Russian sources reported that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near #Svatove on January 19. Russian forces continued limited counterattacks to regain lost positions near #Kreminna. isw.pub/UkrWar01192023
2/ Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a counteroffensive to capture #Novoselivske (15km northwest of #Svatove) and advanced to the railway station in the eastern part of the settlement.
3/ A milblogger said that Ukrainian forces are waiting for reinforcements to continue the counteroffensive to liberate #Kuzemivka (15km NW) of #Svatove), which they claimed is not under Ukrainian or Russian control, but ISW makes no assessments about future Ukrainian operations.
4/ Russian forces continued limited counterattacks near #Kreminna on January 19 with #Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai saying heavy fighting between Russian and Ukrainian forces on the outskirts of Kreminna and near Dibrova (5km SW of Kreminna). isw.pub/UkrWar01192023
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Ukrainian forces have previously employed a similar gradual attrition model to compel Russian operations in certain areas to culminate after months of suffering high personnel and equipment losses in pursuit of marginal tactical gains.🧵isw.pub/UkrWar012123
2/ Russian troops spent months attempting to grind through effective Ukrainian defenses in Severodonetsk and Lysychansk in the early summer of 2022 and captured Lysychansk only after a controlled Ukrainian withdrawal from the area.
3/ The capture of Lysychansk and the Luhansk Oblast administrative border, however, quickly proved to be operationally insignificant for Russian forces.
While the costs associated with Ukraine’s defense of Bakhmut are significant & likely include opportunity costs related to potential Ukrainian counter-offensive operations elsewhere, Ukraine would also have paid a significant price for allowing Russian troops to take it easily.🧵
2/ #Bakhmut itself is not operationally or strategically significant but had Russian troops taken it relatively rapidly and cheaply they could have hoped to expand operations in ways that could have forced #Ukraine to construct hasty defensive positions in less favorable terrain.
3/ One must also not dismiss the seemingly “political” calculus of committing to the defense of #Bakhmut lightly—Russian forces occupy over 100K sq km of Ukrainian territory including multiple Ukrainian cities & are inflicting atrocities on Ukrainian civilians in occupied areas.
The #Kremlin is likely intensifying its efforts to present #Russia’s invasion of #Ukraine as an existential war to set informational conditions for a protracted war in Ukraine. isw.pub/UkrWar012023
2/ Russian and social media sources circulated images on January 19 and 20 showing Russian officials installing air defense systems on the roof of the Russian Ministry of Defense building in Moscow and elsewhere near the city.
3/ The Kremlin likely deployed the air defense systems in Moscow to generate inflammatory images that portray the war as more threatening to the Russian public. isw.pub/UkrWar012023
The Wagner Group appears to be struggling to present itself as an effective parallel military structure, thus increasingly proving to be a parasitic paramilitary entity. isw.pub/UkrWar012023
2/ US intelligence confirmed the rivalry between the Russian Ministry of Defense and Wagner Group which @TheStudyofWar has long reported.
3/ Wagner Group financier Yevgeny #Prigozhin’s quest for legal recognition of the #Wagner Group may also trigger further factionalization within the Russian government.
The #Kremlin is intensifying its information operation to promote a false narrative that the war will escalate if #Ukraine receives weapons capable of striking Russian forces in occupied #Crimea. isw.pub/UkrWar01192023
2/ #Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded on January 19 to a @nytimes report that US officials are considering providing Kyiv with weapons capable of striking Russian military infrastructure in occupied #Crimea and southern #Ukraine. nytimes.com/2023/01/18/us/…
3/ Peskov stated that Western provisions of long-range weapons to #Ukraine that can threaten Russian forces in #Crimea will bring ”the conflict to a new qualitative level, which will not go well for global and pan-European security.”
The most dangerous course of action (MDCOA) of a new Russian attack against #Ukraine from #Belarus in early 2023 seems less likely given current Russian military activity in Belarus. A new MDCOA of an attack from Belarus in late 2023 seems more plausible, though still unlikely.🧵
2/ Russian forces currently deployed in #Belarus are undergoing training rotations and redeploying to fight in eastern #Ukraine.
3/ There are no observed indicators that Russian forces in #Belarus have the command and control structures necessary for the winter or spring 2023 attack against #Ukraine about which Ukrainian issued warnings in late 2022.