The reality here is that the West is saying that they don’t wish to step up military production to any great extent because of the cost. Meanwhile, the Russians are beginning to mobilise their industry. 1/9 🧵 (Thanks @shashj for raising this issue).
2/ In his September mobilisation speech, Putin spoke of industrial production. “The heads of defense industry enterprises will be directly responsible for attaining the goals of increasing the production of weapons and military equipment.” washingtonpost.com/world/2022/09/…
3/ He also described how “at the same time, the government must address without any delay all aspects of material, resource and financial support for our defense enterprises.” We have seen limited comments of the same nature from Western leaders despite declining weapons stocks.
4/ Like it or not, this war is now a battle of industrial systems - like previous large wars. The post Cold War ‘small, exquisite, periodic and expensive’ approach to weapons procurement in the West is over. We just haven’t fully realized that yet.
5/ At some point, I hope governments (including my own) come to realize that mobilizing industry is part of our conventional deterrent regime. We want potential adversaries to know we can (and will) step up production if they pick a fight. It is a sign of capability and will.
6/ In Europe, such a step up would send an important message to Putin about European will now, but also of their longer term willingness to deter Russian aggression.
7/ In the Pacific, industrial capacity of nations such as the US, Japan, India, Korea and Australia is a vital capability in deterring the noxious wolf warrior diplomacy and military aggression of the Chinese Communist Party.
8/ In both regions, the West will need to make hard decisions about industrial capacity, especially about duplicating and dispersing capacity (for survivability and expanded capacity), the balance of munitions versus platforms, and expanded war stocks.
9/ There is an old saying - ‘the best time to mobilise was yesterday’. There is a time imperative in this issue. Good, strategic and courageous decisions related to mobilising industry in the West are needed now. End.
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This is a good point from @ralee85. While winter might slow things down, it will not stop the war. Ukraine has momentum and the initiative in this war - they are not going to waste it. 1/2
2/ There are so many historical precedents for wars continuing through winter: Korea, WW2 in Europe, etc. Winter has been occurring in Ukraine for a long time. They know how to deal with it. smh.com.au/world/europe/w…
3/ And it is worth noting that winter absolutely is NOT the time to force negotiations on Ukraine. It is however time to surge weapons, munitions and training for Ukrainian Armed Forces.
More information is emerging about the Russian withdrawal from West Bank of the Dniepr River in #Ukraine. This will have a range of impacts on the war. 1/25 🧵
2/ This thread builds on my earlier one that contained initial observations about a potential Russian withdrawal.
3/ The first order issue - is this real or possibly part of a deception campaign to draw the Ukrainians into a fight the Russians have prepared for? My sense is that it is the real deal. The Russian position is very difficult to sustain in #Kherson.
Interesting report of a possible Russian withdrawal in #Kherson, most likely from the west bank of the Dniepr. A short thread with some observations. 1/8🧵
2/ First, this announcement was made by the military and not Putin. Ceding territory should be a political decision; this is more evidence of Putin is clearly setting up the military as the fall guys for the Russian debacle in Ukraine.
3/ Second, is this real or possibly part of a deception campaign to draw the Ukrainians into a fight the Russians have prepared for? My sense is it is the real deal. Even if the Russians are well prepared on the West Bank, their position is ultimately difficult to sustain.
Again we see reports of more extensive obstacle belts being constructed by the Russians in occupied #Ukraine. This tells us a few things - a thread on the political and military utility of these obstacles. 1/19 🧵
2/ First, the construction on these obstacle belts demonstrates the political importance of the areas where they are being installed. I will look at their military utility later, but these obstacles appear to be a statement of political will.
3/ With the potential loss of #Kherson province to the west of the Dniepr, Russia needs to demonstrate resolve to hold other parts of Ukraine it has annexed and illegally occupies. Thus the very visible construction of obstacles. nytimes.com/2022/11/07/wor…
Recently, there has been coverage of Russian mobilisation of new troops for #Ukraine. There has been some chaos, but it has been an uneven process across many Russian #training depots. So I thought I would discuss what a modern military training system should look like. 1/25 🧵
2/ What is my background to talk about this? I was a soldier for 35 years & commanded at many levels including a combined arms Brigade. I also reviewed & led the @AustralianArmy training, education, lessons & #doctrine system in 2016-2017. researchcentre.army.gov.au/sites/default/…
3/ Before I get into the structural aspects, there are some key ideas underpinning military training: alignment with core institutional mission (combat), honest assessment, realism, adaptivity, doctrinal alignment, continuous learning & good resourcing. And excellent instructors!
Recently, I have written how Russia’s strategy for Ukraine is evolving (again), as well as the potential impacts of winter. Looking beyond the next few months, what might Russia’s options be for 2023, and what are the vulnerabilities Ukraine can attack? 1/24 🧵
2/ Since the beginning of this war, Ukrainian resistance and battlefield success has forced Russia to constantly adapt their strategy. The war has not gone remotely like the Russians expected. They have had to continuously evolve (and downgrade) their ‘theory of victory’.
3/ So now, in November 2022, Russia’s #strategy is comprised of several elements. The 1st pillar of the Russian strategy is their strategic narrative that this is a war to resist #NATO aggression. A subordinate element is the ludicrous story about #Ukraine being run by Nazis.