(1/24) #NewcastleUnited / #NUFC have the richest owners in football. But how much can the club spend in the summer of 23’? In this 🧵 I will explain why it can be estimated that spending will be limited to buying 3.5 Alexander Isaks during the summer of 23' under the new #FSR.
(2/24) This is under the assumption that Newcastle finish top 4 this season. I mark the quality of my forecast on #FFP compliance on a scale from 1-10 depending on available information. In this case, the mark is a generous 2, since 21/22 Annual Accounts are unavailable.
(3/24) The significant rules Newcastle must comply with in the new FSR are the #FootballEarningsRule (hereinafter "FER") and the #SquadCostRule (hereinafter "SCR"). Let’s first look at the FER.
(4/24) UEFA’s licensing system is backward-looking. Hence, Newcastle’s spending in the summer of 23’, impacts its license in 24’. The FER monitor period reviewed in 24’ covers the 22/23 season and the 23/24 season.
(5/24) To ensure compliance in 24', Newcastle must in the summer of 23' determine its outcome from 22/23 and prepare a budget for 23/24 based on a forecast for its financials from that season. Since we do not have any 22/23 data, we must forecast both 22/23 and 23/24 seasons.
(6/24) The basis for our forecast will constitute on the information provided by (a) Deloitte in its Football Money League (in EUR) for #NUFC:
(7/24) (b) OffThePitch’s PL forecast for 21/22 (in Sterling) for Newcastle:
(8/24) So what has happened on the income side for Newcastle that we must adjust for in our forecast? Without CL/EL, Match Day revenue is fairly stable. We will apply ordinary growth to it. The item the new owner can impact is Commercial income.
(9/24) We know that Newcastle has added a 7.5m sponsorship deal with noon.com.
(10/24) For next season, a new kit sponsor is expected to bring in app. an additional 30m/y.
(11/24) On the cost side, the cost for both amortization and wages have of course risen because of a net 136m spend on transfers in the summer of 22'. Shelvey, Ritchie, and Karius are out of contract in the summer of 23'. Adjustments shall be made.
(12/24) As a result, we get the following forecast under the #FootballEarningsRule for #NUFC, meaning that the Club theoretically could incur additional costs for the 23/24 season of £147m:
(13/24) But what about costs for training ground, stadium and what not – financed and paid for by the owners? I do not speculate on them – but it does not impact the bottom line (!). These would be “Relevant Investments”, which can be deducted under the FER.
(14/24) So what does “incurring additional costs of £147m” mean? Can Newcastle spend 147m on players? No.
(15/24) Buying a player impacts Newcastle’s costs for 23/24 in two ways. (1) The players amortization cost. The amortization cost is the transfer fee divided with the length of the contract the player gets. (2) The players wage.
(16/24) Newcastle paid 70m for Isak, who got a 6-year deal under which he makes 6.25m per year. Hence buying one “Isak” costs Newcastle 18.25m per season, meaning that they theoretically could buy app. 8.2 players with costing as much as Isak under the Football Earnings Rule.
(17/24) That is a lot (but we must still look at the Squad Cost Rule...). What stands out with Newcastle’s financials is that the club has – very – slim costs besides direct squad costs, just 20m. In comparison, #MUFC has £156m costs under the same items.
(18/24) Over to the #SquadCostRule, under which a licensee’s Squad Cost Ratio for the licence season must be no greater than the defined limit of 70%. What is the Squad Cost Ratio? It is basically calculated as follows on a 12-month basis:
(19/24) The SCR is however implemented in three steps, 31 December 2023 the defined limit is 90%, in 2024 its 80% and in 2025 its 70%.
(20/24) Newcastle has a big squad already and will buy players. When calculating how much Newcastle can spend under the SCR, we will not get an illustrative result if we do not include any income from Newcastle selling players.
(21/24) Assuming that Newcastle will sell players for 35m, we get the following result under the Squad Cost Rule:
(22/24) As a result, we can see that the amount of costs Newcastle can incur in the summer of 2023 will be limited by the SCR (£63m) as opposed to the FER (£147m). Without having done the exact SCR math on all top 7 clubs, I believe NUFC is impacted the most by the SCR.
(23/24) Other clubs simple have – much – higher other costs, meaning that they will record a loss and violate the FER if they spend more than 80/90% on the Squad. At least a club like #MUFC with huge financing costs and more than 1,000 employees, can't have a ratio above 75-80%.
(24/24) So what does it mean, that #NUFC can incur an additional 63m in costs in the summer of 2023? By the same principles as set out in tweet (16/24), it means that Newcastle could buy 3.5 “Alexander Isaks”.
I do not have the biggest Twitter following, so if you liked this thread, please retweet and follow if you want more. Will make a thread per day for the foreseeable future.
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(1/40) #CFC’s strategy signing long contacts to lessen the #FFP impact is much covered. In this 🧵, it is explained how #Boehly’s FFP strategy has enabled #CFC to spend £68.5m more than rival clubs in compliance with FFP – and it has nothing to do with the length of contracts.💣
(2/40) In 2022, the new FFP rules -- #FinancialSustainabilityRegulation / #FSR – entered into force. FSR is described as FFP, but with teeth. So how can #ChelseaFC spend 490m? As a shrewd PE investor, #Boehly will have simulated different strategies, and...
(3/40) …the path chosen by #Bohely is of course the one deemed the most beneficial for #CFC. As shown in the following, it will however impose austerity on CFC for coming years.
(1/24) The Glazers have decided to not back ETH this January window while the #MUFC faithful are seeing all rivals do the opposite. But in this 🧵 we look into how much #MUFC possible could spend in the summer under the new #FFP rules with #GlazersOut. #BestCaseScenario
(2/24) In this best-case scenario, we assume that the club (a) is cleared from debt, (b) deadwood including Maguire, McTominay, Henderson and AWB are sold for a total of 80m, and (c) #United finish top 4. #BuckleUp
(3/24) I mark the quality of my forecast on a scale from 1-10 depending on available information. In this case, the mark is a 7, since Manchester United plc has published both the annual accounts for 21/22 and the Q1 report for 22/23.
(1/22) On the pitch this year, #Arsenal is drawing comparisons to the #Invincibles, but success in games also means big profits. In this 🧵, I will explain how this would mean that #AFC could afford to buy 3.1 “Mudryk” in the summer of 2023 under the new #FFP (#FSR). #Gunners
(2/22) This is under the assumption that #Gunners win the Premier League this season. A potential Caicedo signing is currently up in the air, but would impact the financials roughly the same as a summer signing.
(3/22) I mark the quality of my forecast on a scale from 1-10 depending on available information. In this case, the mark is a generous 2, since we do not have access to the 21/22 Annual Accounts.
(1/19) Napoli are investigated for accounting fraud due to structuring the acquisition of Victor Osimehn to cheat the #FFP / #FSR. How was this done? Will it be stopped, or can it be used by others? No it is not stopped, and yes it can be used. A 🧵
(2/19) It is widely reported that Napoli bought Osimehn for €72m, which also explains their high asking price for him. This is not entirely true. Napoli acquired Osimehn for a cash payment of €52m and the registration rights to four players – assigned a value of €20m.
(3/19) Who were these players? Back-up GK Orestis Karnezis (€10m) and youth players Claudio Manzi, Ciro Palmieri and Luigi Liguori (€10m in total). Karnezis played 90 minutes and the kids never got anywhere. ilmattino.it/sport/sscnapol…
(1/8) More reports on potential private Saudi interest in buying United today. The likely bidder behind those reports is Mohamed Al-Khereiji, who runs “Saudi Media Company for Advertising” (not “Saudi Media Group”). So who is Al-Khereiji? arabnews.com/node/1769781/a…
(2/8) Not much is known about him or the SMCA. Except that they are fairly rich. However — any bid by them must have heavy backing, they are not “that” rich. But with the right connections, access to a lot of funds could be obtained in the SA/ME.
(3/8) The SMCA are said to have submitted an offer worth £2.7bn to buy the Chelsea, of which Al-Khereiji supposedly is a fan… The bid was rejected due to a formality (too extensive DD).
(1/60) As promised, here is a thread on how the Top 6 in the Premier League will be impacted by the new Financial Sustainability Regulation (FSR), expected to have a dramatic impact on the summer transfer window of 2023. #MUFC#LFC#Spurs#ManCity#Arsenal#CFC#FSR
(2/60) Unfortunately, my threads tend to get really long, but the subject is complicated, so you have to bear with me to get through this. First, we will look at the relevant rules of the FSR (i.e. the “new” FFP rules).
(3/60) After that, we will look at the forecast of each Club, starting from the bottom. Lastly, we will cover the quality of each forecast, since that differ due to available information, and I will also add some thoughts on the margins of error.