🧵 #Russian tactical radios 1/ Long story short: it is FUBAR.
But if you want some more details, enjoy. But keep in mind it is not a comprehensive 🧵. The more I read in 🇷🇺 forums, the more questions arise. I hope some readers have better knowledge than me and answer them. 👉2/
2/ who is the architect of 🇷🇺 signals troops and where is he now? His name is GenCol Khalil Arslanov (2013-2020). And his position was Chief of Main Signals Directorate of the Russian General Staff. Now accused for corruption, but his court case is classified from June 2022.
3/ The responsible the purchase of the Azart digital radios confessed that the contract (18.5 billion RUR) was artificially increased by 6.7 billion RUR.
And in reality the radios were purchased in 🇨🇳, only cosmetic touches were added in Russia. Here export & military versions.
4/ R-187P1 Azart radio problems:
(these radios debuted in Sochi in 2014)
- sets cannot be upgraded with batteries /chargers/antennas
- 1st batch: three batteries and a charger for each station
- 2nd batch: two batteries and three chargers for five stations
5/
- no spare chargers/batteries
- no repeater, stationary antenna or possibility to connect to external/car/magnetic antenna
- no vehicle versions, only portable sets
- 25 components are sanctioned, 5 cannot be bought at all
6/ - the 🇷🇺 factory “Радиотехника” cannot initiate additional production or repair.
- a u/i brigade in 2014 Central MD received 100 sets (not enough, a battalion requires at average 15-20 sets)
- there were two batches delivered, but their quality is low or lower
7/ - R-187P1 Azart is based on 1GHz processor made in 65nm technology (here the good technical news end).
Its continuous work on one battery is 6-12 hrs
So maybe other radios are better?
See R-168 Akveduk digital radios that were distributed in early 2022
8/ - blind displays were a normal occurrence
- even brand new batteries were broken
- produced in 2006-2011, guarantee for 5 years
- so batteries are makeshift repaired or re-produced by cannibalism (you make 2 good out of 5 broken) or by AliExpress replenishment
9/ It is the entire family of radios
R-168-0.1U (0.1 W) for scouts
R-168-40U (40 W) for tanks
R-168-100U/KB/KA (100 W) for HQ vehicles
R-168-5KN (5 W) for Spetsnaz/Airborne
but R-168 cannot communicate with digital R-187 Azart.
10/ And as older tanks are equipped with R-123/173 and newer with R-168 (T-72B3 or T-90) that (if want to coordinate with analogues radios) can only operate in fixed frequencies.
So both digital/analog are used. Like here 👇
11/ What is the general picture then?
The theory on the left and the reality on the right. An unhappy 🇷🇺 signals officer was careless enough to point to all deficiencies and red crossed all parts of the 🇷🇺 digital signals
that are non-existent.
12/ And this person also shared that the only 🇷🇺 battalion with both digital and analog communications was “Призрак” from LNR 2 Army Corps that commander bought components from R-169P1-01. Based on his assessment LNR units have best comms compared to DNR or 🇷🇺 Army.
13/
In the army I served there is a saying: “President May make you a general, but only comms can make you a commander”.
#Russian mobilization system (1/3). Shortly.
1.Soviet model disbanded in 2009
- “mobilization” officers’ specialties erased
- military universities stopped teaching “mobilization”
- voenkomats re-subordinated to civilian administrations
(2/3)
- numerous “mothballed” units/depots disbanded
- training area sold, ammunition for sale/training/utilization
2.mobilization system restored in 2018
- 🇷🇺MoD attempt to reverse the losses
- but to restore was much more difficult than liquidate
(3/3)
- current production went to active army, not depots
- regions or PMC started to buy en masse defense production
- still the system is saturated with corruption
The system was maintained for 50+ years, vanished for 10, now it is a makeshift & impromptu patchwork.
- #RussianArmy unable to gain advantage over technologically comparable enemy
- trained to parade & prevent, not win the war
- inadequate ORBAT (because not necessary in daily/parade routine) without:
2/n - modern signals units
- reconnaissance units
- UAVs
- direct link to 🇷🇺 satellites
- ammunition, especially precise
- sights/scopes/optics/NVGs/thermal
Inadequate/limited training w/o
- night livex
- medical
- maintenance/logistics/repair scenarios
3/n
- camouflage/concealed deployment
- all directions manouvre (withdrawal/retrograde/flanking/encircling)
- rear area security
- liaison officer exchange & General Staff attached monitors
1/n #Russian defense tactics in short headers:
- based on strengthened separated (200-900m) points
- the "empty" spaces covered by artillery & obstacles (mines)
- but not in Donbas, where the 🇷🇺 defense is much denser & cover/protect one another with fire
2/n - 🇷🇺 defense are often along rivers but once 🇺🇦 bridgeheads are established, 🇷🇺 unable to defeat them
- 🇺🇦 can and 🇷🇺 can’t maneuver their center of gravity
- 🇷🇺 artillery is not flexible
- 🇷🇺 units/commanders like having a significant space in front of them (no man’s land)
3/n - this no man’s land serves as observation & artillery strike area
- 🇷🇺 need this to recognize 🇺🇦 avenues of approaches
- 🇷🇺 arty not prepared to strike in the depths of own formation
- 🇷🇺 units also untrained to fight inside large forests
cc @STRATPOINTS_EU@TheStudyofWar
1/n 70+ years old #Russian assessment of the 🇷🇺 Army
- low/no quality military training
- army as private pasture (looted by the top brass)
- a paper tiger
- no smart tactics, just fight to die
- only ceremonies & parades lon43.livejournal.com/669950.html?il…
2/n - 🇷🇺 listen & swallow the 3xS propaganda & subservience(Simonyan, Solovev, Skabeeva)
- miraculously to 🇷🇺 command, 🇺🇦 turned out not to be stupid chicken but smart & strong
- & 🇷🇺 rooster is loosing its down, plumage and claws
- no blitzkrieg whatsoever
3/n - 🇷🇺 army fails and it is presumably the best what #Russia had
- but its best is in killing & raping children
- 🇷🇺 losses predominately among Tuva, Buryatya, Dagestan inhabitants, non-Russians
- if more 🇷🇺 killed, expect social unrest, even mutiny
2/n (F) says #Putin most likely to hit a military formation or logistics center. I disagree, because it would mean a ground level strike followed by a significant contamination. Putin knows the strategic consequences. Hence a high altitude nuclear explosion is much more likely.
3/n RVSN will not be used because this is the global reach weapon threatening NATO/USA, not 🇺🇦. And would trigger a US/NATO critical defcon level.
I wanted to say that (F) claim of the most powerful tactical nuclear yield in Russia is incorrect (100 kt mentioned), but I can’t.
#Lyman this morning
Source: 🇷🇺
- 503 MR regt reinforcing the 🇷🇺 defense
- 🇷🇺 strength: 4-5k soldiers incl. reinforcements
- map: red dots named as the "road of life" Svatovo-Lyman