There is much in the war in #Ukraine we do not see. The struggle on the ground is dynamic, and the correlation of forces can be unclear. This makes predictions about the future trajectory of the war nearly impossible. 1/25 🧵
2/ However, there are certain variables which are likely to have a significant impact on the course of the war in 2023. I believe there are five key variables, which depending on the approaches of #Russia and #Ukraine, will shape this war in the coming year.
3/ Variable 1 is effective conservation of ammunition and the capacity of the west to increase defence production. The war in #Ukraine is the first in three decades to challenge post-Cold War defence industrial and strategic logistic models.
4/ Drawdowns of forces and consolidations of defence companies in the wake of the Cold War saw smaller military organisations demanding less equipment and ammunition, and stocking less, than had been the case for the preceding decades.
5/ But consumption rates in #Ukraine of precision munitions (anti-air and anti-tank missiles as well as ground attack rockets and missiles) has drastically reduced the munitions held by Ukraine, Russia and many of their allies and partners.
6/ For some, the solution is for the Ukrainians to ‘fight like Americans’ & use less ammunition. Given current shortfalls, this is part of the solution. washingtonpost.com/national-secur…
7/ But even with more conservative use of munitions, large amounts of ammunition will be required by Ukraine in offensives to take back occupied territory. The medium-term solution is to this to expand the production capacity of Western defence industry.
8/ So far, only the United States has indicated that it will do so – and this will not take effect for 6-12 months. Until then, more effective use of existing munitions stockpiles will be the rule. Fortunately, the Russians are facing similar problems. defensenews.com/pentagon/2022/…
9/ Variable 2. The next variable is the ability of #Ukraine & #Russia to mobilise, train and deploy its troops. Ukraine mobilised its forces early and has been constantly training regular and territorial forces for defensive and offensive operations.
10/ Reportedly mobilising around 700,000 troops, the Ukrainians have an advantage in numbers (at this point) as well as motivation for their soldiers. euronews.com/2022/05/21/liv…
11/ The Russians, after suffering massive losses in northern Ukraine, and the Donbas, finally undertook a ‘partial mobilisation’ from September last year. While initially chaotic, the Russians appear to have streamlined mobilisation of person to fight in Ukraine.
12/ The influx of tens of thousands of new Russian troops, and the potential mobilisation of more in 2023, presents a challenge for Ukrainian strategy moving into 2023. The ability for either side to most effectively mobilise their people is a key variable in the war.
13/ Variable 3 is the willingness of the west to provide more sophisticated ground and air offensive capabilities to Ukraine. The West has taken a stepped approach to providing sophisticated weapons, avoiding the provision of tanks, fighter aircraft and long-range missiles.
14/ Part of the theory for this is to ensure that training and logistics can be undertaken to ensure that the systems provided to Ukraine are supportable over the long term.
15/ But, there have also been some in the US and Europe who have seen the provision of more advanced weapons such as tanks and the long range ATACMS missile as escalatory. But, Ukraine can’t win this war by defensive operations only.
16/ A turning point in 2023 will be reached if the west flings off this unnecessary fear – what @EliotACohen has called ‘baloney realism’ - and gives Ukraine the offensive capability it needs to take back all of its territory. theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/…
17/ Variable 4. An interesting variable is the willingness of China to remain ‘neutral’ in this war. There are several reasons for China’s reticence including trade with the US, but its ‘neutrality’ so far has benefited Ukraine.
18/ China still imports Russian coal, LNG and oil, providing revenue for Putin’s regime. However, should the Chinese decide assisting Russia is more important than its trade relationship with America, it could see a significant shift in Russian fortunes. bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
19/ Variable 5. A final variable is the strategic leadership of @ZelenskyyUa, Putin & Biden – and their ability to nurture & sustain the will of their people. Putin’s direction launched this war, and Zelensky’s leadership has united a nation to resist the Russian onslaught.
20/ Biden’s #leadership has been vital in hardening western resolve and coordinating a steady flow of aid to Ukraine. In 2023, Biden & Zelensky will be under greater pressure, from Europe and some in the US Congress, to explore peaceful resolutions to the war.
21/ Putin, on the other hand, is playing for time, hoping that the west gradually tires of the war in 2023. The ability of Biden & Zelensky to keep Europe & America unified in its support for the Ukrainian war effort in 2023 will be a key variable in the year ahead.
22/ There are other variables that might also be considered in the coming year. These include how effective each side is in strategic influence operations, economic factors or the potential for events in the #IndoPacific to draw attention and resources from #Ukraine.
23/ Nothing in war is certain. Despite some very fine articles that have recently explored scenarios for 2023, we cannot predict future human actions or the outcome of this war.
24/ By exploring different variables however, we might be able to ascertain Russian weaknesses that can be exploited. We might also ensure that the right kinds and quantities of support are provided at the right time to #Ukraine in the coming year. End.
“The advantages of threatening an American ground intervention are real. The advantages of actually committing boots on the ground are also real but more limited. The disadvantages could be numerous.” My weekly update on Iran, Ukraine and the Pacific. 1/6 🧵
2/ Ukraine has achieved something significant in the south. Ukrainian attacks there have disrupted Russian offensive planning, consumed Russian reserve forces, and demonstrated that Ukrainian combined arms operations can impose genuine operational costs. But there is also a trade-off in these southern operations. Gains in the south have come at some cost to northern Donetsk, and Russian forces retain the initiative on what is Russia’s main effort on the ground: the envelopment of Ukraine’s fortress belt and the remainder of Donetsk.
3/ In Iran, the oldest lesson in strategy keeps surfacing: military success in the air and at sea does not automatically translate into political outcomes on the ground. Iran has not been beaten. The question being probably being considered in the Pentagon, Congress and the White House is whether ground forces would ensure that the military campaign achieves a decisive political outcome - or whether it would lead to a larger and more difficult American military commitment to the Middle East with uncertain results.
The latest update on drone and missile attacks on the UAE has just been released. With this as context, I thought I would share some initial insights arising from this Iranian retaliatory campaign and the overall war against #Iran. 1/9 🧵
2/ First, the battlespace is not transparent. It is highly visible but high visibility is not the same as high wisdom about what is seen. And we must not fall into the trap of assuming that we actually are seeing everything we need to see rather than what the enemy wants us to see. Finally, no tech can see into the hearts and minds of soldiers and combat leaders, especially when they are functioning under conditions of existential threat.
3/ Second, Understanding the enemy, and how resilient it is, matters. The Iranians have been preparing for this fight for decades, will have many caches of weapons and have strategised how this might play out. And assuming that a few bombs from the sky topple a regime (especially when it has never been achieved before) badly under estimated the Iranians.
"America & Iran are fighting two very different wars and have two different theories of victory. China & others in the authoritarian learning & adaptation bloc are observing closely & learning." An assessment of where we are, & who is learning from the Iran War. 1/6 🧵
2/ This assessment examines the two wars in and around Iran: the military campaign that Washington is fighting, and the economic campaign that Tehran is waging. It then asks the following question: what are the respective theories of victory, and how does that theory play out differently for each belligerent?
3/ A theory of victory is not simply a list of military objectives. It is a coherent account of how the application of military force produces a political outcome that endures. The Trump administration entered Operation Epic Fury with a theory of the means, and a range of constantly changing ends (at least in public). It might be able to use the military to win the war, but it is unclear whether it has a longer-term plan to win the peace.
Wars are never simple. Despite the efforts of governments, war resists the clarity, certainty & clever narratives supported by AI slop videos, we wish to impose on them. The #Iran war & developments in #Ukraine, were exemplars of this during the week. 1/7
2/ Welcome to my weekly update on war and strategic competition. This week, shifting strategic initiative in Ukraine, the war in Iran, politics in the Pacific & my Big 5 reading recommendations.
3/ In #Ukraine, Ukrainian forces achieved some of the most operationally significant gains of the past year, reclaiming territory in the south while striking deep into Russia’s military-industrial complex. Diplomacy continued its chaotic and erratic journey.
"At some point, Putin will have to reckon with the failure of his strategic bombing campaign against Ukraine’s cities to shift Ukraine’s political posture, and the slow-rolling military failure that is Russia’s bloody ground campaign." A comprehensive update of the big #Ukraine & Pacific issues this week. 1/6 🧵🇺🇦
2/ In Europe this week, the annual Munich Security Conference was held. Lots of interesting speeches, but not a lot of progress on ending the war in Ukraine.
And as Zelenskyy stated: "A lot of time now is spent on negotiations. We truly hope that the trilateral meetings next week will be serious, substantive, and helpful for all of us. But honestly – sometimes it feels like the sides are talking about completely different things."
3/ In Ukraine, the armed forces were able to undertake opportunistic counter attacks against Russian forces deprived of Starlink.
But otherwise, as I describe in my assessment of the trajectory of the war in 2026, "the brutal calculus of the past four-years will continue into 2026 unless there is a significant breakthrough in technology, tactics or strategy that changes the deep, close and rear aspects of the overall battlefield dynamic.
The only other thing that might significantly change the trajectory of the war is if there is a significant shift in political will in Kyiv or Moscow."
America has just released its 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS). Not seeing much press activity from the Dept of Defense/War on this. While I need time to ponder the deeper implications of the document, a few things stand out on first reading. 1/11 🧵
2/ First, the document is consistent with the 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) released by the Trump Administration in November 2025. Key priorities in the NDS align with the NSS, as you would expect. However, while the NSS has priorities, the NDS has "Lines of Effort". whitehouse.gov/wp-content/upl…
3/ There are four Lines of Effort in the new NDS:
1. Defend the U.S. Homeland. 2. Deter China in the Indo-Pacific Through Strength, Not Confrontation. 3. Increase Burden-Sharing with U.S. Allies and Partners. 4. Supercharge the U.S. Defense Industrial Base.