#Austria vetoed, in the European Council, the accession of #Romania and #Bulgaria into the #Schengen area. This is odd because it runs against the views of all other member states bar the #Netherlands and against the recommendation of the European Commission.
2-5
The Austrians complain they're experiencing a surge in arrivals of people who are, de facto, economic migrants, from multiple origins, who then claim political asylum.
It is true there has been a surge. But Romania and Bulgaria appear to have very little to do with it.
3-5
Instead it appears it is #Serbia that serves as a new massive point of arrival for migrants who then make it to AUT. This seems to be mainly through HUN:
AUT voted for Croatia's entry into Schengen, and I don't see complaints about Slovenia.
Therefore, Vienna's position in the European Council against Romania and Bulgaria doesn't seem well justified at all - and it would explain why everybody else is disagreeing with Austria.
5-5
It would be useful to know the importance of the Serbia-Hungary-Austria route.
I have 4 questions:
- do we have reliable data for each route?
- is Orban a soft touch in Schengen?
- is Serbia playing a Belarus-type game?
- why the apparent blame-shifting on RO & BG?
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Study: Left-wing authoritarians share key psychological traits with far right
"in terms of their psychological characteristics and their actual behaviors, left-wing authoritarians are extremely similar to authoritarians on the right."
"Right-wing authoritarians tend to aggressively back the established hierarchy, while left-wing authoritarians tend to aggressively oppose it. They are almost like mirror images of one another that both share a common psychological core"
3-8
"Authoritarians have a predisposition for liking sameness and opposing differences among people in their environment"
"They are submissive to people they perceive as authority figures, they are dominant and aggressive towards people they disagree with"
Looking at the U.S. and the UK back in 2016, what interested the Russian state was to seek to "amplify existing “wedge issues" ... Immigration, police brutality, and elite corruption" while noting that "it works with what is already there"
This is why those who are focused on security policy keep on insisting: be less polarized.
The rights or wrongs of the latest political scandal are often exaggerated by both sides. And excess partisan emotion is a weakness that enemy states, esp. Russia, will exploit.
As today's massive missile attack by Russia against civilian targets in Ukraine makes clear, the way forward is to take out the launch facilities and platforms: Russian aircraft and ships.
Kyiv needs capabilities to strike at distances of 1000 km or more, inside Russia.
2-4
It appears some kind of strike hit a Russian air base 500 km from the Ukrainian border. This is a hopeful sign that Ukraine may have developed some kind of capability to do so. But much more is needed, for targets on land, in the air, and at sea.
Our nations should endeavour to help Ukraine as much as possible, covertly if need be, at the technical and industrial level, to generate the relevant capabilities in sufficient numbers.
Orthodox Christianity, as a faith, is one thing.
The Russian Orthodox Church on the other hand is a front organization, controlled by the Putin regime for internal & external propaganda and for the promotion of the state's war aims.
=> it should be banned in all our nations
2-3
In 2019, Ukrainian intelligence had established that the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP) was “99 percent controlled” by the special services of the Russian Federation, the FSB at home and the SVR abroad.
3-3
"The evidence of this control is overwhelming, the Ukrainian intelligence chief says, but unfortunately, many in the West cannot accept it because it is beyond their imagination."
Everything Chancellor Scholz expresses about Europe and European security is sensible and known. His condemnation of Russia's actions is very clear. His commitment for Germany to help Ukraine and take on more responsibility for European security is clear.
3-25
What is likely to trigger the greatest interest is how he frames the evolving US-China rivalry and how he sees Germany and the EU in that context. In fact, that issue is his primary topic and the chosen title of the piece: "How to Avoid a New Cold War in a Multipolar Era"
My takeaways from Pres. Macron's interview, today 3 Dec., on the Russia-Ukraine war and the post-war environment.
A:
Only Ukraine decides whether the fight aims at the full restoration of its 2013 borders (or less). This means full diplomatic backing to recapture Crimea.
2-13
A: (cont.)
The journalist badgered Macron on Crimea. His answer was passionate:
"Do you think that when we, French people, had to live through the seizure of Alsace-Lorraine, we would have liked, in wartime, to have a foreign leader tell us you must do this or that?"
3-13
A: (cont.)
"What is at play in Ukraine and what we're defending are the principles of the UN Charter. Territorial integrity and national sovereignty (...) it's for the Ukrainian people to decide under what conditions, how, when. It's not for us. (...)"