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Nov 27 • 11 tweets • 3 min read
Russian officials may be attempting to counterbalance the influence of #Wagner Group financier Yevgeny #Prigozhin through the promotion of other parallel military structures. isw.pub/UkrWar112622
2/ The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 26 that Russian officials appointed a Viktor Yanukovych-linked, pro-Kremlin businessman, Armen Sarkisyan, as the new administrator for prisons in Russian-occupied territories in Ukraine...
...and that Sarkisyan intends to use the role to create a new “private military company.”
2/ The GUR reported that Sarkisyan modeled his effort to create a new private military company on the Wagner Group’s recruitment of prisoners in the Russian Federation and that Russian-Armenian businessman Samvel Karapetyan is sponsoring the effort.
3/ Karapetyan is the owner of Tashir Holding company, a longtime subcontractor for Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom.
4/ The GUR reported that Sarkisyan’s attempt to create a new private military structure is an attempt to create a counterweight to Prigozhin’s de facto monopoly in the field of Russian private military companies.
5/ It is likely that high-ranking Russian officials have approved Sarkisyan’s efforts as private military companies are illegal in Russia.
6/ Meanwhile, the head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov reported that he met with Putin on 25 NOV & claimed to have discussed the participation of Chechen units in the war in Ukraine and the creation of new Russian military & Rosgvardia units comprised of Chechen personnel.
7/ @TheStudyofWar has previously reported that Kadyrov routinely promotes his efforts to create Chechen-based parallel military structures.
8/ Russian officials may be further promoting Kadyrov’s existing parallel military structures and Sarkisyan’s efforts to create a private military company to counteract the growing influence of Prigozhin...
...whom @TheStudyofWar has previously assessed uses his own parallel military structures to establish himself as a central figure in the Russian pro-war ultranationalist community.

isw.pub/UkrWar112622

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More from @TheStudyofWar

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Nov 28
🧵Part 3 on Eastern #Kherson:

Russian forces have likely deployed mobilized personnel to the primary lines of defense and pulled experienced, professional units to the secondary and tertiary lines of defense, a deployment pattern that could lead to more rapid Ukrainian advances.
2/ As @TheStudyofWar has previously reported, Russian mobilized personnel are generally poorly trained, equipped, and led, significantly increasing casualties among mobilized personnel and decreasing their willingness to fight.
3/ Such reports are so frequent and pervasive that they have divided the Russian information space and prompted swift punishment and suppression.
Read 11 tweets
ISW Profile picture
Nov 28
🧵Part 2 on Russian defenses in eastern #Kherson:

Russian forces may be attempting to delay (slow down) rather than defend against (stop) a Ukrainian offensive on the east (left) bank of the #Dnipro River. isw.pub/UkrWar112722
2/ Russian forces would presumably delay until they can deploy reinforcements to either stop or slow Ukrainian forces from breaking through secondary and tertiary lines of defense that protect critical GLOCs both to #Crimea and to western #Zaporizhia Oblast (as shown in the map).
3/ It is unclear if the Russian military leadership foresees a delay mission at the operational or the strategic level. An operational-level delay would require holding long enough to allow forces already in theater to move from other areas to eastern #Kherson.
Read 9 tweets
ISW Profile picture
Nov 28
Russian forces are fortifying their positions along critical GLOCs in eastern #Kherson Oblast against a possible future Ukrainian counteroffensive.🧵 isw.pub/UkrWar112722

Satellite images below were captured 15 NOV via @Maxar
2/ @Maxar imagery from 15 NOV shows that Russian forces have prioritized digging trenches & erecting dragon’s teeth anti-tank defenses along GLOCs that connect Russian forces on the left bank of the Dnipro River with southeastern rear areas in Kherson Oblast and Crimea... Trenches, fortifications, a...Trenches near Novotroitske,...
...as well as with eastern rear areas around Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast.

3/ Most of these field fortifications are situated directly on the GLOCs and are primarily oriented perpendicular to the roads themselves.
Read 15 tweets
ISW Profile picture
Nov 28
Tonight's assessment from @TheStudyofWar and @criticalthreats evaluates the defensive positions Russian forces are establishing in eastern #Kherson Oblast and what those positions suggest about Russian expectations for future operations in this area.🧵isw.pub/UkrWar112722 Image
2/ The Russian military clearly assesses that Ukrainian forces could cross the Dnipro River and conduct counter-offensive operations in eastern Kherson Oblast, possibly threatening all of the critical ground lines of communications (GLOCs) from Crimea to the mainland.
3/ Russian forces have been digging trench lines and concentration areas in eastern Kherson since early October 2022 in apparent preparation for the withdrawal from the west bank of the Dnipro River and Kherson City.
Read 9 tweets
ISW Profile picture
Nov 27
Russian forces are likely using inert Kh-55 cruise missiles in their massive missile strike campaign against Ukrainian critical infrastructure, further highlighting the depletion of the Russian military’s high-precision weapons arsenal. isw.pub/UkrWar112622
2/ The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on November 26 that Russia is likely removing nuclear warheads from aging Kh-55 missiles and launching the missiles without warheads at targets in #Ukraine.
3/ The UK MoD suggested that Russian forces are likely launching the inert missiles as decoys to divert Ukrainian air defenses.
Read 6 tweets
ISW Profile picture
Nov 27
#Russian-Occupied Areas Update:

Russian officials are continuing efforts to deport children to Russia under the guise of medical rehabilitation schemes and adoption programs.
isw.pub/UkrWar112622
2/ The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on NOV 26 that the Russian occupation admin. in Luhansk Obl. conducted medical examinations of 15K children ages 2-17 & found that 70% (10.5K) are in need of “special medical care” requiring them to be removed to Russia for “treatment.”
3/ The Resistance Center stated that Russian officials intend these forced deportation schemes to lure children’s families to Russia to collect their children after the children receive treatments...
Read 5 tweets

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