Interesting report of a possible Russian withdrawal in #Kherson, most likely from the west bank of the Dniepr. A short thread with some observations. 1/8🧵
2/ First, this announcement was made by the military and not Putin. Ceding territory should be a political decision; this is more evidence of Putin is clearly setting up the military as the fall guys for the Russian debacle in Ukraine.
3/ Second, is this real or possibly part of a deception campaign to draw the Ukrainians into a fight the Russians have prepared for? My sense is it is the real deal. Even if the Russians are well prepared on the West Bank, their position is ultimately difficult to sustain.
4/ Third, the pace and organization of any Russian withdrawal - given this should be a deliberate activity - will tell us much about the morale and capability of the Russian forces in the south.
5/ Fourth, given the time the Russians have had to prepare this withdrawal, they may not be leaving behind as much equipment and munitions dumps as they did in the Kharkiv offensive. Therefore it may not be a bonanza of recovering enemy equipment for the Ukrainians.
6/ Fifth, the Russians may accompany this withdrawal with stepped up strategic strikes elsewhere in Ukraine. From a Russian perspective, this is payback but will also provide strategic comms material to distract a Russian audience from the Kherson withdrawal & loss of territory.
7/ This is important. Having told the Russian people, in the annexation declaration, that Kherson is part of Russia, Putin will need a story to justify the withdrawal and distract the domestic audience from it.
8/ Finally, if a withdrawal does take place, the locations to which withdrawn troops are deployed will provide insights into their combat status as well as General Surovikin’s priorities for the winter and early 2023.
9/ These are initial thoughts only. There are still many uncertainties about this potential withdrawal. The coming days will provide better clarity. End.
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More information is emerging about the Russian withdrawal from West Bank of the Dniepr River in #Ukraine. This will have a range of impacts on the war. 1/25 🧵
2/ This thread builds on my earlier one that contained initial observations about a potential Russian withdrawal.
3/ The first order issue - is this real or possibly part of a deception campaign to draw the Ukrainians into a fight the Russians have prepared for? My sense is that it is the real deal. The Russian position is very difficult to sustain in #Kherson.
Again we see reports of more extensive obstacle belts being constructed by the Russians in occupied #Ukraine. This tells us a few things - a thread on the political and military utility of these obstacles. 1/19 🧵
2/ First, the construction on these obstacle belts demonstrates the political importance of the areas where they are being installed. I will look at their military utility later, but these obstacles appear to be a statement of political will.
3/ With the potential loss of #Kherson province to the west of the Dniepr, Russia needs to demonstrate resolve to hold other parts of Ukraine it has annexed and illegally occupies. Thus the very visible construction of obstacles. nytimes.com/2022/11/07/wor…
Recently, there has been coverage of Russian mobilisation of new troops for #Ukraine. There has been some chaos, but it has been an uneven process across many Russian #training depots. So I thought I would discuss what a modern military training system should look like. 1/25 🧵
2/ What is my background to talk about this? I was a soldier for 35 years & commanded at many levels including a combined arms Brigade. I also reviewed & led the @AustralianArmy training, education, lessons & #doctrine system in 2016-2017. researchcentre.army.gov.au/sites/default/…
3/ Before I get into the structural aspects, there are some key ideas underpinning military training: alignment with core institutional mission (combat), honest assessment, realism, adaptivity, doctrinal alignment, continuous learning & good resourcing. And excellent instructors!
Recently, I have written how Russia’s strategy for Ukraine is evolving (again), as well as the potential impacts of winter. Looking beyond the next few months, what might Russia’s options be for 2023, and what are the vulnerabilities Ukraine can attack? 1/24 🧵
2/ Since the beginning of this war, Ukrainian resistance and battlefield success has forced Russia to constantly adapt their strategy. The war has not gone remotely like the Russians expected. They have had to continuously evolve (and downgrade) their ‘theory of victory’.
3/ So now, in November 2022, Russia’s #strategy is comprised of several elements. The 1st pillar of the Russian strategy is their strategic narrative that this is a war to resist #NATO aggression. A subordinate element is the ludicrous story about #Ukraine being run by Nazis.
This video from @Osinttechnical, despite some poor tactical flying, highlights a larger issue. What is the survivability of rotary wing aircraft on the modern (and future) battlefield? 1/7 🧵
2/ This is not an anti-helicopter tirade. I love our Army RW combat aviators. They have provided sterling and courageous service for decades. But perhaps it is time for a reassessment of their ability to operate effectively in some battlefield functions.
3/ These are platforms that have many easily detectable signatures, particularly noise and the signature of their blades. They are slow moving. And some of them carry a lot of humans!
More details are emerging about the Ukrainian attack on Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in occupied Crimea. Lots more clarity to come in the following days, but a few immediate observations are possible. 1/20 🧵 #Sevastopol
2/ First, it is clear that #Ukraine’s ability to target Russian forces continues to expand beyond the battlefield. Operational and strategic targets are now in their sights, underpinned by good intelligence and long range strike tools like #HIMSRS and maritime drones.
3/ This will place even more stress on a Russian military that is struggling to hold its ground in the areas of #Ukraine they have occupied. Mobilized troops will be little help in preventing the kind of attacks that just occurred in #Sevastopol