Recently, I have written how Russia’s strategy for Ukraine is evolving (again), as well as the potential impacts of winter. Looking beyond the next few months, what might Russia’s options be for 2023, and what are the vulnerabilities Ukraine can attack? 1/24 🧵 
2/ Since the beginning of this war, Ukrainian resistance and battlefield success has forced Russia to constantly adapt their strategy. The war has not gone remotely like the Russians expected. They have had to continuously evolve (and downgrade) their ‘theory of victory’.
3/ So now, in November 2022, Russia’s #strategy is comprised of several elements. The 1st pillar of the Russian strategy is their strategic narrative that this is a war to resist #NATO aggression. A subordinate element is the ludicrous story about #Ukraine being run by Nazis.
4/ This narrative is important to sustain support for the war (and Putin) in Russia, but also among other nations. The ‘NATO aggression’ narrative plays well in certain parts of the world, especially the Middle East, South Asia and China.
5/ A 2nd element is the strategic energy warfare against the west. In particular, Putin still hopes that he can leverage a cold winter and high energy prices to shape western public and have a European intervention that forces a ceasefire (which would only favour Russia).
6/ Until then, Putin is happy to draw the war out, continue terrorizing and killing Ukrainian civilians while hoping western publics tire of the war.
7/ A 3rd element of Russia’s Ukraine strategy is strategic ‘bombing’. Early in the war, this focussed on cities and civilians. It still does this but also targets power and water. While not as obvious, this probably also includes cyber war against Ukraine.
8/ A 4th pillar of Russia’s current strategy is mobilisation. This replaces their personnel losses, and rebuilds an Army for future offensive operations. There is also an industrial aspect to this, which aims to replace lost equipment and improve military manufacturing output.
9/ A 5th and final part of Russia’s strategy is to hold the territory already seized by Russian forces. This includes parts of five Ukrainian oblasts, and is underpinned by Putin’s September annexation declaration.
10/ Given this strategic context, how might Russian General Surovikin be thinking about a 2023 Russian campaign in Ukraine? abc.net.au/news/2022-10-2…
11/ The 1st element of Russia’s 2023 campaign is likely to be a continuation of strategic strikes. This might include more precision strikes on strategic military targets, particularly logistics and training hubs. But it will also seek to deter foreign investment in Ukraine.
12/ As part of these strategic strikes, we may see Russia conduct some form of suppression of enemy air defences against new ground based air defence systems deployed in Ukraine. The increasingly effective Ukrainian sky shield is a threat to Russian strategic objectives.
13/ A 2nd part of a 2023 Russian campaign is operations to secure the five oblasts of the Russian annexation declaration. This is an important political and strategic objective. This includes taking territory but also stamping out partisans. understandingwar.org/backgrounder/i…
14/ A 3rd part of Russia’s 2023 campaign will be political activities to ‘Russify’ the territory they control. We have seen this in places like Kherson, and it is a way that Putin feels he can further legitimize his invasion.
15/ A 4th part of the 2023 Russian campaign may be ‘economy of force’ missions which fix Ukrainians in places so there’s forces can’t be used in the south or east to conduct offensives or defend against Russia. Belarus at the moment is an example of this.
16/ A 5th & final part of the 2023 Russian campaign might be attempts to improve the battlefield effectiveness of Russian ground & air forces. This may include attempts to improve logistics and rear area security, the integration and air & ground forces, and operational security.
17/ How can Ukraine and the west respond? First, ongoing western support - equipment, training, financial and humanitarian- is required for the medium term. This is a large, industrial scale war. It will take time, resources and strategic patience for Ukraine to prevail.
18/ Second, more air and missile defence, and counter-drone technologies, will be required. Russia, supported by Iran, is clearly going to continue its strategic air and missile attacks against Ukraine.
19/ Third, the Ukrainian ‘strategy of corrosion’ - which attacks Russian logistics, C2 and morale - will still be needed. But it must adapt as the Russians evolve their campaign. The adaptation battle is something the Ukrainians must win (they are so far). engelsbergideas.com/essays/how-ukr…
20/ Fourth, the generation and employment of Ukrainian combat forces needs ongoing support. This includes armored fighting vehicles, munitions, intelligence support and training. To support this, expanded Defence production in the west must commence.
21/ Finally, the Ukrainian strategic influence campaign remains critical. It is an important part of sustaining western political & public support for the war. While wars are not pleasant, this is the right war that must be fought now, and it must be fully supported by the west.
22/ The war will not stop in the coming winter. But is will be fought at a different tempo. And it provides political and military leaders an opportunity to plan for the year ahead. smh.com.au/world/europe/w…
23/ This thread is not designed to predict outcomes for 2023. That is impossible - there are too many uncertainties in war. But I hope it provides some insights into how senior leaders on both sides might be thinking about their operations after the coming winter. End.
24/ Thank you to the following whose images and work were used in this thread: @TDF_UA @UAWeapons @defenceu @thestudyofwar @criticalthreats @ralee85
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