War is a very destructive human endeavour. But war is also a learning opportunity for military institutions. Many governments and institutions are watching the war in #Ukraine for insights into future competition and conflict. A thread on lessons and the war. 1/25 🧵
2/ Back in May, I explored why learning in war is so important, and explained some of the principles related to lessons and lessons learned for military organisations. You can read that post here:
3/ In the past ten months there has been a profusion of articles that propose lists of lessons from the Russo-Ukraine War. Some – from experts on war, the military, strategy and national security affairs - are well informed and cogently argued. atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atla…
4/ Some, on the other hand, are biased, poorly structured, misinformation or just plain wrong (or even weird). This includes premature declarations such as ‘the death of (insert your least favourite military equipment here)’.
5/ But learning from war is a serious business that has significant consequences for military organisations if not done well. The lives of our future service personnel literally hang on how competently we learn, and adapt, from our observations of modern wars.
6/ Why should we look at lessons from war in general, and this one in particular? The answer is that our world is constantly changing. Rather than continuously making our own mistakes in responding to change, clever institutions can learn from the missteps of others.
7/ To exploit the failures of others requires a military institution to have a learning culture. As I have explored previously in my threads, the Ukrainians have demonstrated a superior learning culture in this war, and in its lead up. They learned from 2014, adapted & improved.
8/ I have explored this competitive learning environment in #Ukraine, which can be better called an adaptation battle, in several articles. engelsbergideas.com/essays/how-ukr…
9/ With this as context, I wanted to explore some of the better observations from the war in #Ukraine. While there is a long way to go, these provide good intellectual foundations for the lessons that military institutions will draw from the war to inform modernisation efforts.
10/ The November 2022 report from @RUSI_org is probably the best report on Ukraine war observations released thus far. rusi.org/explore-our-re…
11/ It has a particular focus on Russian operations and the integration of different force elements. Its critiques of Ukrainian operations are limited however, noting the requirement for operational security. That said, it is a very good report on initial observations of the war.
13/ And while this is not a long report, the source makes it worthy of perusing. In June this year, the Secretary of the US Army discussed five key lessons from #Ukraine. breakingdefense.com/2022/06/us-arm…
14/ The war in the air over Ukraine is worthy of additional study. There has been a lot going on with both crewed and uncrewed systems, missiles, and Ukraine’s integrated air and missile defence system. One of the better studies on this is from @RUSI_org static.rusi.org/SR-Russian-Air…
16/ Cyber operations, have been described by some as that dog that hasn’t barked in Ukraine. This is probably an unfair assessment – there have been cyber operations on both sides. But they are not as obvious or transparent as other aspects of the war. lawfareblog.com/cyberwar-ukrai…
17/ In June this year, Microsoft issued a report on the early lessons of cyber from the war in Ukraine. It is a good read, although should be read in conjunction with other views of the cyber war such as those from @WIRED and @TheEconomist blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/…
18/ Finally, information warfare. This war has seen widespread influence operations from both sides. It has also seen a Cambrian explosion in civil influence operations, open-source mapping and assessment, and intelligence analysis. gov.uk/government/spe…
19/ This discussion from @CSIS explores a range of observations drawn from the war in #Ukraine. The link is a transcript, but a video of the discussion is also available. csis.org/analysis/nafo-…
20/ While reviewing the many observations made of this war so far, there are 2 things to keep in mind. First, events in the coming months might change the context of these current observations. And second, even with these observations, not all military #innovation is good.
21/ We must ensure that institutional processes are informed by examples of failed lessons and failed ‘lessons learned’ processes. Examples of failed reform processes can be just as informative as successful adaptations.
22/ Earlier this year, Kendrick Kuo explored how military innovation can also hurt military effectiveness. It is a long read but contains many useful lessons for observing military affairs and drawing lessons on innovation and adaptation. belfercenter.org/publication/da…
23/ In #learning from this war, western military institutions will need to invest in – and apply – collection, analysis, dissemination, and adaptation processes. Importantly, as Don Starry described in "To Change an Army" this will require #leadership from the top.
24/ As this war continues, and both sides are adapting based on battlefield learning, their interactions with each other, and new technologies and ideas. Other clever military institutions must be watching, assessing and adapting. End.
Yesterday, my report on the new global adaptation war was published by the @scsp_ai . The report proposes that the learning and adaptation ecosystem spawned by the war in #Ukraine has now metastasised into an international learning and #adaptation competition. 1/10 🧵🇺🇦
2/ As the report describes, in the past three years, Ukraine and Russia have learned and adapted. Both sides have also learned to learn better and to absorb lessons into their military and industrial systems with increasing speed. But the sharing of lessons by both nations has seen the Ukraine Adaptation Battle transform into a global Adaptation War.
3/ A new adversary learning and adaptation bloc has emerged. While not a formal alliance, China, Russia, Iran and North Korea have developed a mesh of different agreements and strategic partnerships that have allowed these authoritarian regimes to construct a connected knowledge market on 21st century strategic competition and conflict.
I have just published my weekly update on modern war and strategic competition. This week: the Battle of Pokrovsk, Russian casualties, deep-strike campaigns, China's 3rd aircraft carrier commissions, as well as my recommended war and national security reads. 1/5 🧵🇺🇦
2/ In #Ukraine, the Battle of #Pokrovsk continues. While an audacious air assault was conducted this week, it is hard to see that it will arrest the overall Russian momentum in enveloping the city. Both Ukraine & Russia are continuing their deep strike operations in the lead up to winter, although Ukraine's strikes are yet to change Putin's strategic calculus about the war.
3/ In the #Pacific, Chinese aggression around #Taiwan continued, albeit at a lower tempo than previous months. The Chinese also commissioned their third aircraft carrier during the week. Taiwan announced several initiatives related to the operation of unmanned systems.
Recently, I returned from my second 2025 visit to Ukraine. It was, as always, both enlightening & inspiring to spend time with Ukrainian military personnel who are innovating & fighting to keep Ukraine free. I published several articles while in #Ukraine, linked below. In this long-ish thread, I cover drone operations. 1/20 🧵🇺🇦
2/ During my visit, I published a series of articles. These were at my Substack, Futura Doctrina, and can be read here: mickryan.substack.com/p/ukraine-disp…
Russia has employed missiles similar to Tomahawks since Day 1 of the full-scale invasion. This is NOT escalation. It is just leveling the playing field for a three-year-long Ukrainian long-range strike campaign that has now achieved critical mass and momentum. How have they done this? 1/16 🧵 🇺🇦 msn.com/en-us/news/wor…
2/ Back in 2022, when Ukraine received HIMARS, it changed the game. Ukraine could now hit Russia at depth. But it was clear even back then that Ukraine had bigger plans for making Russia hurt through even deeper strikes. mickryan.substack.com/p/striking-fur…
3/ By the 2nd half of 2023, Ukraine’s strategic aspirations for deep strike against Russia were clear. As I wrote back then, “throughout the war the Ukrainian Armed Forces have undertaken a range of adaptations to their force posture, structure and processes to enhance their operational effectiveness. Their development of more complex, long-range strike capabilities stands out.”
The last few years have seen many examples of wartime adaptation. This has occurred in #Ukraine as well as the Middle East. We have also seen nations in Europe, North America and Asia seek to learn and conduct peacetime adaptation. But there is a 3rd form of #adaptation that is crucial. 1/4 🧵
2/ This 3rd form of adaptation is that which occurs in the short period between peace and war: Peace to War Adaptation. It is important to understand this form of adaptation because it is the crucial process of learning and change that connects peacetime and wartime adaptation.
3/ The effectiveness or otherwise of Peace to War Adaptation can also influence the trajectory of a war. It is important to ensure governments, industry, the military and society are all prepared for such a rapid cognitive shift.
An initial assessment of the PLA parade that has just finished in Beijing. Overall, no major surprises although there were was some new equipment. The structure and content of the parade was pretty standard. Five key themes stood out for me however. 1/9 🧵
2/ Theme 1. Most of the weapons and platforms were not brand new, but generally, every land, air and sea platform was more modern than that in the inventories of western military organisations. Newer does not always mean better however. While most western military equipment has been tested in Iraq, #Ukraine and elsewhere, none of China's new kit has.
3/ Theme 2. The new weapons and platforms were interesting and demonstrate the ongoing, advanced military R&D eco-system that China now has. The Large Underwater Uncrewed Vessels, the uncrewed rotary wing aircraft and the HHQ-16C (HT @AlexLuck9), DF-61 and DF-31BJ missiles as well as the laser defence systems were new reveals by the PLA. I thought the UAV on the back of the Infantry Fighting Vehicle was interesting. Long gone are the days were China was reliant on Russia or other foreign systems. This level of indigenous capacity infers high levels of sustainability in any future conflict.