Again we see reports of more extensive obstacle belts being constructed by the Russians in occupied #Ukraine. This tells us a few things - a thread on the political and military utility of these obstacles. 1/19 🧵
https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1589871873042444288
2/ First, the construction on these obstacle belts demonstrates the political importance of the areas where they are being installed. I will look at their military utility later, but these obstacles appear to be a statement of political will.
3/ With the potential loss of #Kherson province to the west of the Dniepr, Russia needs to demonstrate resolve to hold other parts of Ukraine it has annexed and illegally occupies. Thus the very visible construction of obstacles. nytimes.com/2022/11/07/wor…
4/ Second, the Russian government - in its domestic messaging - needs to offset their battlefield losses and stories of chaos in their mobilization system. These obstacle belts provide a counter message about the Russian government being serious about holding onto territory.
5/ The Russian Army and Putin are desperate for good news stories from Ukraine. This is one way (albeit a cynical one) of providing such stories.
6/ Third, physical obstacles still have some military utility. They normally mix mines (anti-tank & anti-pers), wire, dragons teeth, and other obstacles to make clearing them difficult. There are some big caveats to this however.
7/ As any good military commander knows, tactical obstacles must always be ‘covered by observation and fire.’ This means that the kind of obstacles belts being constructed by the Russians should be under surveillance (ground or air or a combo).
8/ Obstacles should also be covered by fire. This means that an enemy approaching them, or trying to breach them, can quickly be engaged with direct and indirect fires. 
9/ Obstacles generally have an ‘effect’ in mind when they are designed. This means that they are defined to ‘turn’ enemy forces into an engagement area, ‘block’ or ‘fix’ an enemy in an engagement area, or ‘disrupt’ the formation or speed of an advancing force.
10/ Of course, man made obstacles should always enhance natural obstacles such as rivers, forests, urban areas, etc.
11/ A huge amount of intelligence and planning goes into planning obstacle belts and zones. They are not generally ‘plonked’ down on a map by Sappers. Instead are an integral part of a larger tactical plan from the senior commander.
12/ An important point to note is that given the coming influx into #Ukraine of large numbers of poorly trained, recently mobilized troops, the Russians probably believe they can substitute training for physical obstacles on the battlefield. nytimes.com/2022/11/04/bri…
13/ Defending behind obstacles is a much simpler tactical task than more mobile forms of defence, and much, much easier than offensive operations.
14/ Both western and Russian military doctrine retains the use of obstacles in tactical operations. The Russians know that ground forces must fight to seize back territory in #Ukraine, and must believe that these obstacles will assist in that objective from here onwards.
15/ Now, the big question in #Ukraine is whether these obstacles have been designed and placed primarily for their military effect, or if they are purely there for a political narrative back in Russia.
16/ From my perspective, and despite some of the shortcomings seen in the Russian Army so far in this war, we should assume the Russians have used the principles for obstacles I have examined in this thread. Never under estimate the enemy!
17/ A final point - making and emplacing obstacles like this takes resources. While Russia might be using civil contractors for this, it is still a resource that can’t be used doing other things - like rebuilding the cities and towns the Russian destroyed while capturing them.
18/ In summary, these obstacles have some political and some military utility. But the ultimate impact of these dragons teeth and other obstacles emplaced by the Russians will be seen in the fights to come over winter and into 2023. End.
19/ Thank you to the following, whose images or links, were used in this thread: @CNN @DefenceHQ @nytimes @defenceu @IAPonomarenko
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