We are short $PVBC, a small #bank with massive crypto loan exposure. The loans are already #defaulting and share price is #rapidly declining. We think it’s a zero. Read our report: bit.ly/3OisAKH
$PVBC expanded its #crypto lending business to $138m within 18 months and yesterday impaired more than half of it. A 200yr old #bank went tits-up in a matter of months. Read our report: bit.ly/3OisAKH
The $PVBC crypto lending business was led by Paul #Mansfield, who we think, is an immediate family member of the bank’s CEO David Mansfield. Read our report: bit.ly/3OisAKH
Only after a write-down of repossessed collateral did $PVBC a formal review of the crypto loan portfolio. These #loans are backed by crypto-miners or solely #cryptocurrencies and used for crypto lending and #margin trading. Read our report: bit.ly/3OisAKH
In our opinion the #board of directors #failed its duties and was influenced by favors from $PVBC's management. Read our report: bit.ly/3OisAKH
The chairwoman of #compensation committee was awarded a contract for designing the $PVBC headquarter in 2017, five years later executives compensation totaled 27pct of the bank’s net profits. Read our report: bit.ly/3OisAKH
On top of it, in 2021 $PVBC switched its retirement plans from a collective trust to a self-managed one. More than 40% of savings were invested in its own stock. We estimate the #losses YTD at $7m. Read our report: bit.ly/3OisAKH
We think trust in $PVBC, the executives, and the board of directors has been completely lost. We expect further #revelations and #regulatory actions in the coming weeks. We are short $PVBC. Read our full report: bit.ly/3OisAKH
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1/ We are short Critical Metals Corp. $CRML.
In our opinion, the company is not a legitimate mining venture but an elaborate promotional vehicle. We believe its entire narrative is constructed on geological fantasies and engineering impossibilities.
A thread 🧵
$CRML's flagship pitch is the Tanbreez project, promoted with a "75% of the Rare Earth Oxides are magnet REO" figure.
This is a "metric-gimmick". We checked their own PEA data. The actual share of valuable magnet REOs (Nd, Pr, Dy, Tb) is just 20.08%.
3/ How does $CRML achieves a $2.7bn valuation on its Tanbreez mine?
By, in our opinion, fabricating it. The PEA values their unprocessed concentrate at the final price of fully refined, high-purity oxides.
...while EXCLUDING 100% of the billion-dollar cost to build the refinery.
We are short CCC S.A. (WSE: CCC). Our investigation has uncovered evidence that CCC’s celebrated turnaround is an illusion, engineered through a classic channel stuffing scheme, brazen self-dealing by insiders, and accounting games to hide a rotting core. A thread on $CCC.WA 1/x
At the heart of the deception is a channel stuffing scheme. $CCC.WA is fabricating growth by "selling" hundreds of millions in unwanted inventory to a captive, insolvent franchisee called MKRI. The clearest footprint of this scheme is CCC’s exploding trade receivables. (2/x)
Since 2024, MKRI has been undergoing a PZU restructuring. Despite sales falling by 32%, MKRI increased its inventory massively (+138% YoY) and funded it through short-term credit (+232% YoY). MKRI even tripled warehouse space due to $CCC.WA inventory dump. (3/x)
The $GRND Buyout Bid Is One of the Messiest We’ve Ever Seen.
One of the supposed buyers — who also happens to be the current board chairman — is being margin called on his pledged $GRND shares.
1/x
That $GRND margin call should’ve been disclosed in a Form 4.
Form 4 requires a two-day filing deadline for reporting changes in a company insider's beneficial ownership.
But the filing for the Oct 10 sale? Delayed. Conveniently. 2/x
30 minutes before the first buyout rumors hit the news on Monday, someone snapped up 2,500 call options.
We are short Marex Group $MRX. Our research concludes it's a financial house of cards built on a multi-year scheme of accounting manipulation, intercompany transactions, and fake profits. This thread breaks down our findings.
The scheme starts with an opaque fund structure in Luxembourg. In 2020, we believe $MRX bailed out a failing volatility fund (VPF) to conceal a ~$27M loss. This crucial decision was never approved by the board's acquisition committee—a major governance failure.
After the bailout, $MRX created a new, off-balance-sheet vehicle: the "Marex Fund." It holds at least ~$930M in derivatives, with Marex as the sole counterparty. Strikingly, group auditor Deloitte resigned from this specific entity, a material event Marex never disclosed.
$COCO's supply chain, touted as a competitive advantage, is a mess. Inventory shortages have upset retailers, with Walmart downgrading shelf placement & reducing SKUs, leading to double-digit sales declines.
$COCO's private-label story is cracking. Investors expect small customer losses in 2025, but we found Costco, representing ~25% of net sales, is terminating their partnership due to supply chain failures.
We are short Merchants Bancorp, $MBIN, because, our investigation uncovered that MBIN has been aggressively expanding its loan book by lending money to bad actors that have a history of:
fraud,
housing code violations, and
running properties into the ground.
The most significant expansion has taken place in $MBIN's multifamily and healthcare loan book, growing from $529 million in 2017 to $6.6bn in Mid-2024.
Multiplying its bridge loan portfolio by a factor of eleven in less than seven years.
(2/n)
$MBIN claims to be different from other banks facing over-exposure to risky commercial property, at 411%, MBIN actually has one of the highest CRE concentration ratios in the US.