Army that was defeated in the #Kyiv campaign and the #Kharkiv campaign. It is also on the backfoot in northern #Luhansk and northern #Kherson. It is holding ground in #Zaporizhzhia and making very small gains in #Donetsk.
15/ The only part of the Russian Army currently undertaking offensive operations is their Wagner mercenaries. There are tactical as well as political drivers for this. barrons.com/news/wagner-me…
16/ The Russian army is being supplemented with mobilisation, which Putin has announced would come to a conclusion soon. As @massdara notes, this mobilisation of humans is accompanied by a mobilisation of state & economic resources for war.
https://twitter.com/MassDara/status/1582739687495503873?s=20&t=5QQ0yTqU1dw9CKmH-LykjA
17/ Regardless of the number of troops mobilised, the best #Surovikin can hope for is that they provide a ‘stabilising’ influence. This means that they will be used to plug gaps in the existing Russian scheme of defence in the east and south. They are human speed bumps.
18/ Rebuilding Russia’s offensive power for the war will take time. Surovikin has almost no resources at his disposal now to conduct large offensive ground operations to secure the annexed oblasts. This is a key reason he will probably rely on air attacks in the coming months.
19/ Given this, what kind of campaign can we expect Surovikin to construct & lead in the coming months? First, he will sustain his campaign targeting Ukrainian infrastructure and the will of the Ukrainian people (despite there being no historical example of this being successful)
20/ Second, he will pick ground to be defended over the winter and that which will have to be ceded so he can preserve his force and concentrate it to defend key areas between now and Spring in 2023. He has already started shaping perceptions around this for #Kherson.
21/ Third, he will be ensuring the key supply routes are defended and that he is building a more resilient and hard to target logistics network. This will probably be accompanied by a build-up of stocks for future offensive operations.
22/ Fourth, he will already be planning his 2023 campaign objectives, including the application of any new ground forces that might become available next year. While the Russian’s tactical recon has not been great, they will be conducting recon to support planning for 2023.
23/ Fifth, #Surovikin must meet Russian political intent of drawing the war out for as long as possible. Putin clearly believes the west will eventually lose interest in the war, and supporting Ukraine. While this is yet to be proven, he appears convinced this is a possibility.
24/ Notwithstanding Surovikin’s brutal and highly questionable background, it is prudent to assume that he is a competent & crafty campaign planner / leader. Despite Russian poor performance so far, we should not underestimate the enemy. End.
25/ Thank you to those who images, and work, were used in this thread: @massdara @barronsonline @nytimes @APNews @IAPonomarenko @TheStudyofWar @criticalthreats @KarolinaAHird @RALee85
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