Just had our first run in with the "#TSLA Fan Boy Club" after posting a high-level back-of-the-envelope comps analysis to see what a reasonable valuation could look like.
Boy was that enough to set them off.
We found that there are 5 distinct types of Fan Boys, listed below👇
1) The ones who have clearly never seen nor even heard of 'valuation' or have any idea of how to derive it in the real world. Usually, they've done just enough Investopedia browsing to type words like 'margin' and 'growth', but that's it - these are the toughest type to deal with
2) The ones who may understand the basics, but who simply deny that Tesla has any competitors. They believe Tesla is the only auto co. on the planet and that any other view is so incredibly out of touch with reality, that ad hominem attacks are the only correct course of action
3) The hardliner "Tesla Fan Boy Party Line":
"Why don't you short if then?"
As if this statement alone is enough to justify a P/E ~20x higher than the highest competitor in the comp set... but that would assume they believe Tesla has competitors which they most assuredly do not
4) The straight-up ad hominem types... no mucking about from these lads, just right into it:
"You dumb f***ing inbred coward racist, etc. etc. etc."
They can get creative with the insults though, so kudos to them.
5) The ones who actually know a bit of what they're talking about, but got caught up in the mania and are now clearly at odds with what reality is showing to them. They still want to believe, so they oscillate between logic and fantasy. I actually like these types the best
Sad thing is, Tesla is a cool company and they've done something very few have ever been able to do: force large, established incumbents to rewrite their playbooks.
But, you can like a company and still disagree with its valuation, because good companies can still be overvalued.
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From @RogerHirst3 in our latest Lykeion Research publication
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1/18
There is huge uncertainty in wages (we know this because of the failure of the Phillips curve before COVID).
The Philips curve states that the lower the unemployment rate, the tighter the labor market, and therefore, firms must raise wages to attract scarce labor, which we have not seen yet.
Whilst there’s no dispute that the employment market is currently tight, what matters to policymakers is how strong the market really is. A tight labor market may not necessarily translate into higher wages and higher inflation if real wages continue to be negative.
Real wage destruction is rarely a good thing, and the longer this goes on the larger the impact to demand (this is only a good thing if you’re trying to kill inflation as it reduces demand).
However, this is not really sustainable as there’s a limit to which workers will accept being squeezed before demanding wage increases to at least offset inflation.
A short 🧵on Policy Credibility, A (Politically) Pragmatic Fed, Shorting JGBs, Brazil, and the Commodity Super Cycle
1- Policy Credibility Matters
“As of right now, there’s probably not that many signs of relief, so it looks like everything comes back to policy credibility controlling inflation expectations, which means they have to engineer a genuine foreign headline inflation. So as of
right now, it still feels like the hiking and the hawkishness will persist. I think in order to see a shift, we definitely need to see headline inflation roll over as the initial first condition. But obviously, we still don’t see that.”
"Looking back, QE was essentially monetary policy for the asset rich, with trickle -down benefits for the less wealthy."
"Asset price inflation on the back of traditional QE, and consumption growth on the back of fiscal QE (helicopter money), pushed the level of demand higher, and the pandemic and geopolitics have pushed the level of supply lower."
"If the origin of QE is to lean against deflation by generating asset price inflation (positive wealth effects), leaning against inflation must involve generating asset price deflation (negative wealth effects) – the core of Bill Dudley’s arguments."
A brief history of the US #Oil Export Ban and subsequent lifting in '15
With gas prices recently breaking ATHs, ‘the ban’ will likely be a heated topic going forward… likely once the energy secretary figures out just how much oil the country she represents consumes 👀
1/21
From ‘50 to ‘57, US production of crude increased by 33% while imports doubled as new cheap oil from the ME reached the market. Concerned about the nation’s growing dependence on imports, Congress authorized the Mandatory Oil Import Quota Program in '59, restricting imports. 2/21
From '59 until '70, domestic crude oil production increased by 2.6 mbpd, and net imports of oil increased by 0.4 million barrels per day. In '70, annual oil production peaked at 9.6mbpd. The program ended in '73. 3/21