Thread by @WarintheFuture

Earlier this week, I published a thread that was the first of two parts examining how #Ukraine and Russia might think about – and plan – the inevitable offensives to come in 2023. The #Gerasimov appointment pushed this second part back a couple of days! 1/25 🧵

2/ In Part 1, I proposed seven considerations for those planning these offensives: purpose; design; timing; location; resources; adaptation; & politics. I then examined the first 4 in detail. Today, I explore the final 3 considerations.
(Part 1👇)

https://twitter.com/WarintheFuture/status/1612943234598305793?s=20&t=1wC1ugsGip_9JazOEyPs-g

3/ Resources. Offensive operations are hugely expensive in recon assets (to find, fix and kill the enemy), artillery, armour and mobility support (engineers), logistics and air support. Multitudes of each, combined in Brigades, Divisions or Corps, will be needed.

4/ Follow on forces are also needed. Whether they are military police for traffic control, civil police and emergency services or reconstruction personnel, once territory and towns is liberated, Ukrainian government authority needs to be re-established.

5/ For Russia, part of assembling resources for 2023 has been their recent mobilisation efforts. While chaotic at times, they appear to have achieved some efficiencies, which has resulted in large numbers of mobilised troops being sent to the front.

https://twitter.com/nytopinion/status/1582080754204348416

6/ How these troops will be used is already becoming clear. In the withdrawal from Kherson, mobilised troops were often used as disposal rear guards as more valuable and elite formations withdrew across the Dnipro. kyivpost.com/post/5598

7/ And in the Battle of #Bakhmut, mobilised troops are used in human waves, essentially as ‘bullet catchers’ so other units behind them might be able to exploit any gains they make. We will probably see more of this in the campaigns to come.

8/ Ukraine too is recruiting troops as replacements as well as continuing to build new formations for 2023. These troops however appear to be getting a higher standard of training, including in NATO countries, and better equipment. This will be important in the battles of 2023.

9/ Strategic support will also be necessary for both sides. Ukrainian industry, and western aid donors, will be required to provide weapons, ammunition and other support for the current defensive campaign, as well as building up huge stocks for any offensive.

10/ The provision of newer IFVs and western tanks – as well as their support vehicles like recovery vehicles, engineer vehicles, fuel trucks and low loaders – will be critical aspects of this support, as will be the fuel and ammunition for them.

11/ If Ukraine is conducting break-in battles as part of its offensives, this armoured capability will be vital. But so will the provision of intelligence on Russia’s intentions, troop movements and logistic support. washingtonpost.com/world/2023/01/…

12/ As part of this support, western industry also needs to increase production of munitions.

13/ For the Russians, they are starting to run short on the munitions and weapons that were stockpiled over decades during the Cold War. Russia will have to increase the output of its defence industry and seek foreign sources of supply. politico.eu/article/russia…

14/ Adaptive Campaigning. Probing for opportunity is necessary even after planning is complete and an offensive has been launched. The Ukrainians – especially at the tactical level – have been superior to the Russians at recognising and exploiting battlefield opportunities.

15/ As a 2022 RUSI report notes, the Russians “are culturally vulnerable to deception because they lack the ability to rapidly fuse information, are culturally averse to providing those who are executing orders with the context to exercise judgement.” rusi.org/explore-our-re…

16/ The Ukrainians therefore have a greater capacity to deceive the Russians about main and supporting efforts, exploit opportunities where they appear, and to re-orient offensives (or conduct immediate subsequent operations) where possible.

17/ In every offensive both sides start by fighting ‘with’ information. As the battle develops, both sides fight ‘for’ information. With this they will seek heretofore unidentified opportunities to adapt to exploit weaknesses in their enemy’s plan, morale or scheme of maneuver.

18/ Politics. A final consideration, for both sides for their offensives in 2023 will be politics. As Clausewitz tells us: “War is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.”

19/ Every offensive in 2023 will be connected to the political situation. The recent installation of Gerasimov, while largely about Moscow politics, is also about Putin being impatient for battlefield victories. This will influence the timing and kind of Russian offensives.

20/ It is certainly an influence in the Ukrainian offensives to come. Possessing a healthy interplay of civil and military leaders (what @EliotACohen calls the unequal dialog) military endeavours have political objectives (liberation of Ukrainian territory).

21/ Politics also influences exploitation imits. In offensive operations ‘limit of exploitation’ is a line beyond which military commanders may not exploit the success of earlier stages of an attack.” In a major campaign, this won’t just be a military consideration.

22/ The Ukrainian President will be seeking a balance of reclaiming Ukrainian territory while retaining Western support. While the limits of Ukrainian military offensives may be governed by political and not just military issues, Zelensky has been clear on liberating all Ukraine.

23/ There have been many speculative articles on when offensives might occur in #Ukraine. My aim here is not to discuss exact timing or locations, but to discuss how campaign planners might think about the fight ahead.

24/ So, we are at a point where we await potential Ukrainian & Russian offensives in 2023. Over the winter both sides will have been preparing & shaping the environment for these offensives. There are many more battles to come before Ukraine liberates all its territory. End.

25/ Thank you to the following whose images and links were used in this thread: @DefenceU @IAPonomarenko @washingtonpost @APNews @KyivIndependent @POLITICOEurope @TDF_UA @Reuters @Militarylandnet @nytimes @MassDara